Note: I misplaced my copy of the 2nd edition of our text, so I was not able to copy the Taylor article for you. Instead, I’ve substituted the Reichenbach article, which is in both the 3rd and 4th editions of the text, and is, if I remember Taylor well, more accessible.
Reading: Reichenbach, “The Cosmological Argument”, pp. 187-195 and Aquinas, “The Classical Cosmological Argument”, pp. 184-186.
We will focus on the Reichenbach article in class, especially section 6. The Aquinas is assigned primarily for background.
Reichenbach
Note: If you’re already familiar with Hume’s basic approach, then you can skip my explanation. Similarly, if you’re already familiar with the idea of a “God of the gaps”, there’s no need to read my explanation.
Since the editors provide a good summary of this article, I would recommend reading that too.
Reichenbach begins by summarizing Aquinas’ version (or one of them) of the cosmological argument, then notes that during the Enlightenment, the Principle of Sufficient Reason “gradually” replaced Aristotelian physics as the basis of the cosmological argument. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is stated on p. 188. Reichenbach endorses the moderate version of this principle. According to Reichenbach, the PSR “is not derivable from more basic principles”, but “this is not to say that the principle is unjustified” (188). Rather, the principle can be justified in two ways: (1) by considering the requirements of explanation (the “epistemological” ground) or (2) by grounding it in the nature of contingent beings (the “ontological” ground),
For those of you who are unfamiliar with Hume, two points are especially pertinent in the context of R’s discussion of Hume on p. 188. First, Hume believed that our knowledge of the world comes through ideas, which themselves are copies of impressions we receive through the senses and through reflection. Second, Hume was a skeptic with respect to causation; as a good Empiricist (knowledge comes through experience), he pointed out that we never observe causation; rather, what we observe is constant correlation and temporal order. Suppose we observe that event A always precedes event B. We then infer that A caused B, but strictly speaking, we don’t have sufficient warrant for this inference.
In sections 2 & 3, Reichenbach makes two important distinctions. The first is between a partial explanation and a full explanation; the central point here is that “theistic arguments demand that whatever exists contingently or arises contingently have a full explanation” (189). Opponents tend to reject the requirement that there be a “full” explanation. The second distinguishes scientific from personal explanations. This distinction is significant because defenders of the cosmological argument assume that personal explanations, explanations that appeal to a person’s intentions and his acting on those intentions, are legitimate explanations. However, as Reichenbach points out on p. 190, “the events in question (the things that need to be explained, e.g., the coming into being of the universe – RS) must be intrinsically and not merely accidentally, completely inexplicable by scientific or natural explanations”. He then gives a helpful example.
For those of you who are unfamiliar with the phrase God of the gaps, the basic idea is this: Historically, when a philosopher reached a point at which there was a gap between the conclusion his argument supported and the conclusion he desired to prove, he’d often plug the gap by postulating the existence of God. For instance, Descartes, having established that there is reason to doubt the existence of the external world and having presumed that we should not believe anything doubtful, finds himself in a bind. He wants to restore knowledge of the external world, but if the slightest reason for doubt means that we don’t have knowledge, there’s clearly a problem. Descartes’ solution is to postulate that clear and distinct ideas can’t be doubted because God, being a morally perfect being, is not a deceiver and thus would not create us such that even our clear and distinct ideas could be false. So, God’s existence is postulated in order to guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas; since some of our clear and distinct ideas are about the external world, Descartes has reached the conclusion he wants simply by postulating that God exists and is not a deceiver. (He does give arguments for these claims, but of his two arguments, one is viciously circular and the other is a version of the ontological argument.)
In section 6, Reichenbach gives a general statement of the cosmological argument. Pay attention to his definitions of a contingent being and a necessary being. We are contingent beings; we actually exist, but we “can not-exist”. At some point, each of us will cease to exist. A necessary being is defined as “a being which, if it exists, cannot not-exist” (191). Reichenbach explains the significance of the “if it exists” clause on p. 194, when he distinguishes logical necessity from ontological or factual necessity. From pp. 191-194, Reichenbach discusses and rebuts three objections to the cosmological argument set out on p. 191. In section 6.1, he discusses Russell’s objection that the existence of the universe doesn’t need to be explained. Russell gives two different arguments to support this objection. Since the second version is hard to evaluate given the disagreement in quantum physics about indeterminacy, focus on the first version. The second objection Reichenbach responds to is Hume’s objection that explaining each of the parts is sufficient to explain the whole; thus, if we can explain each part of the universe, we’ve explained the universe itself. This argument seems to presume that the whole is nothing over and above the sum of its parts. The third objection is that the cosmological argument “presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument” (194). In response, Reichenbach points out that the cosmological argument and the ontological argument rely on different conceptions of a necessary being. Thus, the former does not presuppose the latter. In the last section, he provides four reasons why appealing to God provides “the best or ultimate” explanation of the existence of the universe.
