L39 Reading Guide: Sartre

Reading: Sartre, “Ethics without Religion”, pp. 622-629

Reading Guide: The editors give a nice overview of Sartre on p. 622. Sartre was an atheist and an existentialist. For Sartre, “existence precedes essence”; the “first principle” of existentialism is that “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself”(622). Since there is no God, there is no such thing as a “human nature” & thus man’s actions are not determined (625). Man is radically free. Even though we can no longer claim that man is “made in God’s image”, man still has “a greater dignity than inanimate objects and other living organisms. See p. 623 for the source of our dignity. A crucial early passage is on p. 623: “When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses all men”. Be aware that sometimes what Sartre means is not immediately evident; you think he means one thing, then discover a little later that he couldn’t have meant what you initially thought he meant. So, tag any claims that seem extraordinary or jump out at you and keep those in mind as you read further. On pp. 623-626, Sartre discusses the implications of man’s radical freedom – anguish, forlornness, and despair. Note that his definitions of forlornness and despair seem to have no psychological component. His discussion of anguish is more overtly psychological. Note also that in his discussion of anguish, he makes use of an idea that seems very similar to Kant’s universal law test. While we might think that anguish is paralyzing, Sartre maintains that “it is not a curtain separating us from action, but is part of action itself” (624). In the section on forlornness, Sartre discusses the implications of the recognition that God does not exist. I think this section is pretty straightforward. Note especially his discussion of the example of the young man who was struggling to decide whether to decamp to England and fight with the French Free Forces or instead to stay at home with his mother whose psychological health seemed to depend on his presence. From the bottom of p. 626 through p. 629, Sartre identifies and responds to 3 objections to his position. All 3 of these objections seem to stem from the concern that existentialism makes our choices arbitrary. In response to the objection that the basis of choice is anarchic, Sartre argues that the basis of choice is not caprice or whim; he compares making ethical choices to painting a work of art. Neither the painter nor the moral agent acts arbitrarily. Second, he agrees that there’s a sense in which “we are unable to pass judgment on others”, but maintains that there’s also a sense in which the existentialist can judge others, both epistemically and morally. Still, the kind of moral judgment that the existentialist can pass on others’ ethically significant choices is not likely to satisfy the objector. Third, he responds to the objection that “values aren’t serious” if existentialism is true. Finally, he explains the sense in which existentialism is a humanism and the sense in which it is not a humanism.

L38 Reading Guide

Reading: Aquinas, "Ethics and Natural Law", pp. 619-621. This reading consists of two excerpts from Aquinas. The first excerpt is from The Summa Theologica Question 94, Article 2. Your text has omitted a couple of paragraphs from the beginning of Q94, Article 2, but otherwise, the excerpt is intact. Please go to www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm to read Article 2 of Question 94 in its entirety. When I printed it out, it was 2 full pages. I presume that the second excerpt is also from The Summa, but I could not find the exact reference (googling key phrases didn't help, probably because this is an updated translation). It doesn't appear to be from Q94.

Reading Guide: First Excerpt: The question of Article 2 is "Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?". Aquinas begins, as is his wont, by stating 3 objections (see online text). He then indicates his own position ("On the contrary"). Finally, he begins to explain his position beginning at "I answer that". (If you're reading in your textbook, the words "I answer that" are deleted, but everything that follows those words is included in your text. However, the 3 objections and the "On the contrary" that precede "I answer that" are not included.) He invokes a distinction between practical reason and speculative or theoretical/demonstrative reason. He notes that both practical reason and speculative reason start from first principles, principles that are self-evidently true and are not subject to demonstration. Propositions (statements) may be self-evidently true in themselves, but not self-evidently true to us. (I think our earlier reading on Aquinas explained this.) Some propositions that are self-evidently true (or "self-known") are self-evident to all. Others are self-evident only to the wise. Aquinas gives examples of each of these. The first principle of speculative reason is the principle of noncontradiction, "It is not proper at once to affirm and to deny". The first principle of practical (action-guiding reason) is "The good is what all desire". From this principle, it is a short step to the first principle of natural law. I'll let you read it for yourself. Aquinas then tells us that reason helps us determine what things are goods and what things are evils (things to be avoided) -- see the text for the criteria. Having articulated the standard of goods and evils, he examines our natural inclinations, which he divides into 3 sources: inclinations we share with all substances, inclinations we "share with other animals", and inclinations that have their source in our rational and social nature. (You may recognize Aristotle's influence here.) This marks the end of Article 2.

Second Excerpt: This excerpt begins at the bottom of p. 620 in your book (right after the ...). In this excerpt, Aquinas reminds us that "every judgment of practical reason issue(s) from certain naturally known principles". He then says that although "all moral rules belong to the law of nature", they do not "all" belong to the law of nature "in the same way" (621). He divides moral rules into 3 types, based on how accessible they are. The most accessible moral rules "belong in an unqualified way to the law of nature".