Reading: Paley, “The Analogical Teleological Argument” and Hume, “Critique of the Analogical Teleological Argument”, pp. 212-221.
Reading Guide
Since the teleological argument , a.k.a. the Argument from Design, is the most popular argument for God’s existence, most of you probably have a basic familiarity with the argument. I know that a few of you are also familiar with Paley’s version of the argument.
Paley starts with the simple example of a watch, but he could have used any other complex artifact as an example. He argues that if we found a watch in a meadow and examined its features, we would naturally conclude that the watch was made by a designer. The best explanation of the watch’s apparent design is that the watch is in fact the product of design. He then extends this argument to the natural world, arguing that the features of the watch that lead us to conclude that someone designed it are found to an even greater extent in nature. If these features when found in artifacts imply design, they also imply design when found in nature.
Paley goes into a lot of detail about the watch, but you will find that the details are generally important for developing or understanding the argument. Notice also that Paley separates the question of whether there is a designer from the question of the designer’s attributes.
For a reading guide to Hume, please consult the editors’ excellent summary at the beginning of the article.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
L8 Reading Guide: The Cosmological Argument
Note: I misplaced my copy of the 2nd edition of our text, so I was not able to copy the Taylor article for you. Instead, I’ve substituted the Reichenbach article, which is in both the 3rd and 4th editions of the text, and is, if I remember Taylor well, more accessible.
Reading: Reichenbach, “The Cosmological Argument”, pp. 187-195 and Aquinas, “The Classical Cosmological Argument”, pp. 184-186.
We will focus on the Reichenbach article in class, especially section 6. The Aquinas is assigned primarily for background.
Reichenbach
Note: If you’re already familiar with Hume’s basic approach, then you can skip my explanation. Similarly, if you’re already familiar with the idea of a “God of the gaps”, there’s no need to read my explanation.
Since the editors provide a good summary of this article, I would recommend reading that too.
Reichenbach begins by summarizing Aquinas’ version (or one of them) of the cosmological argument, then notes that during the Enlightenment, the Principle of Sufficient Reason “gradually” replaced Aristotelian physics as the basis of the cosmological argument. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is stated on p. 188. Reichenbach endorses the moderate version of this principle. According to Reichenbach, the PSR “is not derivable from more basic principles”, but “this is not to say that the principle is unjustified” (188). Rather, the principle can be justified in two ways: (1) by considering the requirements of explanation (the “epistemological” ground) or (2) by grounding it in the nature of contingent beings (the “ontological” ground),
For those of you who are unfamiliar with Hume, two points are especially pertinent in the context of R’s discussion of Hume on p. 188. First, Hume believed that our knowledge of the world comes through ideas, which themselves are copies of impressions we receive through the senses and through reflection. Second, Hume was a skeptic with respect to causation; as a good Empiricist (knowledge comes through experience), he pointed out that we never observe causation; rather, what we observe is constant correlation and temporal order. Suppose we observe that event A always precedes event B. We then infer that A caused B, but strictly speaking, we don’t have sufficient warrant for this inference.
In sections 2 & 3, Reichenbach makes two important distinctions. The first is between a partial explanation and a full explanation; the central point here is that “theistic arguments demand that whatever exists contingently or arises contingently have a full explanation” (189). Opponents tend to reject the requirement that there be a “full” explanation. The second distinguishes scientific from personal explanations. This distinction is significant because defenders of the cosmological argument assume that personal explanations, explanations that appeal to a person’s intentions and his acting on those intentions, are legitimate explanations. However, as Reichenbach points out on p. 190, “the events in question (the things that need to be explained, e.g., the coming into being of the universe – RS) must be intrinsically and not merely accidentally, completely inexplicable by scientific or natural explanations”. He then gives a helpful example.
For those of you who are unfamiliar with the phrase God of the gaps, the basic idea is this: Historically, when a philosopher reached a point at which there was a gap between the conclusion his argument supported and the conclusion he desired to prove, he’d often plug the gap by postulating the existence of God. For instance, Descartes, having established that there is reason to doubt the existence of the external world and having presumed that we should not believe anything doubtful, finds himself in a bind. He wants to restore knowledge of the external world, but if the slightest reason for doubt means that we don’t have knowledge, there’s clearly a problem. Descartes’ solution is to postulate that clear and distinct ideas can’t be doubted because God, being a morally perfect being, is not a deceiver and thus would not create us such that even our clear and distinct ideas could be false. So, God’s existence is postulated in order to guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas; since some of our clear and distinct ideas are about the external world, Descartes has reached the conclusion he wants simply by postulating that God exists and is not a deceiver. (He does give arguments for these claims, but of his two arguments, one is viciously circular and the other is a version of the ontological argument.)
