Reading: Swinburne, "Why God Allows Evil", pp. 95-113 (handout)
Reading Guide: Tuesday, we'll start with a brief description of the standard free will defense so that it is clear how Swinburne's position improves upon the standard free will defense. Swinburne provides a free will defense with a bit of a twist. His thesis is stated at the bottom of p. 96. One of the important twists is that he makes it really clear that it is "free and responsible choice that is so valuable, not free will narrowly defined (p.98). He stresses that responsibility and usefulness are great goods, goods that we moderns may undervalue. In explicating the position that responsibility is a great good, he distinguishes between "genuine responsibility" and "limited responsibility" (p. 99). He then compares human parents to a divine parent (i.e., God). This theme of the responsibilities and privileges of parents is important, both in his defense of moral evils and his defense of natural evils. On p. 101, Swinburne argues that "in order to have a choice between good and evil (& thereby to have genuine responsibility - RS), agents need already a certain depravity, in the sense of a system of desires for what they correctly believe to be evil". Turning to the claim that usefulness is a great good, Swinburne argues that suffering is not "a pure loss" to those who suffer. On p. 102, he claims that "being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced upon you". He then discusses how suffering makes the sufferer useful and is thus a benefit to the sufferer. On pp. 103-107, he replies to two objections to his account of moral evil. In the course of responding to the second objection, Swinburne acknowledges that the benefit of Life may not, in particular cases, be sufficent "to outweigh the suffering" (106); still, we should "recall that it is an additional benefit to the sufferer that his suffering is the means whereby the one who hurt him had the opportunity to make a significant choice between good and evil ..." (106). This, of course, will not be much comfort to the sufferer. He closes the section on moral evil by acknowledging that there are limits (and sketching those limits) to God's right to allow some to suffer for the good of others.
At the bottom of p. 107, Swinburne begins to discuss the justification of natural evils. He argues that natural evils "make it possible for humans to have" free and responsible choice and "to make available to humans specially worthwhile kinds of choices" (107). After articulating two ways in which natural evils make these "specially worthwhile kinds of choices" available, he introduces the objection that natural evils are unnecessary overkill on God's part (109). After responding to this objection, he briefly discusses whether the suffering of animals can be justified, poses a thought-experiment, and identifies his "fall-back" position.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
L18 Reading Guide Mackie
Reading: J.L. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, pp. 288-296
Mackie was a well-respected British philosopher who was equally well known for his atheism. His book The Miracle of Theism is a tightly reasoned rejection of theism and defense of atheism. The article you are reading for Friday is an earlier piece, originally published in 1955. Mackie died in 1983.
Notice that Mackie is arguing for a very strong thesis, viz., “that religious beliefs … are positively irrational”.
Mackie, like Hume, does not explicitly include omniscience in his description of the problem of evil, but presumably a being that lacked knowledge would also lack power and thus would not be omnipotent. So, he may be implicitly assuming that God is omniscient. Mackie seems to assume that omnipotence means being able to do anything (even something that is logically impossible).
On page 289-290, Mackie distinguishes between adequate and fallacious solutions to the problem of evil. An adequate solution to the problem of evil gives up one of the assumptions that generate the problem (e.g., revising the dfn of omnipotence). Fallacious solutions “explicitly maintain all the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil” (290). Mackie then argues that 4 popular solutions to the problem of evil are fallacious.
Mackie was a well-respected British philosopher who was equally well known for his atheism. His book The Miracle of Theism is a tightly reasoned rejection of theism and defense of atheism. The article you are reading for Friday is an earlier piece, originally published in 1955. Mackie died in 1983.
Notice that Mackie is arguing for a very strong thesis, viz., “that religious beliefs … are positively irrational”.
Mackie, like Hume, does not explicitly include omniscience in his description of the problem of evil, but presumably a being that lacked knowledge would also lack power and thus would not be omnipotent. So, he may be implicitly assuming that God is omniscient. Mackie seems to assume that omnipotence means being able to do anything (even something that is logically impossible).
