Reminder: Jason is presenting tomorrow.
Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief", pp. 99-103
Reading Guide
As I noted in class, Clifford's position on what it takes to believe responsibly is stronger than Aquinas'. Whereas Aquinas believed that individual believers are not required to understand the proofs for those religious truths that can be demonstrated, Clifford believed that each individual is responsible for believing only propositions for which they themselves have sufficient evidence: "No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe" (102).
Clifford begins with the story of a shipowner who believes on "insufficient evidence" that his ship is shipworthy. In the first version of the story, this has disastrous consequences for his passengers. In the 2nd version, all is well. Pay attention to Clifford's analysis of this example and the subsequent example of the islanders who made "grave accusations" against men who were perceived as heretics. Why does Clifford say in each case that the shipowner and the accusers had "no right to believe" the beliefs they acted upon?
Clifford then explains why the shipowner and the accusers can be faulted both for their actions and for their beliefs. He argues that this duty to believe nothing for which you have insufficient evidence applies to all persons. Moreover, we can still be blamed for believing what turns out to be true if we believed it on insufficient evidence.
These are strong claims. As you read, try to discern what would count for Clifford as sufficient evidence for belief.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Friday, March 26, 2010
L26 Reading Guide
Readings: Aquinas, "The Harmony of Reason and Revelation" (pp. 92-95) AND Pascal, "The Wager" (pp. 96-97)
Reminder: Laura will be presenting on Aquinas. Brennan will be presenting on Pascal.
AQUINAS
As indicated by the title of this piece, Aquinas believes that faith and reason are not ultimately at odds. As he puts it at the end of this selection, what is known by revelation cannot conflict with truths "we are naturally endowed to know" via reason, for truth does not conflict with truth. Aquinas believed that truths about God fall into 2 categories -- those that are knowable via reason and those that are known only via revelation. He gives examples of each of these in your text. Truths about God that are knowable by reason may also be believed simply on the basis of faith or revelation; basing one's belief on faith rather than demonstration is not irrational. Insisting otherwise has three "awkward effects". After identifying these awkward effects, Aquinas discusses beliefs about God that fall into the second category -- those that cannot be ascertained by human reason. Aquinas gives us 3 reasons why divine revelation of truths that cannot be known through human reason is both necessary and beneficial. He then argues that belief that is based solely on revelation (and can only be based on revelation) is not foolish. Finally, he claims that reason and revelation do not conflict.
PASCAL
Most of you are probably familiar with Pascal's Wager. This excerpt is a bit abstract, but the central idea should be clear enough. Notice that Pascal begins by assuming that we can't prove whether God exists. He also thinks that we must bet one way or the other (this is the ultimate/cosmic version of You Bet Your Life). Given these assumptions, the real question is whether it is more rational to bet that God exists or more rational to bet that God does not exist. Pascal argues that it is more rational to bet that God does exist. In fact, he seems to think that it is irrational to bet against God's existence. To make this selection less abstract, as you read, imagine the consequences for each bet ("God exists" or "God doesn't exist"): What happens if you bet correctly? What happens if you bet incorrectly?
Reminder: Laura will be presenting on Aquinas. Brennan will be presenting on Pascal.
AQUINAS
As indicated by the title of this piece, Aquinas believes that faith and reason are not ultimately at odds. As he puts it at the end of this selection, what is known by revelation cannot conflict with truths "we are naturally endowed to know" via reason, for truth does not conflict with truth. Aquinas believed that truths about God fall into 2 categories -- those that are knowable via reason and those that are known only via revelation. He gives examples of each of these in your text. Truths about God that are knowable by reason may also be believed simply on the basis of faith or revelation; basing one's belief on faith rather than demonstration is not irrational. Insisting otherwise has three "awkward effects". After identifying these awkward effects, Aquinas discusses beliefs about God that fall into the second category -- those that cannot be ascertained by human reason. Aquinas gives us 3 reasons why divine revelation of truths that cannot be known through human reason is both necessary and beneficial. He then argues that belief that is based solely on revelation (and can only be based on revelation) is not foolish. Finally, he claims that reason and revelation do not conflict.