In section 6, Reichenbach gives a general statement of the cosmological argument. Pay attention to his definitions of a contingent being and a necessary being. We are contingent beings; we actually exist, but we “can not-exist”. At some point, each of us will cease to exist. A necessary being is defined as “a being which, if it exists, cannot not-exist” (191). Reichenbach explains the significance of the “if it exists” clause on p. 194, when he distinguishes logical necessity from ontological or factual necessity. From pp. 191-194, Reichenbach discusses and rebuts three objections to the cosmological argument set out on p. 191. In section 6.1, he discusses Russell’s objection that the existence of the universe doesn’t need to be explained. Russell gives two different arguments to support this objection. Since the second version is hard to evaluate given the disagreement in quantum physics about indeterminacy, focus on the first version. The second objection Reichenbach responds to is Hume’s objection that explaining each of the parts is sufficient to explain the whole; thus, if we can explain each part of the universe, we’ve explained the universe itself. This argument seems to presume that the whole is nothing over and above the sum of its parts. The third objection is that the cosmological argument “presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument” (194). In response, Reichenbach points out that the cosmological argument and the ontological argument rely on different conceptions of a necessary being. Thus, the former does not presuppose the latter. In the last section, he provides four reasons why appealing to God provides “the best or ultimate” explanation of the existence of the universe.
Aquinas
Read the editors’ summary of the article. In your reading of the article, focus on the initial argument, which is set out in paragraphs 1 and 3 (the editors omitted paragraph 2). Don’t worry too much about the details of the argument. Aquinas relies on Aristotle’s arguments for a prime mover. Unfortunately, he does not always provide Aristotle’s argument; sometimes, he just says “as it is proved in the Physics” and assumes that his audience is familiar with that part of Aristotle’s argument.
Reading: Reichenbach, “The Cosmological Argument”, pp. 187-195 and Aquinas, “The Classical Cosmological Argument”, pp. 184-186.
We will focus on the Reichenbach article in class, especially section 6. The Aquinas is assigned primarily for background.
Reichenbach
Note: If you’re already familiar with Hume’s basic approach, then you can skip my explanation. Similarly, if you’re already familiar with the idea of a “God of the gaps”, there’s no need to read my explanation.
Since the editors provide a good summary of this article, I would recommend reading that too.
Reichenbach begins by summarizing Aquinas’ version (or one of them) of the cosmological argument, then notes that during the Enlightenment, the Principle of Sufficient Reason “gradually” replaced Aristotelian physics as the basis of the cosmological argument. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is stated on p. 188. Reichenbach endorses the moderate version of this principle. According to Reichenbach, the PSR “is not derivable from more basic principles”, but “this is not to say that the principle is unjustified” (188). Rather, the principle can be justified in two ways: (1) by considering the requirements of explanation (the “epistemological” ground) or (2) by grounding it in the nature of contingent beings (the “ontological” ground),
For those of you who are unfamiliar with Hume, two points are especially pertinent in the context of R’s discussion of Hume on p. 188. First, Hume believed that our knowledge of the world comes through ideas, which themselves are copies of impressions we receive through the senses and through reflection. Second, Hume was a skeptic with respect to causation; as a good Empiricist (knowledge comes through experience), he pointed out that we never observe causation; rather, what we observe is constant correlation and temporal order. Suppose we observe that event A always precedes event B. We then infer that A caused B, but strictly speaking, we don’t have sufficient warrant for this inference.
In sections 2 & 3, Reichenbach makes two important distinctions. The first is between a partial explanation and a full explanation; the central point here is that “theistic arguments demand that whatever exists contingently or arises contingently have a full explanation” (189). Opponents tend to reject the requirement that there be a “full” explanation. The second distinguishes scientific from personal explanations. This distinction is significant because defenders of the cosmological argument assume that personal explanations, explanations that appeal to a person’s intentions and his acting on those intentions, are legitimate explanations. However, as Reichenbach points out on p. 190, “the events in question (the things that need to be explained, e.g., the coming into being of the universe – RS) must be intrinsically and not merely accidentally, completely inexplicable by scientific or natural explanations”. He then gives a helpful example.
For those of you who are unfamiliar with the phrase God of the gaps, the basic idea is this: Historically, when a philosopher reached a point at which there was a gap between the conclusion his argument supported and the conclusion he desired to prove, he’d often plug the gap by postulating the existence of God. For instance, Descartes, having established that there is reason to doubt the existence of the external world and having presumed that we should not believe anything doubtful, finds himself in a bind. He wants to restore knowledge of the external world, but if the slightest reason for doubt means that we don’t have knowledge, there’s clearly a problem. Descartes’ solution is to postulate that clear and distinct ideas can’t be doubted because God, being a morally perfect being, is not a deceiver and thus would not create us such that even our clear and distinct ideas could be false. So, God’s existence is postulated in order to guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas; since some of our clear and distinct ideas are about the external world, Descartes has reached the conclusion he wants simply by postulating that God exists and is not a deceiver. (He does give arguments for these claims, but of his two arguments, one is viciously circular and the other is a version of the ontological argument.)
