Reading: Sartre, “Ethics without Religion”, pp. 622-629
Reading Guide: The editors give a nice overview of Sartre on p. 622. Sartre was an atheist and an existentialist. For Sartre, “existence precedes essence”; the “first principle” of existentialism is that “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself”(622). Since there is no God, there is no such thing as a “human nature” & thus man’s actions are not determined (625). Man is radically free. Even though we can no longer claim that man is “made in God’s image”, man still has “a greater dignity than inanimate objects and other living organisms. See p. 623 for the source of our dignity. A crucial early passage is on p. 623: “When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses all men”. Be aware that sometimes what Sartre means is not immediately evident; you think he means one thing, then discover a little later that he couldn’t have meant what you initially thought he meant. So, tag any claims that seem extraordinary or jump out at you and keep those in mind as you read further. On pp. 623-626, Sartre discusses the implications of man’s radical freedom – anguish, forlornness, and despair. Note that his definitions of forlornness and despair seem to have no psychological component. His discussion of anguish is more overtly psychological. Note also that in his discussion of anguish, he makes use of an idea that seems very similar to Kant’s universal law test. While we might think that anguish is paralyzing, Sartre maintains that “it is not a curtain separating us from action, but is part of action itself” (624). In the section on forlornness, Sartre discusses the implications of the recognition that God does not exist. I think this section is pretty straightforward. Note especially his discussion of the example of the young man who was struggling to decide whether to decamp to England and fight with the French Free Forces or instead to stay at home with his mother whose psychological health seemed to depend on his presence. From the bottom of p. 626 through p. 629, Sartre identifies and responds to 3 objections to his position. All 3 of these objections seem to stem from the concern that existentialism makes our choices arbitrary. In response to the objection that the basis of choice is anarchic, Sartre argues that the basis of choice is not caprice or whim; he compares making ethical choices to painting a work of art. Neither the painter nor the moral agent acts arbitrarily. Second, he agrees that there’s a sense in which “we are unable to pass judgment on others”, but maintains that there’s also a sense in which the existentialist can judge others, both epistemically and morally. Still, the kind of moral judgment that the existentialist can pass on others’ ethically significant choices is not likely to satisfy the objector. Third, he responds to the objection that “values aren’t serious” if existentialism is true. Finally, he explains the sense in which existentialism is a humanism and the sense in which it is not a humanism.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Sunday, May 2, 2010
L38 Reading Guide
Reading: Aquinas, "Ethics and Natural Law", pp. 619-621. This reading consists of two excerpts from Aquinas. The first excerpt is from The Summa Theologica Question 94, Article 2. Your text has omitted a couple of paragraphs from the beginning of Q94, Article 2, but otherwise, the excerpt is intact. Please go to www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm to read Article 2 of Question 94 in its entirety. When I printed it out, it was 2 full pages. I presume that the second excerpt is also from The Summa, but I could not find the exact reference (googling key phrases didn't help, probably because this is an updated translation). It doesn't appear to be from Q94.
Reading Guide: First Excerpt: The question of Article 2 is "Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?". Aquinas begins, as is his wont, by stating 3 objections (see online text). He then indicates his own position ("On the contrary"). Finally, he begins to explain his position beginning at "I answer that". (If you're reading in your textbook, the words "I answer that" are deleted, but everything that follows those words is included in your text. However, the 3 objections and the "On the contrary" that precede "I answer that" are not included.) He invokes a distinction between practical reason and speculative or theoretical/demonstrative reason. He notes that both practical reason and speculative reason start from first principles, principles that are self-evidently true and are not subject to demonstration. Propositions (statements) may be self-evidently true in themselves, but not self-evidently true to us. (I think our earlier reading on Aquinas explained this.) Some propositions that are self-evidently true (or "self-known") are self-evident to all. Others are self-evident only to the wise. Aquinas gives examples of each of these. The first principle of speculative reason is the principle of noncontradiction, "It is not proper at once to affirm and to deny". The first principle of practical (action-guiding reason) is "The good is what all desire". From this principle, it is a short step to the first principle of natural law. I'll let you read it for yourself. Aquinas then tells us that reason helps us determine what things are goods and what things are evils (things to be avoided) -- see the text for the criteria. Having articulated the standard of goods and evils, he examines our natural inclinations, which he divides into 3 sources: inclinations we share with all substances, inclinations we "share with other animals", and inclinations that have their source in our rational and social nature. (You may recognize Aristotle's influence here.) This marks the end of Article 2.