PASCAL
Most of you are probably familiar with Pascal's Wager. This excerpt is a bit abstract, but the central idea should be clear enough. Notice that Pascal begins by assuming that we can't prove whether God exists. He also thinks that we must bet one way or the other (this is the ultimate/cosmic version of You Bet Your Life). Given these assumptions, the real question is whether it is more rational to bet that God exists or more rational to bet that God does not exist. Pascal argues that it is more rational to bet that God does exist. In fact, he seems to think that it is irrational to bet against God's existence. To make this selection less abstract, as you read, imagine the consequences for each bet ("God exists" or "God doesn't exist"): What happens if you bet correctly? What happens if you bet incorrectly?
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Reminder: no reading or homework -- movie day
I won't be able to show the film I originally scheduled (Shadowlands, the version with Debra Winger and Anthony Hopkins) because the movie is no longer being made and it was too hard to find a copy that didn't cost the earth. I, will, however, still show a film both this class and next class.
Thursday, March 11, 2010
L23 Reading Guide (Rowe)
Reading: “The Evidential Argument from Evil”, pp. 324-330 (pp. 354 & following in 3rd edition)
Reading Guide
You may remember that when we initially presented the problem of evil, I distinguished between the Logical problem of evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil. The readings we have looked at so far have focused on the logical problem of evil, i.e., the claim that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, “wholly good” God. In this article, Rowe presents a version of the Evidential Problem of Evil; he argues that even if we cannot prove that evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God, the existence of evil is evidence that God does not exist. More precisely, the existence of evil for which there seems to be “no morally sufficient reason” is evidence against the existence of God. Thus, we have “rational grounds for believing” that God does not exist.
In the introduction, Rowe lays out what he will do and distinguishes between theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “narrow sense” and theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “broad sense”. In the narrow sense, theism, atheism and agnosticism are positions regarding the existence of “a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good” (325). In this article, Rowe focuses on the narrow sense; thus, he is not at all concerned here with whether the world is utterly devoid of “divine being or divine reality”.
In section I, Rowe presents his argument from evil for atheism. He helpfully states the argument in premise-conclusion form on p. 325 (R-H column). He carefully unpacks the 2nd premise (the premise that God would not allow “intense suffering” unless He “could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”). He thinks that theists will accept premise 2. The premise theists will reject is the first premise, which states that there are evils in this world “which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (325). Although Rowe does not think anyone could prove that premise 1 is true OR false, he does think that it is reasonable to believe that there are such evils. He makes this argument on pp. 326-327.
In section II, Rowe considers how a theist might respond to the 1st premise of his argument for evil. While he recognizes that some theists might be “content” to argue that “we have no good reasons for accepting (1) as true”, he notes that the theist “is … committed to the view that (1) is false” (328). For that reason, he focuses on responses designed to show that (1) is false. At the bottom of p. 328 (L-H column), he considers one version of a direct attack on (1) – this version is similar to Hick’s theodicy. At the top of the Right Hand column, he gives two reasons why direct attacks “cannot succeed” (328). On pp. 328-329, he presents a version of an indirect attack on (1); he dubs this “the G.E. Moore shift”. You may find this a little difficult to follow in spots, but the central idea should be clear enough. The theist’s indirect attack is presented on p. 329 (left-hand column) – for those of you who have the earlier edition, just look for the passage where it says “not-3”, followed by 2, therefore, “not-1”.
In section III, Rowe distinguishes between three different responses an atheist might have to this move; he calls them “unfriendly” atheism, “indifferent” atheism, and “friendly” atheism. Rowe then defends the position of friendly atheism, i.e., the position that “some theists are rationally justified in believing that God exists” (329). His argument for friendly atheism begins from the assumption that a person can be justified in holding a false belief; this, by the way, is non-controversial in epistemology. Justification does not guarantee truth. Before considering what reasons the theist might proffer to support his belief in God, Rowe gives an example of a justified belief that is nonetheless false. He then suggests that the friendly atheist can even claim, consistent with his atheism, that modern theists, “people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science”, can be rationally justified in believing that God exists. As he himself notes, this position will not set well with many atheists, but it may nonetheless be a tenable position.