In section 6, Reichenbach gives a general statement of the cosmological argument. Pay attention to his definitions of a contingent being and a necessary being. We are contingent beings; we actually exist, but we “can not-exist”. At some point, each of us will cease to exist. A necessary being is defined as “a being which, if it exists, cannot not-exist” (191). Reichenbach explains the significance of the “if it exists” clause on p. 194, when he distinguishes logical necessity from ontological or factual necessity. From pp. 191-194, Reichenbach discusses and rebuts three objections to the cosmological argument set out on p. 191. In section 6.1, he discusses Russell’s objection that the existence of the universe doesn’t need to be explained. Russell gives two different arguments to support this objection. Since the second version is hard to evaluate given the disagreement in quantum physics about indeterminacy, focus on the first version. The second objection Reichenbach responds to is Hume’s objection that explaining each of the parts is sufficient to explain the whole; thus, if we can explain each part of the universe, we’ve explained the universe itself. This argument seems to presume that the whole is nothing over and above the sum of its parts. The third objection is that the cosmological argument “presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument” (194). In response, Reichenbach points out that the cosmological argument and the ontological argument rely on different conceptions of a necessary being. Thus, the former does not presuppose the latter. In the last section, he provides four reasons why appealing to God provides “the best or ultimate” explanation of the existence of the universe.
Aquinas
Read the editors’ summary of the article. In your reading of the article, focus on the initial argument, which is set out in paragraphs 1 and 3 (the editors omitted paragraph 2). Don’t worry too much about the details of the argument. Aquinas relies on Aristotle’s arguments for a prime mover. Unfortunately, he does not always provide Aristotle’s argument; sometimes, he just says “as it is proved in the Physics” and assumes that his audience is familiar with that part of Aristotle’s argument.
Friday, January 22, 2010
L7 Reading Guide: Anselm & Guanilo
Reading: Anselm, “The Classical Ontological Argument”, pp. 169-170 & Gaunilo, “Critique of Anselm’s Argument”, pp. 171-173.
Reading Guide
The ontological argument attempts to deduce proof of God’s existence from the very definition of “God”. Anselm’s main argument is in Ch.2. Pay close attention to his definition of God; you will note that it is a rather abstract definition.
Because his definition is expressed rather awkwardly, this can cause confusion, but if you underline the definition, that should help you keep your bearings. See the editors’ abstract for a summary of Anselm’s argument.
Anselm’s painter example contrasts two senses of “existence”: existing in the understanding and existing in reality. Anselm thinks it is clear even to “the fool” that God exists in the understanding. Although some things that exist in the understanding do not exist in reality, Anselm argues that if God exists in the understanding (i.e., if we have a concept of God), he must exist in reality. The editors’ abstract will help you understand Anselm’s argument here.
Since the editors provide an excellent summary of Gaunilo’s argument, I won’t add to it. Gaunilo is best remembered for his perfect island example, but this is not his only criticism of Anselm’s argument. By the way, in response to Gaunilo’s perfect island example, Anselm asserts that his argument applies only to God, not to anyone or anything else. However, he does not explain why the concept of God is different from all other concepts.
Reading Guide
The ontological argument attempts to deduce proof of God’s existence from the very definition of “God”. Anselm’s main argument is in Ch.2. Pay close attention to his definition of God; you will note that it is a rather abstract definition.
Because his definition is expressed rather awkwardly, this can cause confusion, but if you underline the definition, that should help you keep your bearings. See the editors’ abstract for a summary of Anselm’s argument.
Anselm’s painter example contrasts two senses of “existence”: existing in the understanding and existing in reality. Anselm thinks it is clear even to “the fool” that God exists in the understanding. Although some things that exist in the understanding do not exist in reality, Anselm argues that if God exists in the understanding (i.e., if we have a concept of God), he must exist in reality. The editors’ abstract will help you understand Anselm’s argument here.
Since the editors provide an excellent summary of Gaunilo’s argument, I won’t add to it. Gaunilo is best remembered for his perfect island example, but this is not his only criticism of Anselm’s argument. By the way, in response to Gaunilo’s perfect island example, Anselm asserts that his argument applies only to God, not to anyone or anything else. However, he does not explain why the concept of God is different from all other concepts.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
Reminder: presentations
Please email me a list of two or three articles you'd like to use for your presentation; be sure to rank them in order of preference.
Also, be sure that you will be in town both on the day the article is scheduled for discussion and on the previous and subsequent days (just in case we're running behind a day or running ahead).
Finally, since I may be on jury duty T0 & T11, it's best not to schedule a presentation for that day. Since we may not have caught back up by then, it's best not to schedule a presentation on Paley, either. Paley was originally scheduled for T9, but will probably be discussed T10. Plantinga, originally scheduled for T11, will most likely be discussed on T12.
Presentation Schedule (to be updated as I get more information from you)
T13 -- Whitney -- Hume, "The Evidence for Miracles is Weak" -- note: this will be
T13 only if we catch up before then; otherwise, it'll be T16
T16 (T17 if still a class behind) -- Logan -- Swinburne, "Miracles and Historical Evidence"
T26 -- Laura, Aquinas, “The Harmony of Reason and Revelation”, pp. 92-95
Brennan, Pascal, “The Wager", pp. 96-97
T27 -- Jason -- Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief"
T29 -- Jarrod -- Kierkegaard, “Truth is Subjectivity”
T30 -- Caleb -- Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion"
T33 -- Matt Rice -- Dawkins, "Science Discredits Religion"
T34 -- Matt Reynolds -- Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines"
T37 -- Edward -- MacIntyre, "Which God Ought We to Obey?"
T38 -- Dan -- Aquinas, "Ethics and Natural Law"
T39 or T40 (depending on which is the Paper Writing Day) -- Katie
Also, be sure that you will be in town both on the day the article is scheduled for discussion and on the previous and subsequent days (just in case we're running behind a day or running ahead).