Second Excerpt: This excerpt begins at the bottom of p. 620 in your book (right after the ...). In this excerpt, Aquinas reminds us that "every judgment of practical reason issue(s) from certain naturally known principles". He then says that although "all moral rules belong to the law of nature", they do not "all" belong to the law of nature "in the same way" (621). He divides moral rules into 3 types, based on how accessible they are. The most accessible moral rules "belong in an unqualified way to the law of nature".
Reading Guide: First Excerpt: The question of Article 2 is "Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?". Aquinas begins, as is his wont, by stating 3 objections (see online text). He then indicates his own position ("On the contrary"). Finally, he begins to explain his position beginning at "I answer that". (If you're reading in your textbook, the words "I answer that" are deleted, but everything that follows those words is included in your text. However, the 3 objections and the "On the contrary" that precede "I answer that" are not included.) He invokes a distinction between practical reason and speculative or theoretical/demonstrative reason. He notes that both practical reason and speculative reason start from first principles, principles that are self-evidently true and are not subject to demonstration. Propositions (statements) may be self-evidently true in themselves, but not self-evidently true to us. (I think our earlier reading on Aquinas explained this.) Some propositions that are self-evidently true (or "self-known") are self-evident to all. Others are self-evident only to the wise. Aquinas gives examples of each of these. The first principle of speculative reason is the principle of noncontradiction, "It is not proper at once to affirm and to deny". The first principle of practical (action-guiding reason) is "The good is what all desire". From this principle, it is a short step to the first principle of natural law. I'll let you read it for yourself. Aquinas then tells us that reason helps us determine what things are goods and what things are evils (things to be avoided) -- see the text for the criteria. Having articulated the standard of goods and evils, he examines our natural inclinations, which he divides into 3 sources: inclinations we share with all substances, inclinations we "share with other animals", and inclinations that have their source in our rational and social nature. (You may recognize Aristotle's influence here.) This marks the end of Article 2.
Second Excerpt: This excerpt begins at the bottom of p. 620 in your book (right after the ...). In this excerpt, Aquinas reminds us that "every judgment of practical reason issue(s) from certain naturally known principles". He then says that although "all moral rules belong to the law of nature", they do not "all" belong to the law of nature "in the same way" (621). He divides moral rules into 3 types, based on how accessible they are. The most accessible moral rules "belong in an unqualified way to the law of nature".
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
L37 Reading Guide, MacIntyre
Reading: MacIntyre, Which God Ought we to Obey?, pp. 612-618
Reading Guide: The editors provide a summary of MacIntyre’s position, but not much detail. Most of you have probably encountered this question at some point: Are actions right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right? The Divine Command theorist argues that actions are right because God commands them. MacIntyre rejects the Divine Command theory, but tries to preserve some notion of the independence of God the lawgiver.