Reading Guide
You may remember that when we initially presented the problem of evil, I distinguished between the Logical problem of evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil. The readings we have looked at so far have focused on the logical problem of evil, i.e., the claim that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, “wholly good” God. In this article, Rowe presents a version of the Evidential Problem of Evil; he argues that even if we cannot prove that evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God, the existence of evil is evidence that God does not exist. More precisely, the existence of evil for which there seems to be “no morally sufficient reason” is evidence against the existence of God. Thus, we have “rational grounds for believing” that God does not exist.
In the introduction, Rowe lays out what he will do and distinguishes between theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “narrow sense” and theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “broad sense”. In the narrow sense, theism, atheism and agnosticism are positions regarding the existence of “a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good” (325). In this article, Rowe focuses on the narrow sense; thus, he is not at all concerned here with whether the world is utterly devoid of “divine being or divine reality”.
In section I, Rowe presents his argument from evil for atheism. He helpfully states the argument in premise-conclusion form on p. 325 (R-H column). He carefully unpacks the 2nd premise (the premise that God would not allow “intense suffering” unless He “could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”). He thinks that theists will accept premise 2. The premise theists will reject is the first premise, which states that there are evils in this world “which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (325). Although Rowe does not think anyone could prove that premise 1 is true OR false, he does think that it is reasonable to believe that there are such evils. He makes this argument on pp. 326-327.
In section II, Rowe considers how a theist might respond to the 1st premise of his argument for evil. While he recognizes that some theists might be “content” to argue that “we have no good reasons for accepting (1) as true”, he notes that the theist “is … committed to the view that (1) is false” (328). For that reason, he focuses on responses designed to show that (1) is false. At the bottom of p. 328 (L-H column), he considers one version of a direct attack on (1) – this version is similar to Hick’s theodicy. At the top of the Right Hand column, he gives two reasons why direct attacks “cannot succeed” (328). On pp. 328-329, he presents a version of an indirect attack on (1); he dubs this “the G.E. Moore shift”. You may find this a little difficult to follow in spots, but the central idea should be clear enough. The theist’s indirect attack is presented on p. 329 (left-hand column) – for those of you who have the earlier edition, just look for the passage where it says “not-3”, followed by 2, therefore, “not-1”.
In section III, Rowe distinguishes between three different responses an atheist might have to this move; he calls them “unfriendly” atheism, “indifferent” atheism, and “friendly” atheism. Rowe then defends the position of friendly atheism, i.e., the position that “some theists are rationally justified in believing that God exists” (329). His argument for friendly atheism begins from the assumption that a person can be justified in holding a false belief; this, by the way, is non-controversial in epistemology. Justification does not guarantee truth. Before considering what reasons the theist might proffer to support his belief in God, Rowe gives an example of a justified belief that is nonetheless false. He then suggests that the friendly atheist can even claim, consistent with his atheism, that modern theists, “people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science”, can be rationally justified in believing that God exists. As he himself notes, this position will not set well with many atheists, but it may nonetheless be a tenable position.
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
L22 Reading Guide: Adams
Reading: Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God”, pp. 333-339
Adams argues that standard solutions to the problem of evil cannot successfully deal with “horrendous evils”, i.e., “evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good on the whole” (334). The main problem with standard solutions is that their justifications of evil are “generic and global” (335, emphasis in the original). Such justifications have little or no power in the face of the concern that “God cannot be said to be good or loving to any created persons the positive meaning of whose lives He allows to be engulfed in and/or defeated by evils” (336, emphasis in the original). Moreover, Adams maintains that appealing to global, generic justifications for evil doesn’t “make the participant’s life more tolerable, more worth living for him/her” and may even make it worse (336). She considers the suggestion that we should “let the above-mentioned generic and global reasons cover divine permission of nonhorrendous evils, and find other reasons compatible with perfect goodness why even an omnipotent, omniscient God would permit horrors”(337), but rejects this as a non-starter. In her view, “we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile lives for human participants in them” (337). Even so, the Christian’s belief in an “all-wise and all-powerful God” who loves each of us is not “positively irrational” (337).