Finally, since I may be on jury duty T0 & T11, it's best not to schedule a presentation for that day. Since we may not have caught back up by then, it's best not to schedule a presentation on Paley, either. Paley was originally scheduled for T9, but will probably be discussed T10. Plantinga, originally scheduled for T11, will most likely be discussed on T12.
Presentation Schedule (to be updated as I get more information from you)
T13 -- Whitney -- Hume, "The Evidence for Miracles is Weak" -- note: this will be
T13 only if we catch up before then; otherwise, it'll be T16
T16 (T17 if still a class behind) -- Logan -- Swinburne, "Miracles and Historical Evidence"
T26 -- Laura, Aquinas, “The Harmony of Reason and Revelation”, pp. 92-95
Brennan, Pascal, “The Wager", pp. 96-97
T27 -- Jason -- Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief"
T29 -- Jarrod -- Kierkegaard, “Truth is Subjectivity”
T30 -- Caleb -- Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion"
T33 -- Matt Rice -- Dawkins, "Science Discredits Religion"
T34 -- Matt Reynolds -- Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines"
T37 -- Edward -- MacIntyre, "Which God Ought We to Obey?"
T38 -- Dan -- Aquinas, "Ethics and Natural Law"
T39 or T40 (depending on which is the Paper Writing Day) -- Katie
L6 Reading Guide -- Minas
Reading: Minas, “God and Forgiveness”
Minas argues that God cannot forgive because He is divine. If she is right, this has significant consequences for any religion that emphasizes the forgiveness God grants to us. Minas’ strategy, identified on p. 138, is to “take up various kinds of actions forgiveness is, or might be, and show that not one of them is an action that could be performed by a perfect being”. To that end, she discusses the following varieties of forgiveness:
Forgiveness as reversal of moral judgment - pp. 138-140
Forgiveness in response to special considerations – p. 140
Forgiveness as condoning offenses – pp. 140-141
Forgiveness as remitting punishment without changing your initial judgment of the offense or the offender - p. 141-144
Forgiveness as giving up resentment, which she associates with ceasing to take an injury personally, pp. 144-148
Forgiveness as the “washing away of sins”, pp. 149-150
In between discussing the last two types of forgiveness, Minas gives us a perfectly general reason why God cannot forgive -- viz., that “forgiveness … is appropriately directed only towards actions which have wronged the forgiver” (149). She wonders “how it is possible to wrong, to injure, a perfect being” (149). Setting that concern aside, she finds it disturbing, perhaps even incomprehensible, that a perfect being “could construe as primarily wrongs to himself actions which seem mainly to harm someone else” (149).
As you can gather from the page numbers above, Minas gives the most attention to two types of forgiveness – forgiveness as remitting punishment and forgiveness as giving up resentment. With regard to the former, Minas argues that if God remits punishment despite retaining his original judgment of the offense and the offender, then he is either “something of a practical joker” or unjust. Regarding forgiveness as giving up resentment, Minas identifies ways in which humans come to cease to take an injury personally. First, over time, the initial feelings may erode unless one stirs them up. But God is omnipercipient; “to be omnipercipient is to have all reactions to all situations equally vivid, regardless of when they happened” (145). Thus, God’s feelings do not grow dim over time. Second, a human being might, in order to heal a breach or to protect his psychological health, consciously work to dispel his resentment. It is only here that she makes the rather obvious point that God, a perfect being, wouldn’t take an injury personally in the first place. She also claims that a perfect being wouldn’t have allowed a breach to occur. Nor would he need to protect his psychological health.
I think you’ll find Minas’ article both provocative and thought-provoking
Minas argues that God cannot forgive because He is divine. If she is right, this has significant consequences for any religion that emphasizes the forgiveness God grants to us. Minas’ strategy, identified on p. 138, is to “take up various kinds of actions forgiveness is, or might be, and show that not one of them is an action that could be performed by a perfect being”. To that end, she discusses the following varieties of forgiveness:
Forgiveness as reversal of moral judgment - pp. 138-140
Forgiveness in response to special considerations – p. 140
Forgiveness as condoning offenses – pp. 140-141
Forgiveness as remitting punishment without changing your initial judgment of the offense or the offender - p. 141-144
Forgiveness as giving up resentment, which she associates with ceasing to take an injury personally, pp. 144-148
Forgiveness as the “washing away of sins”, pp. 149-150
In between discussing the last two types of forgiveness, Minas gives us a perfectly general reason why God cannot forgive -- viz., that “forgiveness … is appropriately directed only towards actions which have wronged the forgiver” (149). She wonders “how it is possible to wrong, to injure, a perfect being” (149). Setting that concern aside, she finds it disturbing, perhaps even incomprehensible, that a perfect being “could construe as primarily wrongs to himself actions which seem mainly to harm someone else” (149).