In the first section (The Nature of God’s Commands), MacIntyre begins with Freud’s “psychologically primitive version of the relation between beliefs about” morality and “beliefs about divine commands”, where the father’s commands are interpreted by the child as having divine authority. He contrasts “the God of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures” with the child’s vision of her father as god and with Jupiter. MacIntyre then considers whether it could be “right for someone to obey (the Jewish or Christian God -RS) and yet also to have justified regrets for so doing”, to be “divided in feelings and will” (613, 614). He contrasts R.M. Adams’ modified divine command theory with Occam’s unmodified divine command theory. Although MacIntyre is not a divine command theorist, he sides with Occam here: “it is logically impossible that it should be true of any action both that it is commanded by God and that it would not be wrong not to do it” (614). MacIntyre believes that both Occam and Adams have impoverished “moral theories”, theories that “are unlikely to be able to distinguish adequately between the claims to human allegiance made in the name of a variety of gods who allegedly issue commands to us” (614). After discussing what’s wrong with Adams’ view, he turns to the question of what assumption(s) we would need to add in order to “derive the conclusion ‘We ought to do what God commands’” (614). In the second section (Why Only Just Commands are Worthy of Obedience), he identifies the “crucial concept that is characteristically missing from divine command theories” (614). In the final section (How We Acquired our Understanding of a Just God), he discusses 3 historical stages of the concept of the divine; he may mean this historical story to apply only to Western civilization, for the 1st stage is recognizably that of ancient Greece. Each of the 3 stages represents “ideal types”, which I take to be his way of saying that he is not presenting his analysis of these stages or the transitions between stages as an accurate, complete historical account. I think it’s pretty clear what the difference is between a stage 1 (or “episode” 1) conception of the divine and a stage 2 conception of the divine. The stage 3 conception of the divine is of the Jewish or Christian God OR a god like the J-C God in important respects. The first paragraph of MacIntyre’s discussion of Stage 3 is quite important; this paragraph gives a good description of MacIntyre’s own position on the relationship between morality and divine commands. The last sentence of the paragraph is especially important. On p. 617, MacIntyre makes a claim that will probably seem surprising, especially if you raced through the previous paragraphs on Stage 3: “From the fact that we can at one stage in our progress towards God evaluate the divine claims, using a standard of justice acquired and elaborated independently of the knowledge of God, it does not follow that in so doing we are judging the Word of God by something external to it.” If you read Section 3 carefully (including the remaining few paragraphs), I think you’ll see why he says this.
Reading Guide: The editors provide a summary of MacIntyre’s position, but not much detail. Most of you have probably encountered this question at some point: Are actions right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right? The Divine Command theorist argues that actions are right because God commands them. MacIntyre rejects the Divine Command theory, but tries to preserve some notion of the independence of God the lawgiver.
In the first section (The Nature of God’s Commands), MacIntyre begins with Freud’s “psychologically primitive version of the relation between beliefs about” morality and “beliefs about divine commands”, where the father’s commands are interpreted by the child as having divine authority. He contrasts “the God of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures” with the child’s vision of her father as god and with Jupiter. MacIntyre then considers whether it could be “right for someone to obey (the Jewish or Christian God -RS) and yet also to have justified regrets for so doing”, to be “divided in feelings and will” (613, 614). He contrasts R.M. Adams’ modified divine command theory with Occam’s unmodified divine command theory. Although MacIntyre is not a divine command theorist, he sides with Occam here: “it is logically impossible that it should be true of any action both that it is commanded by God and that it would not be wrong not to do it” (614). MacIntyre believes that both Occam and Adams have impoverished “moral theories”, theories that “are unlikely to be able to distinguish adequately between the claims to human allegiance made in the name of a variety of gods who allegedly issue commands to us” (614). After discussing what’s wrong with Adams’ view, he turns to the question of what assumption(s) we would need to add in order to “derive the conclusion ‘We ought to do what God commands’” (614). In the second section (Why Only Just Commands are Worthy of Obedience), he identifies the “crucial concept that is characteristically missing from divine command theories” (614). In the final section (How We Acquired our Understanding of a Just God), he discusses 3 historical stages of the concept of the divine; he may mean this historical story to apply only to Western civilization, for the 1st stage is recognizably that of ancient Greece. Each of the 3 stages represents “ideal types”, which I take to be his way of saying that he is not presenting his analysis of these stages or the transitions between stages as an accurate, complete historical account. I think it’s pretty clear what the difference is between a stage 1 (or “episode” 1) conception of the divine and a stage 2 conception of the divine. The stage 3 conception of the divine is of the Jewish or Christian God OR a god like the J-C God in important respects. The first paragraph of MacIntyre’s discussion of Stage 3 is quite important; this paragraph gives a good description of MacIntyre’s own position on the relationship between morality and divine commands. The last sentence of the paragraph is especially important. On p. 617, MacIntyre makes a claim that will probably seem surprising, especially if you raced through the previous paragraphs on Stage 3: “From the fact that we can at one stage in our progress towards God evaluate the divine claims, using a standard of justice acquired and elaborated independently of the knowledge of God, it does not follow that in so doing we are judging the Word of God by something external to it.” If you read Section 3 carefully (including the remaining few paragraphs), I think you’ll see why he says this.