Aquinas
Read the editors’ summary of the article. In your reading of the article, focus on the initial argument, which is set out in paragraphs 1 and 3 (the editors omitted paragraph 2). Don’t worry too much about the details of the argument. Aquinas relies on Aristotle’s arguments for a prime mover. Unfortunately, he does not always provide Aristotle’s argument; sometimes, he just says “as it is proved in the Physics” and assumes that his audience is familiar with that part of Aristotle’s argument.
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6 comments:
Perhaps I need to get refreshed on Aristotle, but I'm not buying Aquinas's argument about an unmoved mover. His logic produces an explanation that a theoretical unmoved mover could exist, but nothing exists that necessarily makes that unmoved mover a god. His explanation could be used to show that something must account for the movement of all things, but nothing conclusive mandates that that be a deity. Reichenbach suffers from a similar end, in that he does not explicitly prove the existence of God. Rather, he concludes that there must be something, which I find unconvincing.
Aquinas’ cosmological argument may have merit but would require some tweaking to conform to modern knowledge. A current application of it dives strait to the beginning of the universe and into a realm that scientists claim to be able to know very little about. What possibly could have caused the big bang? Is it similar to virtual particles only in this case the universe just spat out a bomb big enough to create us?
As for Reichenbach, I am very wary whenever a philosopher begins to talk about quantum mechanics. While various interpretations of quantum mechanics do exist, they are not all on equal footing. Most philosophers tend to treat both the credible and less credible options as equal and many treat the less credible ones as superior. Often times the descriptions they rely on are mediocre and Reichenbach is no exception. That being said this deficiency is probably not fatal.
I think that in this type of argument, faith stops too short and science goes too far. Aquinas does not have the scientific background of 21st century thinkers, he has gaps in his argument that prove so. My question would be, why can’t the chain of movers proceed to infinity? I guess I really don’t understand his Aristotle arguments against this claim. On the other hand there are things which science cannot prove. I don’t believe that science can prove the existence of God. Humans might be able to make theories and maybe prove how the world came in the existence (big bang, ect.) but it is impossible to prove that there is or was a “unmoved mover”.
I am not sold on Aquinas's assertion that all things that move are moved by a seperate mover. However, even if i were to accept this notion for the time being to move onto the pertinent argument, i am still at issue with his conclusion. He says that there can be no infinite amount of movers and that God must be the initial mover of the universe. If God can move though, who/what moves Him? Are we supposed to rely upon our Faith in his divine being in order to make this assertion. If so, this school of thought is no different than that which is was conceived to contradict.
One claim made in the cosmological argument deals with the clash between scientific and personal explanations. I don't agree with the fact that personal explanations provide as legitimate an explanation as a scientific one merely because, as stated in the reading, scientific explanations always have gaps in them, inevitably to be filled by admittance of not fully understanding how to attain a complete solution. Scientific explanations create barriers on which they can only be formed and focus on an x, y, z, formula rather than on determining the basis or intentions which led to a problem. As stated in the reading, the brain may cause a person to act in a manner in which they have no actual intention. While this may have a scientific explanation, it fails to yield the answer as to why the body would be constructed in such a manner as to do this.
I want to focus on Reichenbach. He does admit that he (believes he) has proven the existence of a god, but not necessarily the God of any particular religious tradition. Good for him for not making that leap. However, I find the idea that "The Principle of Sufficient Reason" is inapplicable to God rather.. shall we say, hokey. That's almost as bad as saying "We can never understand God fully, so we just have to trust that he exists/is all powerful/etc." In relation to Aquinas, (and a little to Reichenbach) why can't there be an infinite line of movers (using Aquinas's/Aristotelian speech)? I know Laura touched on this, but I felt the same way and had to ask the question. While I feel slightly convinced by the arguments, moreso than the ontological argument, it still doesn't hold too much water with me, especially since I feel much like Edward in that I don't see why that being must be godly or divine in any way.
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