As you can gather from the page numbers above, Minas gives the most attention to two types of forgiveness – forgiveness as remitting punishment and forgiveness as giving up resentment. With regard to the former, Minas argues that if God remits punishment despite retaining his original judgment of the offense and the offender, then he is either “something of a practical joker” or unjust. Regarding forgiveness as giving up resentment, Minas identifies ways in which humans come to cease to take an injury personally. First, over time, the initial feelings may erode unless one stirs them up. But God is omnipercipient; “to be omnipercipient is to have all reactions to all situations equally vivid, regardless of when they happened” (145). Thus, God’s feelings do not grow dim over time. Second, a human being might, in order to heal a breach or to protect his psychological health, consciously work to dispel his resentment. It is only here that she makes the rather obvious point that God, a perfect being, wouldn’t take an injury personally in the first place. She also claims that a perfect being wouldn’t have allowed a breach to occur. Nor would he need to protect his psychological health.
I think you’ll find Minas’ article both provocative and thought-provoking
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
L4 Reading Guide God as Eternal: Boethius & Wolterstorff
Reading: Boethius, “God is Timeless”, pp. 150-152 & Wolterstorff, “God is Everlasting”, pp. 153-159
You will need to read Boethius carefully; he’s not easy to understand. Wolterstorff is, I think, significantly easier to follow.
Boethius
The editors give a pretty good summary on p. 150 of Boethius’ position. Boethius here endorses the doctrine that God is outside of time. He begins by defining eternity and then contrasts the eternal with the temporal. Temporal things “live in no more than a fleeting, transitory moment”; by contrast, an eternal being “grasps and possesses simultaneously the entire fullness of an unending life, a life which lacks nothing of the future and has lost nothing of the fleeting past” (150-151). An eternal thing is, of course, infinite, but an infinite thing is not necessarily eternal. So, even if Aristotle is right when he says that the universe is infinite, it does not follow from this that the universe is eternal.
The next key move comes at the bottom of the left-hand column on p. 151 where Boethius tells us that the nature of a being determines the contents of its knowledge. Since God is eternal, His knowledge will be eternal; as B. puts it, God’s “foresight” is “the knowledge of a never fading instant” (151). He later adds that “God sees all things in His eternal present”; hence, His “divine foreknowledge does not change” (151).
Boethius then considers the objection that if God sees something as “about to happen”, it must happen. Doesn’t God’s foreknowledge then render all human actions unfree? Boethius’s response to this objection rests on a distinction between simple necessity (necessity that is in the nature of things, e.g., man is mortal) and conditional necessity (see p. 152 for an explanation of this concept). Simple necessity is incompatible with freedom. To use B’s example, we are not free not to die. We have no control over whether we will die. By contrast, conditional necessity is compatible with freedom. For example, IF I “really know” that you will be on time this morning, then you WILL be on time. However, this kind of necessity does not “alter the nature of things”. Boethius thinks it doesn’t matter whether the knower is another human being or God Himself. The mere fact that God knows what you will do before you do it does not entail that your action is unfree. What determines whether your act is free or not is whether it is simply necessary. Another way of putting the argument is this: God’s foreknowledge implies conditional necessity, but does not imply simple necessity.
Finally, Boethius responds to the objection that it seems like “I can make Providence void” because “it is within my power to change my mind” (152). Here, I think the objector is assuming that if an act is free, then the agent could have done otherwise. If that’s the case, then it seems like the agent can, by doing something other than God foresees, negate Providence.
Wolterstorff
Wolterstorff rejects the traditional interpretation of the doctrine that God is eternal. In this selection, he argues that the God of the Bible is everlasting, “existing within time”. He supports his argument by looking at the picture of God presented by the biblical authors.
He begins by noting that God is presented as both an Agent and a Redeemer. Both of these roles imply change - not change in God’s nature, but rather “a change on God’s time-strand”. He gives 4 examples from the Bible of God as an Agent (one of these is also an example of God as Redeemer). A God that changes cannot be outside of time.
After explaining the origins of the view that God is timeless, he considers how Aquinas might interpret his 4 examples. Aquinas held that God’s actions are not temporal even though the effects of God’s actions ARE temporal. In explaining Aquinas’ view, W. distinguishes between an everlasting event and a temporal event (p. 155). He acknowledges that Aquinas and others could argue that the biblical language is misleading and could plausibly interpret these passages as being consistent with the view that God is timeless. But, he then asks whether Aquinas’s strategy can be generalized – that is, whether every act of God that appears to be temporal could be re-interpreted as eternal via Aquinas’ strategy. At the bottom of the left-hand column on p. 157, he identifies 3 types of divine actions that cannot be successfully interpreted as eternal.
Later on p. 157, W. adds that God’s role as a Planner is inconsistent with the doctrine that God is timeless. Finally, on p. 158, he explains why two key passages that appear to support the doctrine that God does not change actually do not support the doctrine that God does not change and thus cannot be used to support the doctrine that God is timeless.
You will need to read Boethius carefully; he’s not easy to understand. Wolterstorff is, I think, significantly easier to follow.
Boethius
The editors give a pretty good summary on p. 150 of Boethius’ position. Boethius here endorses the doctrine that God is outside of time. He begins by defining eternity and then contrasts the eternal with the temporal. Temporal things “live in no more than a fleeting, transitory moment”; by contrast, an eternal being “grasps and possesses simultaneously the entire fullness of an unending life, a life which lacks nothing of the future and has lost nothing of the fleeting past” (150-151). An eternal thing is, of course, infinite, but an infinite thing is not necessarily eternal. So, even if Aristotle is right when he says that the universe is infinite, it does not follow from this that the universe is eternal.