On page 289-290, Mackie distinguishes between adequate and fallacious solutions to the problem of evil. An adequate solution to the problem of evil gives up one of the assumptions that generate the problem (e.g., revising the dfn of omnipotence). Fallacious solutions “explicitly maintain all the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil” (290). Mackie then argues that 4 popular solutions to the problem of evil are fallacious.
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
L17 Reading Guide
Reading: Hume, "Evil Makes a Strong Case Against God's Existence", pp. 276-281
Reading Guide The editors' summary is quite good; they helpfully tell you a little bit about each character in this dialogue (Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes). The first few pages consist of a catalog of the evils of this world -- the evils suffered by human beings and by other animals are described in very striking terms. Man is not an exception to the rule that "every animal is surrounded with enemies which incessantly seek his misery and destruction" (277). Even though man can conquer his natural enemies (lions, tigers, and bears, oh my), other enemies arise to take their place. Demea lists a number of physical, psychological and social woes, concluding that "All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man, but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them (i.e., ills of life -RS) almost ... is sufficient to render life ineligible" (278). Philo chimes in at this point, asserting that the only reason we don't kill ourselves is that we're "afraid of death": "We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence" (278). He also responds to the charge that things aren't really so bad; it's only our "wretched temper" (i.e., temperament) and "delicate sensibilities" that make us miserable.
On p. 279, we have the first statement of the problem of evil (top of the page, right-hand column). Notice that omniscience is not explicitly mentioned. This is likely because omnipotence seems to imply omniscience. On p. 280, Demea proposes his solution, a solution that Cleanthes vehemently rejects. Cleanthes' own solution seems equally unsatisfactory -- insist that the evils of life are outweighed by the goods of life. Philo rejects Cleanthes' solution, but he grants it for the sake of argument. Still, even if Cleanthes is right, a revised version of the original problem rears its ugly head: How can a benevolent, all-powerful God allow ANY misery?
Finally, Philo says that even if he grants that evil is compatible with the existence of God, this doesn't help Cleanthes: "A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient". (281)
Reading Guide The editors' summary is quite good; they helpfully tell you a little bit about each character in this dialogue (Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes). The first few pages consist of a catalog of the evils of this world -- the evils suffered by human beings and by other animals are described in very striking terms. Man is not an exception to the rule that "every animal is surrounded with enemies which incessantly seek his misery and destruction" (277). Even though man can conquer his natural enemies (lions, tigers, and bears, oh my), other enemies arise to take their place. Demea lists a number of physical, psychological and social woes, concluding that "All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man, but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them (i.e., ills of life -RS) almost ... is sufficient to render life ineligible" (278). Philo chimes in at this point, asserting that the only reason we don't kill ourselves is that we're "afraid of death": "We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence" (278). He also responds to the charge that things aren't really so bad; it's only our "wretched temper" (i.e., temperament) and "delicate sensibilities" that make us miserable.
On p. 279, we have the first statement of the problem of evil (top of the page, right-hand column). Notice that omniscience is not explicitly mentioned. This is likely because omnipotence seems to imply omniscience. On p. 280, Demea proposes his solution, a solution that Cleanthes vehemently rejects. Cleanthes' own solution seems equally unsatisfactory -- insist that the evils of life are outweighed by the goods of life. Philo rejects Cleanthes' solution, but he grants it for the sake of argument. Still, even if Cleanthes is right, a revised version of the original problem rears its ugly head: How can a benevolent, all-powerful God allow ANY misery?
Finally, Philo says that even if he grants that evil is compatible with the existence of God, this doesn't help Cleanthes: "A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient". (281)
Friday, February 19, 2010
L16 Reading Guide, Swinburne on miracles
Reading: Swinburne, “Miracles and Historical Evidence”, pp. 455-460
Reading Guide
Swinburne seems to be defining miracles as events that cannot be explained by the laws of nature because these events are physically impossible. In contrast to Hume, he broadens the scope of evidence for miracles. The basic distinction is between historical evidence, which is divided into 3 types (testimony, our own apparent memories, physical traces), and scientific evidence (“our contemporary understanding of what things are physically impossible or improbable”, 455).