Monday, April 26, 2010
L36 Reading Guide
Reading: Hick, “Religious Pluralism”, pp. 597-604
Reading Guide
Note: This is not a reading to try to rush through. You’ll get more out of it by reading it a bit more slowly.
The editors provide an overview of Hick’s position. Hick rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism.
Hick begins by noting that how we understand religious life affects the kinds of questions we ask about religion. From a traditional way of thinking about religion, the obvious question is “which is the true religion?” (p. 598). For Hick, however, this is not the right question, for it implies that one religion has special epistemic status; that is, one religion has dibs on the truth. On p. 599, he criticizes inclusivism, suggesting that “the old dogma (e.g., in Rahner’s case, Christianity) … has … been so emptied of content as no longer to be worth affirming”. Moreover, Hick thinks it is obvious that inclusivism is “logically” unstable (599). Rather, he thinks we should embrace pluralism. His initial definition of pluralism does not sufficiently distinguish pluralism from inclusivism, but the key difference is that for a pluralist there is no privileged access to the divine. He attributes the Christian’s unwillingness to substitute pluralism for inclusivism to “the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation, together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity” (599). On p. 600, he outlines what he takes to be “an acceptable Christian route to religious pluralism”. Here, he contrasts “all-or-nothing Christologies” (or substance Christologies) with “degree Christologies”. He notes that these “degree Christologies” have the “unintended consequence” of removing a barrier to Christians accepting pluralism. From pp. 601-604, Hick makes it clearer what pluralism commits one to and presents considerations that he thinks support pluralism. He admits that we have no “cosmic vision” that can establish that there is one Reality that all religions are tapping into. So, the pluralist cannot KNOW that all religions are accessing ultimate reality or that there even is an ultimate reality. He also admits that “religious experience is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis”. However, if one “treat(s) one’s own form of religious experience … as an experience of transcendent divine Reality … one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience” (601). Pluralism, rather than exclusivism or inclusivism, provides the best account of this diversity. On p. 602, Hick distinguishes between the Real an sich and “the Real as humanly experienced and thought”. He gives multiple examples of religions that make this distinction. He then distinguishes between religions that are personal (that appeal to a Deity or God) and religions that are non-personal (appeal to the Absolute). In large part, we can account for religious diversity by the fact that we cannot experience the Real as it is in itself, but must encounter it through the lens of our “conceptual framework”.
Reading Guide
Note: This is not a reading to try to rush through. You’ll get more out of it by reading it a bit more slowly.
The editors provide an overview of Hick’s position. Hick rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism.