The next key move comes at the bottom of the left-hand column on p. 151 where Boethius tells us that the nature of a being determines the contents of its knowledge. Since God is eternal, His knowledge will be eternal; as B. puts it, God’s “foresight” is “the knowledge of a never fading instant” (151). He later adds that “God sees all things in His eternal present”; hence, His “divine foreknowledge does not change” (151).
Boethius then considers the objection that if God sees something as “about to happen”, it must happen. Doesn’t God’s foreknowledge then render all human actions unfree? Boethius’s response to this objection rests on a distinction between simple necessity (necessity that is in the nature of things, e.g., man is mortal) and conditional necessity (see p. 152 for an explanation of this concept). Simple necessity is incompatible with freedom. To use B’s example, we are not free not to die. We have no control over whether we will die. By contrast, conditional necessity is compatible with freedom. For example, IF I “really know” that you will be on time this morning, then you WILL be on time. However, this kind of necessity does not “alter the nature of things”. Boethius thinks it doesn’t matter whether the knower is another human being or God Himself. The mere fact that God knows what you will do before you do it does not entail that your action is unfree. What determines whether your act is free or not is whether it is simply necessary. Another way of putting the argument is this: God’s foreknowledge implies conditional necessity, but does not imply simple necessity.
Finally, Boethius responds to the objection that it seems like “I can make Providence void” because “it is within my power to change my mind” (152). Here, I think the objector is assuming that if an act is free, then the agent could have done otherwise. If that’s the case, then it seems like the agent can, by doing something other than God foresees, negate Providence.
Wolterstorff
Wolterstorff rejects the traditional interpretation of the doctrine that God is eternal. In this selection, he argues that the God of the Bible is everlasting, “existing within time”. He supports his argument by looking at the picture of God presented by the biblical authors.
He begins by noting that God is presented as both an Agent and a Redeemer. Both of these roles imply change - not change in God’s nature, but rather “a change on God’s time-strand”. He gives 4 examples from the Bible of God as an Agent (one of these is also an example of God as Redeemer). A God that changes cannot be outside of time.
After explaining the origins of the view that God is timeless, he considers how Aquinas might interpret his 4 examples. Aquinas held that God’s actions are not temporal even though the effects of God’s actions ARE temporal. In explaining Aquinas’ view, W. distinguishes between an everlasting event and a temporal event (p. 155). He acknowledges that Aquinas and others could argue that the biblical language is misleading and could plausibly interpret these passages as being consistent with the view that God is timeless. But, he then asks whether Aquinas’s strategy can be generalized – that is, whether every act of God that appears to be temporal could be re-interpreted as eternal via Aquinas’ strategy. At the bottom of the left-hand column on p. 157, he identifies 3 types of divine actions that cannot be successfully interpreted as eternal.
Later on p. 157, W. adds that God’s role as a Planner is inconsistent with the doctrine that God is timeless. Finally, on p. 158, he explains why two key passages that appear to support the doctrine that God does not change actually do not support the doctrine that God does not change and thus cannot be used to support the doctrine that God is timeless.
Monday, January 11, 2010
L3 Reading Guide: Omniscience (Pike)
Reading: Pike, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action”, pp. 144-149
This is an excerpt from a longer article that appeared in Philosophical Review in 1965. In the longer article, Pike considers a couple of attempts to render traditional assumptions about omniscience compatible with human freedom. Here, the editors have chosen to focus on Pike’s description of the basic problem. The problem that Pike is concerned with is this: GIVEN certain assumptions about the nature of God, omniscience itself, knowledge, the limits of human power, and what is required for voluntary action, divine omniscience is incompatible with voluntary action. Thus, no human action is voluntary. The editors have given a very good summary/overview on p. 144 of Pike’s argument, so I recommend reading that before reading the article. Note: Pike is not concerned with the question of whether each of these assumptions is true; rather, he is simply taking some common assumptions and pointing out that they jointly produce the conclusion that divine omniscience is incompatible with human freedom. According to Pike, we can escape this conclusion only by rejecting one or more of the assumptions that jointly entail it.
In editing this, the editors cut out Pike’s initial explication of the doctrine of omniscience and what it entails. However, Pike’s assumptions about knowledge and about the implications of omniscience are stated on p. 147 beginning with “To conclude:”. I recommend reading this paragraph before reading the article. In this summation, Pike also explains the concept of essential omniscience. To say that God is essentially omniscient (omniscience is essential to God’s nature) is to say that God is by definition omniscient; any being who claims to be God, but is not omniscient is not God. In Pike’s formal statement of the argument on p. 146, premises 1 and 2 “make explicit the doctrine of God’s (essential) omniscience with which I am working” (146).
Things to Think About:
- Is Pike right? That is, does endorsing all of these assumptions entail that divine omniscience is incompatible with human freedom?
- Many Christians would find Pike’s conclusion that omniscience is incompatible with human freedom disturbing. Should they find this conclusion disturbing?