On p. 456, Swinburne articulates a basic principle and 3 subsidiary principles regarding how to weigh evidence. He takes these principles to be non-controversial, “adopted … by and large by all historical investigators” (457). In the course of discussing the first subsidiary principle, he uses a term that may be unfamiliar to some of you; ceteris paribus means “all other things equal”. His discussion of the 2nd subsidiary principle may be a bit difficult for some of you to follow, but I think the example of Smith and Jones should help you understand what he means. Basically, he’s talking about a process of making finer and finer distinctions. For example, we can lump all testimonial evidence together or we can make classifications within the category of testimony (e.g., testimony of children vs. testimony of adults, testimony of those who have a stake in the outcome vs. testimony of those who have no stake, Jones’ testimony vs. Smith’s testimony). The need to make narrower classifications is spurred by the conflict of testimony. After making these finer-grained distinctions, we then assess which class of testimony is more reliable.
Swinburne then turns to the question of whether historical or scientific evidence should take precedence when trying to determine whether a miracle has occurred. He agrees with Hume that “we should accept the historical evidence … only if the falsity of the” historical evidence “would be ‘more miraculous’, i.e., more improbable ‘than the event which he relates’” (459). However, he rejects the assumption that scientific evidence automatically takes precedence, an assumption that Antony Flew, an influential modern Humean, accepts and attributes to Hume. Flew identifies what he takes to be an important difference between historical evidence and the laws of nature, viz., that the latter can “in theory, though obviously not always in practice, be tested at any time by any person” (Flew, quoted in Swinburne, 457). Swinburne gives a plausible interpretation of why Flew takes this to be significant, but then argues that the contrast that Flew draws is incorrect. So, “Flew’s justification of his principle” – the principle that scientific evidence always outweighs historical evidence – “is mistaken” (457). But this does not establish that Flew’s principle is wrong. In the last 2+ pages of the article, Swinburne argues that Flew’s principle is wrong: “claims that some formula L is a law of nature, and claims that apparent memory, testimony, or traces of certain types are to be relied on are claims established ultimately in a similar kind of way … and will be strong or weak for the same reasons, and so neither ought to take automatic preference over the other” (457). This section is a bit technical, but I think the basic points are clear enough. Just pay attention to what the variables stand for – L = a specific law of nature, C = correlation between a specific type of (historical) evidence and the facts/the truth (basically, C specifies reliability), and E = the (alleged) event. When scientific and historical evidence conflict, we determine which takes precedence by considering (a) whether L or C is better established (see p. 458, 1st full paragraph for a statement of how a L or C is established) and (b) whether the L is universal or statistical and (c) whether the C is universal or statistical. Swinburne admits that “in general any one correlation C will be less well established than L, and since L will usually be a universal law, its evidence will in general be preferred to that of C” (459). Still, there may be exceptions to the general rule such that the historical evidence will trump the scientific evidence.
Reading Guide
Swinburne seems to be defining miracles as events that cannot be explained by the laws of nature because these events are physically impossible. In contrast to Hume, he broadens the scope of evidence for miracles. The basic distinction is between historical evidence, which is divided into 3 types (testimony, our own apparent memories, physical traces), and scientific evidence (“our contemporary understanding of what things are physically impossible or improbable”, 455).
On p. 456, Swinburne articulates a basic principle and 3 subsidiary principles regarding how to weigh evidence. He takes these principles to be non-controversial, “adopted … by and large by all historical investigators” (457). In the course of discussing the first subsidiary principle, he uses a term that may be unfamiliar to some of you; ceteris paribus means “all other things equal”. His discussion of the 2nd subsidiary principle may be a bit difficult for some of you to follow, but I think the example of Smith and Jones should help you understand what he means. Basically, he’s talking about a process of making finer and finer distinctions. For example, we can lump all testimonial evidence together or we can make classifications within the category of testimony (e.g., testimony of children vs. testimony of adults, testimony of those who have a stake in the outcome vs. testimony of those who have no stake, Jones’ testimony vs. Smith’s testimony). The need to make narrower classifications is spurred by the conflict of testimony. After making these finer-grained distinctions, we then assess which class of testimony is more reliable.