If we can’t “conceive of” reasons why God, as described on p. 337, would permit horrendous evils, then the only alternative is to “show how” God defeats these horrendous evils “within the context of the individual’s life” and “give(s) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338). But this cannot be done by appealing to reasons that are “religion-neutral” (339). Rather, it has to be done by appealing to Christian values: “it is not only legitimate, but, given horrendous evils, necessary for Christians to dip into their richer store of valuables to exhibit the consistency” of the existence of God and the existence of evil (339). In section 4.3, she explains how God could both “engulf” and defeat horrendous evils experienced or done by an individual and “giv(e) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338).
Adams argues that standard solutions to the problem of evil cannot successfully deal with “horrendous evils”, i.e., “evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good on the whole” (334). The main problem with standard solutions is that their justifications of evil are “generic and global” (335, emphasis in the original). Such justifications have little or no power in the face of the concern that “God cannot be said to be good or loving to any created persons the positive meaning of whose lives He allows to be engulfed in and/or defeated by evils” (336, emphasis in the original). Moreover, Adams maintains that appealing to global, generic justifications for evil doesn’t “make the participant’s life more tolerable, more worth living for him/her” and may even make it worse (336). She considers the suggestion that we should “let the above-mentioned generic and global reasons cover divine permission of nonhorrendous evils, and find other reasons compatible with perfect goodness why even an omnipotent, omniscient God would permit horrors”(337), but rejects this as a non-starter. In her view, “we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile lives for human participants in them” (337). Even so, the Christian’s belief in an “all-wise and all-powerful God” who loves each of us is not “positively irrational” (337).
If we can’t “conceive of” reasons why God, as described on p. 337, would permit horrendous evils, then the only alternative is to “show how” God defeats these horrendous evils “within the context of the individual’s life” and “give(s) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338). But this cannot be done by appealing to reasons that are “religion-neutral” (339). Rather, it has to be done by appealing to Christian values: “it is not only legitimate, but, given horrendous evils, necessary for Christians to dip into their richer store of valuables to exhibit the consistency” of the existence of God and the existence of evil (339). In section 4.3, she explains how God could both “engulf” and defeat horrendous evils experienced or done by an individual and “giv(e) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338).
Saturday, March 6, 2010
L21 Reading Guide (Hick)
Reading: Hick, "Soul-Making Theodicy", pp. 316-322
Hick writes very well, so this article is pretty straightforward, which is not to say that it is non-controversial. Hick's starting point is different from that of others we have read. First, Hick views Biblical stories of creation, the Fall, and the great flood, etc., as myths, not recountings of actual events. In consequence, the Augustinian defense of evil (evil as the result of the Fall)holds no appeal for him. Nor, he surmises, does it appeal to anyone who holds a scientific world view. Second, Hick accepts evolution as the right account of human origins. Third, Hick believes in universal salvation, the "culmination" of "the divine program of soul-making" (editors' abstract, p. 316). Hick, in formulating his theodicy, takes inspiration from St. Irenaeus, who distinguished stages in human development. He argues that human beings are gradually evolving from their original spiritual and moral immaturity to a state of moral and spiritual perfection; evils in this world are justified insofar as they are necessary for this evolutionary process.
On p. 316, Hick describes "the theodicy project", which starts from the assumption that "an infinite creative goodness exists ... and attempts to show that this belief is not rendered irrational by the fact of evil". On p. 317, he identifies the standards for a successful theodicy and distinguishes the Augustinian from the Irenaean approach. On pp. 318-322, he develops a theodicy in the spirit of St. Irenaeaus. "The central themes of out which this ... type of theodicy has arisen is the two-stage conception of the creation of humankind, first in the 'image' and then in the 'likeness' of God." (318) Unlike the Augustinian approach, which assumes that we were once morally and spiritually perfect and fell through sin, this approach, as Hick develops it, assumes that we have never been morally and spiritually perfect. Moreover, Hick assumes that we are getting progressively closer (though perhaps in fits and starts) to moral and spiritual perfection. Ultimately, each and every one of us will achieve perfection in the afterlife.