- Assuming that the theist wants to preserve both God’s omniscience and human freedom, how might he do this? Which, if any, of the traditional assumptions about omniscience, God, etc., should the theist reject? Note: in thinking about this, think about the implications of rejecting particular assumptions.
This is an excerpt from a longer article that appeared in Philosophical Review in 1965. In the longer article, Pike considers a couple of attempts to render traditional assumptions about omniscience compatible with human freedom. Here, the editors have chosen to focus on Pike’s description of the basic problem. The problem that Pike is concerned with is this: GIVEN certain assumptions about the nature of God, omniscience itself, knowledge, the limits of human power, and what is required for voluntary action, divine omniscience is incompatible with voluntary action. Thus, no human action is voluntary. The editors have given a very good summary/overview on p. 144 of Pike’s argument, so I recommend reading that before reading the article. Note: Pike is not concerned with the question of whether each of these assumptions is true; rather, he is simply taking some common assumptions and pointing out that they jointly produce the conclusion that divine omniscience is incompatible with human freedom. According to Pike, we can escape this conclusion only by rejecting one or more of the assumptions that jointly entail it.
In editing this, the editors cut out Pike’s initial explication of the doctrine of omniscience and what it entails. However, Pike’s assumptions about knowledge and about the implications of omniscience are stated on p. 147 beginning with “To conclude:”. I recommend reading this paragraph before reading the article. In this summation, Pike also explains the concept of essential omniscience. To say that God is essentially omniscient (omniscience is essential to God’s nature) is to say that God is by definition omniscient; any being who claims to be God, but is not omniscient is not God. In Pike’s formal statement of the argument on p. 146, premises 1 and 2 “make explicit the doctrine of God’s (essential) omniscience with which I am working” (146).
Things to Think About:
- Is Pike right? That is, does endorsing all of these assumptions entail that divine omniscience is incompatible with human freedom?
- Many Christians would find Pike’s conclusion that omniscience is incompatible with human freedom disturbing. Should they find this conclusion disturbing?
- Assuming that the theist wants to preserve both God’s omniscience and human freedom, how might he do this? Which, if any, of the traditional assumptions about omniscience, God, etc., should the theist reject? Note: in thinking about this, think about the implications of rejecting particular assumptions.
Thursday, January 7, 2010
L2 Reading Guide: Omnipotence
Reading: Aquinas, “God Is Omnipotent” (pp. 138-140) & Mavrodes, “Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence” (pp. 141-143)
Aquinas
In this reading, Aquinas discusses how we should interpret or understand the claim that God is omnipotent. Does the claim that God is all-powerful entail that He is able to do anything and everything or are there some things even an omnipotent being cannot do?
For those of you who are not used to reading Aquinas, it may be helpful to outline the structure of this short excerpt from the Summa. Aquinas begins, as is his standard practice, by identifying objections. He indicates disagreement with the objections, then at “I answer that” begins to sketch his own position. After he finishes describing his position, he then responds directly to each objection.
“The Philosopher” = Aristotle
Aquinas begins to articulate his own position at the bottom of p. 138. At the top of p. 139, he tells us that “this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible”. But this claim needs further clarification, for there are different senses in which something is possible or impossible. For instance, it is physically impossible for me to pick up my car using my own brute strength; however, it is physically possible for a lot of people working together to pick up my car. However, if God can do all things just means that he can do all things that are physically possible for human beings to do, then that’s not that impressive.
Aquinas explores two interpretations of the claim that something is possible. We might mean that it is possible “in relation to some power”, either human or divine OR we might mean that it is possible “absolutely”. Aquinas rejects the first alternative. I’ve already partially explained above why we wouldn’t want to define God’s omnipotence “in relation to” human power. See the text for Aquinas’ explanation of why it is a mistake to define God’s omnipotence as the ability to “do all things that are possible to His power”. Having rejected the first alternative, Aquinas then explains what is meant by the claim that an omnipotent being can do anything that is “possible absolutely”. His initial explication may be a bit puzzling to some of you, but it becomes clearer as he goes on. Although he does not use this terminology, Aquinas is essentially saying that God can do anything that is logically possible. He then concludes that omnipotence doesn’t imply the ability to do things that are logically impossible; still, “it is more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them” (139).
At this point, Aquinas turns his attention to responding to the 4 objections he sketched on p. 138. The most interesting and informative of these is his response to Objection 2.
Mavrodes
Mavrodes begins by summarizing Aquinas’ position. He then contrasts two counter-examples to the doctrine of omnipotence:
(1) God “cannot draw a square circle”.
(2) God “cannot create a stone too heavy for Him to lift”.