Swinburne then turns to the question of whether historical or scientific evidence should take precedence when trying to determine whether a miracle has occurred. He agrees with Hume that “we should accept the historical evidence … only if the falsity of the” historical evidence “would be ‘more miraculous’, i.e., more improbable ‘than the event which he relates’” (459). However, he rejects the assumption that scientific evidence automatically takes precedence, an assumption that Antony Flew, an influential modern Humean, accepts and attributes to Hume. Flew identifies what he takes to be an important difference between historical evidence and the laws of nature, viz., that the latter can “in theory, though obviously not always in practice, be tested at any time by any person” (Flew, quoted in Swinburne, 457). Swinburne gives a plausible interpretation of why Flew takes this to be significant, but then argues that the contrast that Flew draws is incorrect. So, “Flew’s justification of his principle” – the principle that scientific evidence always outweighs historical evidence – “is mistaken” (457). But this does not establish that Flew’s principle is wrong. In the last 2+ pages of the article, Swinburne argues that Flew’s principle is wrong: “claims that some formula L is a law of nature, and claims that apparent memory, testimony, or traces of certain types are to be relied on are claims established ultimately in a similar kind of way … and will be strong or weak for the same reasons, and so neither ought to take automatic preference over the other” (457). This section is a bit technical, but I think the basic points are clear enough. Just pay attention to what the variables stand for – L = a specific law of nature, C = correlation between a specific type of (historical) evidence and the facts/the truth (basically, C specifies reliability), and E = the (alleged) event. When scientific and historical evidence conflict, we determine which takes precedence by considering (a) whether L or C is better established (see p. 458, 1st full paragraph for a statement of how a L or C is established) and (b) whether the L is universal or statistical and (c) whether the C is universal or statistical. Swinburne admits that “in general any one correlation C will be less well established than L, and since L will usually be a universal law, its evidence will in general be preferred to that of C” (459). Still, there may be exceptions to the general rule such that the historical evidence will trump the scientific evidence.
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
L13 Reading Guide: Hume on Miracles
Reading: Hume, “The Evidence for Miracles is Weak”, pp. 441-447
Reminder: Whitney is presenting tomorrow. Please be well prepared for class.
Reading Guide: The editors’ summary of this piece is good and the section titles are helpful. Hume’s basic line of argument is straightforward - the evidence against miracles is stronger than the evidence in favor of miracles.
Hume begins by describing the burden of proof on those who allege that miracles have occurred: “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact, which it endeavors to establish”(441-442). He adds that even when the unlikelihood of the testimony’s being false is higher than the unlikelihood of the miracle having occurred, this is still not decisive proof that a miracle has occurred. The force of this fact is diminished by the unlikelihood of the miracle’s having occurred; so, the likelihood of a miracle having occurred is equal to the unlikelihood of the testimony’s being false MINUS the unlikelihood of the miracle having occurred. I think it is obvious that satisfying this burden of proof would be very difficult. Next, Hume articulates several reasons "why we should doubt reports of miraculous events"(442). Each of these is important. Notice that Hume sets out some stiff requirements for witnesses being reliable. In the section on our gullibility, Hume notes our willingness to set aside normal principles of reasoning in order to feed our "passion for surprise and wonder" (442). In his discussion of the counterevidence against miracles, Hume works through a couple of examples and explains why, despite the supposed evidence for the miracles, reason was on the side of the skeptics. The last paragraph of this section is especially important. On p. 445, Hume gives us, via analysis of an example - darkness covering the earth - a description of the kind of evidence that would be needed to make it reasonable to believe on the basis of testimony that a miracle has occurred. He then contrasts this example with the example of testimony that Queen Elizabeth died, was buried for a month, and then came back to life. Pay attention to his analysis of these two examples. Notice that Hume issues an important caveat here: "there may possibly be miracles .. of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony" (445). However, it is doubtful that we would ever be in the position to know that a miracle has occurred. Hume concludes by disputing the testimony of the authors of the Pentateuch (the first 5 books of the Bible).
Terminology:
prodigies = miracles
Maxim = a principle
Reminder: Whitney is presenting tomorrow. Please be well prepared for class.