Hick begins by noting that how we understand religious life affects the kinds of questions we ask about religion. From a traditional way of thinking about religion, the obvious question is “which is the true religion?” (p. 598). For Hick, however, this is not the right question, for it implies that one religion has special epistemic status; that is, one religion has dibs on the truth. On p. 599, he criticizes inclusivism, suggesting that “the old dogma (e.g., in Rahner’s case, Christianity) … has … been so emptied of content as no longer to be worth affirming”. Moreover, Hick thinks it is obvious that inclusivism is “logically” unstable (599). Rather, he thinks we should embrace pluralism. His initial definition of pluralism does not sufficiently distinguish pluralism from inclusivism, but the key difference is that for a pluralist there is no privileged access to the divine. He attributes the Christian’s unwillingness to substitute pluralism for inclusivism to “the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation, together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity” (599). On p. 600, he outlines what he takes to be “an acceptable Christian route to religious pluralism”. Here, he contrasts “all-or-nothing Christologies” (or substance Christologies) with “degree Christologies”. He notes that these “degree Christologies” have the “unintended consequence” of removing a barrier to Christians accepting pluralism. From pp. 601-604, Hick makes it clearer what pluralism commits one to and presents considerations that he thinks support pluralism. He admits that we have no “cosmic vision” that can establish that there is one Reality that all religions are tapping into. So, the pluralist cannot KNOW that all religions are accessing ultimate reality or that there even is an ultimate reality. He also admits that “religious experience is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis”. However, if one “treat(s) one’s own form of religious experience … as an experience of transcendent divine Reality … one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience” (601). Pluralism, rather than exclusivism or inclusivism, provides the best account of this diversity. On p. 602, Hick distinguishes between the Real an sich and “the Real as humanly experienced and thought”. He gives multiple examples of religions that make this distinction. He then distinguishes between religions that are personal (that appeal to a Deity or God) and religions that are non-personal (appeal to the Absolute). In large part, we can account for religious diversity by the fact that we cannot experience the Real as it is in itself, but must encounter it through the lens of our “conceptual framework”.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Reading Guide L35 -- Rahner, Dalai Lama
Reading: Rahner, “Religious Inclusivism”, pp. 588-595 & Dalai Lama, “Buddhism and Other Religions”, pp. 577-581
Note: The primary reading for next class is Rahner; the Dalai Lama piece is meant to complement the Rahner reading. The editors give a good summary of the Dalai Lama “interview” (I’m not sure it’s a real interview). The editors also give a good overview of Rahner, but I will add a few observations here.
Reading Guide to Rahner: The first few paragraphs of the Rahner are, if read too quickly, hard to understand, but the next few pages are much easier. Rahner begins by noting that Catholics (and, indeed, all Christians) can no longer ignore the fact of religious diversity. Given cross-cultural influence, the issue of how to respond to religious pluralism (the fact that there are so many different, incompatible religions) is more pressing than ever. He then discusses how Christians should respond to this fact. In the section titled First Thesis, he acknowledges that Christianity was not always “the religion which binds men to God”; he then argues that although Christianity is “the absolute and only religion for all men”, it is not the case that all men are now under an “absolute obligation” to encounter God through Christianity. He contrasts this position with the “normal” or traditional position on Christianity, which says that from the time of the Apostles, all are bound to approach God through Christ; the implication of this normal position is that anyone who does not acquire “saving faith” in Christ is condemned. Second Thesis: prior to the point where Christianity is an absolute obligation, non-Christian religions are lawful (see the text for what he means). This section of the article repays close reading. It will help to notice that Rahner is making a few important assumptions: (a) Christianity, properly understood, commits the faithful to believing that God desires that all men be saved and thus provides adequate opportunity for each to be saved; (b) if (a) is true, then that implies that Christianity cannot always and everywhere be the only way to achieve salvation; (c) religion is inherently a social phenomenon, at least as it has been and is in practice a social institution. Rahner is also making implicit assumptions about how a just God would interact with men and about the conditions of being morally responsible for having rejected God. Third Thesis: Christians should regard members of non-Christian religions as “anonymous Christians”. Nonetheless, Christians should still proselytize. Fourth Thesis: it is not presumptuous, but humble, to view non-Christian believers as “anonymous Christians”; we should not expect religious diversity to die out any time soon.
As is perhaps evident from this reading guide, the most difficult part of the reading is the Second Thesis; this is also the meatiest part of the reading.