He points out that Aquinas has a perfectly good explanation for why (1) is not a threat to God’s omnipotence. Ultimately, he thinks that Aquinas’ explanation also extends to (2). However, he thinks that (2) is “a more involved problem”. Here, he contrasts the claim that “x is able to draw a square circle” with the claim that “x is able to make a thing too heavy for x to lift”; the former claim, but not the latter, obviously “involve(s) a contradiction”. So, there appears to be a significant difference between these two claims. Mavrodes then argues that counterexample (2) does not force us to give up the doctrine of God’s omnipotence because omnipotence is not damaged by the inability to do “self-contradictory thing(s)” (142). Mavrodes must, then, establish that (2) involves a contradiction. Mavrodes’ main argument begins with “The specious nature of the problem may be seen in this way” (left-hand column, p. 142). Mavrodes notes that the objector can't, in articulating his objection, assume that God is NOT omnipotent, for then his argument would be circular. So, the objector must be understood as mounting a reductio argument. For those of you who don’t know or need a refresher, a reductio (aka reductio ad absurdum) seeks to demonstrate the falsity of a particular claim (“God is omnipotent”, “God exists”, “Human beings are naturally good”, etc. ) by assuming its truth and showing that the assumption that the claim is true produces an absurdity or a contradiction. Mavrodes claims that the objector can’t construct a successful reductio: “On the assumption that God is omnipotent, the phrase ‘a stone too heavy for God to lift’ becomes self-contradictory.” (142) Mavrodes unpacks this line of thought, then considers the possibility that someone might insist that the phrase “a stone too heavy for God (an omnipotent being) to lift” is NOT a contradiction in terms. Mavrodes argues that even if we assume the objector is right, this does not undermine the doctrine of God’s omnipotence. The last few paragraphs propose a different way of understanding why (2) is a specious challenge to God’s omnipotence.
Aquinas
In this reading, Aquinas discusses how we should interpret or understand the claim that God is omnipotent. Does the claim that God is all-powerful entail that He is able to do anything and everything or are there some things even an omnipotent being cannot do?
For those of you who are not used to reading Aquinas, it may be helpful to outline the structure of this short excerpt from the Summa. Aquinas begins, as is his standard practice, by identifying objections. He indicates disagreement with the objections, then at “I answer that” begins to sketch his own position. After he finishes describing his position, he then responds directly to each objection.
“The Philosopher” = Aristotle
Aquinas begins to articulate his own position at the bottom of p. 138. At the top of p. 139, he tells us that “this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible”. But this claim needs further clarification, for there are different senses in which something is possible or impossible. For instance, it is physically impossible for me to pick up my car using my own brute strength; however, it is physically possible for a lot of people working together to pick up my car. However, if God can do all things just means that he can do all things that are physically possible for human beings to do, then that’s not that impressive.
Aquinas explores two interpretations of the claim that something is possible. We might mean that it is possible “in relation to some power”, either human or divine OR we might mean that it is possible “absolutely”. Aquinas rejects the first alternative. I’ve already partially explained above why we wouldn’t want to define God’s omnipotence “in relation to” human power. See the text for Aquinas’ explanation of why it is a mistake to define God’s omnipotence as the ability to “do all things that are possible to His power”. Having rejected the first alternative, Aquinas then explains what is meant by the claim that an omnipotent being can do anything that is “possible absolutely”. His initial explication may be a bit puzzling to some of you, but it becomes clearer as he goes on. Although he does not use this terminology, Aquinas is essentially saying that God can do anything that is logically possible. He then concludes that omnipotence doesn’t imply the ability to do things that are logically impossible; still, “it is more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them” (139).
At this point, Aquinas turns his attention to responding to the 4 objections he sketched on p. 138. The most interesting and informative of these is his response to Objection 2.
Mavrodes
Mavrodes begins by summarizing Aquinas’ position. He then contrasts two counter-examples to the doctrine of omnipotence:
(1) God “cannot draw a square circle”.
(2) God “cannot create a stone too heavy for Him to lift”.
He points out that Aquinas has a perfectly good explanation for why (1) is not a threat to God’s omnipotence. Ultimately, he thinks that Aquinas’ explanation also extends to (2). However, he thinks that (2) is “a more involved problem”. Here, he contrasts the claim that “x is able to draw a square circle” with the claim that “x is able to make a thing too heavy for x to lift”; the former claim, but not the latter, obviously “involve(s) a contradiction”. So, there appears to be a significant difference between these two claims. Mavrodes then argues that counterexample (2) does not force us to give up the doctrine of God’s omnipotence because omnipotence is not damaged by the inability to do “self-contradictory thing(s)” (142). Mavrodes must, then, establish that (2) involves a contradiction. Mavrodes’ main argument begins with “The specious nature of the problem may be seen in this way” (left-hand column, p. 142). Mavrodes notes that the objector can't, in articulating his objection, assume that God is NOT omnipotent, for then his argument would be circular. So, the objector must be understood as mounting a reductio argument. For those of you who don’t know or need a refresher, a reductio (aka reductio ad absurdum) seeks to demonstrate the falsity of a particular claim (“God is omnipotent”, “God exists”, “Human beings are naturally good”, etc. ) by assuming its truth and showing that the assumption that the claim is true produces an absurdity or a contradiction. Mavrodes claims that the objector can’t construct a successful reductio: “On the assumption that God is omnipotent, the phrase ‘a stone too heavy for God to lift’ becomes self-contradictory.” (142) Mavrodes unpacks this line of thought, then considers the possibility that someone might insist that the phrase “a stone too heavy for God (an omnipotent being) to lift” is NOT a contradiction in terms. Mavrodes argues that even if we assume the objector is right, this does not undermine the doctrine of God’s omnipotence. The last few paragraphs propose a different way of understanding why (2) is a specious challenge to God’s omnipotence.
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