On p. 319, Hick raises the obvious question: Why would God have created us "as imperfect and developing creature(s)"? Why not just create us "as ... perfect being(s)" at the outset? Hick's answer is that "coming freely to know and love one's Maker" requires "an (initial) epistemic distance from God". I'll let you read the text to see what he means by epistemic distance and why He thinks such epistemic distance is in fact necessary. He then asks "why humans should not have been created at this epistemic distance from God, and yet at the same time as morally perfect beings" (319). He agrees with Mackie that a world in which we all freely choose not to sin is logically possible. Given that God could have created us as morally perfect creatures who would freely choose not to do evil, why didn't He? His answer appears on the left-hand column of p. 320. Hick then turns to the task of demonstrating that the actual world is "one of" "an immense range of possible worlds", each of which is consistent with "the general concept of spiritually and morally immature creatures developing ethically in an appropriate environment" (320). Along the way, he addresses the justification for non-moral (natural) evil and considers what the world needs to be like to "constitute an appropriate environment" for gradual moral and spiritual maturation.
Hick writes very well, so this article is pretty straightforward, which is not to say that it is non-controversial. Hick's starting point is different from that of others we have read. First, Hick views Biblical stories of creation, the Fall, and the great flood, etc., as myths, not recountings of actual events. In consequence, the Augustinian defense of evil (evil as the result of the Fall)holds no appeal for him. Nor, he surmises, does it appeal to anyone who holds a scientific world view. Second, Hick accepts evolution as the right account of human origins. Third, Hick believes in universal salvation, the "culmination" of "the divine program of soul-making" (editors' abstract, p. 316). Hick, in formulating his theodicy, takes inspiration from St. Irenaeus, who distinguished stages in human development. He argues that human beings are gradually evolving from their original spiritual and moral immaturity to a state of moral and spiritual perfection; evils in this world are justified insofar as they are necessary for this evolutionary process.
On p. 316, Hick describes "the theodicy project", which starts from the assumption that "an infinite creative goodness exists ... and attempts to show that this belief is not rendered irrational by the fact of evil". On p. 317, he identifies the standards for a successful theodicy and distinguishes the Augustinian from the Irenaean approach. On pp. 318-322, he develops a theodicy in the spirit of St. Irenaeaus. "The central themes of out which this ... type of theodicy has arisen is the two-stage conception of the creation of humankind, first in the 'image' and then in the 'likeness' of God." (318) Unlike the Augustinian approach, which assumes that we were once morally and spiritually perfect and fell through sin, this approach, as Hick develops it, assumes that we have never been morally and spiritually perfect. Moreover, Hick assumes that we are getting progressively closer (though perhaps in fits and starts) to moral and spiritual perfection. Ultimately, each and every one of us will achieve perfection in the afterlife.
On p. 319, Hick raises the obvious question: Why would God have created us "as imperfect and developing creature(s)"? Why not just create us "as ... perfect being(s)" at the outset? Hick's answer is that "coming freely to know and love one's Maker" requires "an (initial) epistemic distance from God". I'll let you read the text to see what he means by epistemic distance and why He thinks such epistemic distance is in fact necessary. He then asks "why humans should not have been created at this epistemic distance from God, and yet at the same time as morally perfect beings" (319). He agrees with Mackie that a world in which we all freely choose not to sin is logically possible. Given that God could have created us as morally perfect creatures who would freely choose not to do evil, why didn't He? His answer appears on the left-hand column of p. 320. Hick then turns to the task of demonstrating that the actual world is "one of" "an immense range of possible worlds", each of which is consistent with "the general concept of spiritually and morally immature creatures developing ethically in an appropriate environment" (320). Along the way, he addresses the justification for non-moral (natural) evil and considers what the world needs to be like to "constitute an appropriate environment" for gradual moral and spiritual maturation.
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