Note: The primary reading for next class is Rahner; the Dalai Lama piece is meant to complement the Rahner reading. The editors give a good summary of the Dalai Lama “interview” (I’m not sure it’s a real interview). The editors also give a good overview of Rahner, but I will add a few observations here.
Reading Guide to Rahner: The first few paragraphs of the Rahner are, if read too quickly, hard to understand, but the next few pages are much easier. Rahner begins by noting that Catholics (and, indeed, all Christians) can no longer ignore the fact of religious diversity. Given cross-cultural influence, the issue of how to respond to religious pluralism (the fact that there are so many different, incompatible religions) is more pressing than ever. He then discusses how Christians should respond to this fact. In the section titled First Thesis, he acknowledges that Christianity was not always “the religion which binds men to God”; he then argues that although Christianity is “the absolute and only religion for all men”, it is not the case that all men are now under an “absolute obligation” to encounter God through Christianity. He contrasts this position with the “normal” or traditional position on Christianity, which says that from the time of the Apostles, all are bound to approach God through Christ; the implication of this normal position is that anyone who does not acquire “saving faith” in Christ is condemned. Second Thesis: prior to the point where Christianity is an absolute obligation, non-Christian religions are lawful (see the text for what he means). This section of the article repays close reading. It will help to notice that Rahner is making a few important assumptions: (a) Christianity, properly understood, commits the faithful to believing that God desires that all men be saved and thus provides adequate opportunity for each to be saved; (b) if (a) is true, then that implies that Christianity cannot always and everywhere be the only way to achieve salvation; (c) religion is inherently a social phenomenon, at least as it has been and is in practice a social institution. Rahner is also making implicit assumptions about how a just God would interact with men and about the conditions of being morally responsible for having rejected God. Third Thesis: Christians should regard members of non-Christian religions as “anonymous Christians”. Nonetheless, Christians should still proselytize. Fourth Thesis: it is not presumptuous, but humble, to view non-Christian believers as “anonymous Christians”; we should not expect religious diversity to die out any time soon.
As is perhaps evident from this reading guide, the most difficult part of the reading is the Second Thesis; this is also the meatiest part of the reading.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
L34 Reading Guide (Griffiths)
Reading: Griffiths, “The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines”, pp. 581-587
Reminder: Matt Reynolds is presenting tomorrow.
Recommendation: Since Griffiths refers a couple of times to pluralism, you may find it helpful to read the editors’ introduction to this section (pp. 573-576) or at least to read the description on p. 575 of pluralism. Each of the 3 philosophical articles (defending, respectively, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), refers to at least one of the other two positions.
Reading Guide: Using examples drawn from both Christianity and Buddhism, Griffiths discusses “the five most important dimensions of religious doctrine” (582). Religious doctrines serve as community rules, determine community boundaries (who is part of the community & who isn’t), shape and are shaped by “the spiritual experience of the communities that profess them” (583), “make members” through education and evangelism, and express what the community takes to be “salvifically significant truths” (585). Given these functions or dimensions of religious doctrines, one should not expect religious communities to abandon their universalist and exclusivist claims unless one can offer them “vital and pressing reasons” for doing so. Griffiths concludes with a short section on the uniqueness of Christianity, but he could just as easily have concluded with a section on the uniqueness of Buddhism, Islam, or some other religion. Those of you who have taken Comparative Religions or have direct experience of some other religious tradition should feel free to bring up examples of doctrines within those traditions that serve one or more of the functions listed above.
Reminder: Matt Reynolds is presenting tomorrow.
Recommendation: Since Griffiths refers a couple of times to pluralism, you may find it helpful to read the editors’ introduction to this section (pp. 573-576) or at least to read the description on p. 575 of pluralism. Each of the 3 philosophical articles (defending, respectively, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), refers to at least one of the other two positions.
Reading Guide: Using examples drawn from both Christianity and Buddhism, Griffiths discusses “the five most important dimensions of religious doctrine” (582). Religious doctrines serve as community rules, determine community boundaries (who is part of the community & who isn’t), shape and are shaped by “the spiritual experience of the communities that profess them” (583), “make members” through education and evangelism, and express what the community takes to be “salvifically significant truths” (585). Given these functions or dimensions of religious doctrines, one should not expect religious communities to abandon their universalist and exclusivist claims unless one can offer them “vital and pressing reasons” for doing so. Griffiths concludes with a short section on the uniqueness of Christianity, but he could just as easily have concluded with a section on the uniqueness of Buddhism, Islam, or some other religion. Those of you who have taken Comparative Religions or have direct experience of some other religious tradition should feel free to bring up examples of doctrines within those traditions that serve one or more of the functions listed above.
Sunday, April 18, 2010
L33 Reading Guide (Dawkins)
Reading: Dawkins, “Science Discredits Religion”, pp. 523-526
Optional Link (if you’re interested in seeing more about a Catholic perspective on evolution): http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05654a.htm
Reading Guide: This is a short, clear reading. Unlike Gould, Dawkins is not at all conciliatory to religious belief. After arguing that religion has no “special expertise to offer us on moral questions”, he argues that the Pope’s message on evolution itself intrudes into the domain of science. (The passage he quotes here is the passage I referred to or quoted in class last time.) He then identifies other ways in which the Catholic Church intrudes into the domain of science. Basically, he denies that religion and science inhabit separate domains - at least in practice. As you read, think about how Gould might respond to Dawkins’ claims and how Christians might respond to Dawkins.
Terminology: Some of you may be unfamiliar with the term “speciesism”. The term, as you will gather, is derogatory; those who believe that humans are importantly different from the rest of the animal kingdom and therefore deserving of special consideration are referred to as “speciesists” by animal rights activists, some evolutionists, and others who see no morally significant difference between human beings and other animals. Such critics compare those who invest species with special significance to racists and sexists. The idea here is that species does not in itself make a moral difference, any more than race or sex makes a moral difference. Two points are relevant here: (1) It is speciesist to claim for human beings special consideration that we are not willing to extend to non-human animals who, like us, have the properties that make us deserving of special consideration. (2) It is said to be speciesist to insist that human beings who no longer have the capacities that distinguish us from most of the rest of the animal kingdom be given the same protections as normal human beings; given that they are not superior to other animals, why should they be treated as if they were? (This has implications for the debate over euthanasia.)
Optional Link (if you’re interested in seeing more about a Catholic perspective on evolution): http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05654a.htm
Reading Guide: This is a short, clear reading. Unlike Gould, Dawkins is not at all conciliatory to religious belief. After arguing that religion has no “special expertise to offer us on moral questions”, he argues that the Pope’s message on evolution itself intrudes into the domain of science. (The passage he quotes here is the passage I referred to or quoted in class last time.) He then identifies other ways in which the Catholic Church intrudes into the domain of science. Basically, he denies that religion and science inhabit separate domains - at least in practice. As you read, think about how Gould might respond to Dawkins’ claims and how Christians might respond to Dawkins.
Terminology: Some of you may be unfamiliar with the term “speciesism”. The term, as you will gather, is derogatory; those who believe that humans are importantly different from the rest of the animal kingdom and therefore deserving of special consideration are referred to as “speciesists” by animal rights activists, some evolutionists, and others who see no morally significant difference between human beings and other animals. Such critics compare those who invest species with special significance to racists and sexists. The idea here is that species does not in itself make a moral difference, any more than race or sex makes a moral difference. Two points are relevant here: (1) It is speciesist to claim for human beings special consideration that we are not willing to extend to non-human animals who, like us, have the properties that make us deserving of special consideration. (2) It is said to be speciesist to insist that human beings who no longer have the capacities that distinguish us from most of the rest of the animal kingdom be given the same protections as normal human beings; given that they are not superior to other animals, why should they be treated as if they were? (This has implications for the debate over euthanasia.)
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