Reading Guide: The editors’ summary of this piece is good and the section titles are helpful. Hume’s basic line of argument is straightforward - the evidence against miracles is stronger than the evidence in favor of miracles.
Hume begins by describing the burden of proof on those who allege that miracles have occurred: “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact, which it endeavors to establish”(441-442). He adds that even when the unlikelihood of the testimony’s being false is higher than the unlikelihood of the miracle having occurred, this is still not decisive proof that a miracle has occurred. The force of this fact is diminished by the unlikelihood of the miracle’s having occurred; so, the likelihood of a miracle having occurred is equal to the unlikelihood of the testimony’s being false MINUS the unlikelihood of the miracle having occurred. I think it is obvious that satisfying this burden of proof would be very difficult. Next, Hume articulates several reasons "why we should doubt reports of miraculous events"(442). Each of these is important. Notice that Hume sets out some stiff requirements for witnesses being reliable. In the section on our gullibility, Hume notes our willingness to set aside normal principles of reasoning in order to feed our "passion for surprise and wonder" (442). In his discussion of the counterevidence against miracles, Hume works through a couple of examples and explains why, despite the supposed evidence for the miracles, reason was on the side of the skeptics. The last paragraph of this section is especially important. On p. 445, Hume gives us, via analysis of an example - darkness covering the earth - a description of the kind of evidence that would be needed to make it reasonable to believe on the basis of testimony that a miracle has occurred. He then contrasts this example with the example of testimony that Queen Elizabeth died, was buried for a month, and then came back to life. Pay attention to his analysis of these two examples. Notice that Hume issues an important caveat here: "there may possibly be miracles .. of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony" (445). However, it is doubtful that we would ever be in the position to know that a miracle has occurred. Hume concludes by disputing the testimony of the authors of the Pentateuch (the first 5 books of the Bible).
Terminology:
prodigies = miracles
Maxim = a principle
Monday, February 8, 2010
Paper Assignment (due T16 C.O.B.)
Phil 402
Dr. Smith
Paper Assignment 1
Due Date: T16, C.O.B.
Length: 5-7 pages, typed, double-spaced, using Times New Roman, 10-12 point font
Assignment: Choose an important issue in philosophy of religion that interests you. It should be clear from your paper why this issue is important. Frame the issue or question, then defend your own answer to the question OR subject another person’s argument to critical evaluation and defend your assessment of that person’s argument. A few topic suggestions are listed below; you may choose a topic that is on the list or you may write on some other topic.
Constraints:
You may not recycle a paper you’ve written for another class. Nor may you use this paper for a future class.
Your paper topic should be manageable; that is, it should be possible to write a good, 5-7 page paper on this topic. Your discussion should not be superficial, repetitive, or padded with filler.
Your topic should clearly fall within philosophy of religion. If you have any doubts about whether your topic is acceptable, please run it by me.
Point Value: 175
Documentation: Include a documentation statement at the end of your paper. If no help was received, simply type “No help of any kind was received on this paper”. If you did receive help, indicate who gave you the help and what kind or kinds of help you received. See page 2 of this document for my policy on permissible and impermissible help.
Other Specifications: The last 4 digits of your social security number should appear on the title page. Your name should not appear anywhere on your paper. This is to make sure that I do not know whose paper I am grading. Please staple your papers and number your pages.
Keep a back-up copy of your paper!!
Your paper must be submitted to my university email account.
Audience: A reasonably intelligent person who is not in this class and has not read the authors you discuss should be able to understand their views by reading your paper. You will need to define any terms that would be unfamiliar to your target audience. If an author uses a term (e.g., ‘freedom’) in a non-standard sense, be sure to indicate how the author defines the term. In addition to describing the author’s view, you will need to explain why the author takes a particular stance on an issue. It is not enough to state an author’s argument; you must also explain the reasoning in your own words. I’m looking for evidence that you understand the philosophical issue you are discussing. I’m also looking for evidence of your ability to engage in sustained philosophical analysis.
Drafts: I am happy to meet with you to discuss your paper. I am also happy to read drafts; however, to ensure that I have time to give you useful feedback, you should get the draft to me at least 2 days before the paper is due. I can probably still read it after that point, but how much feedback I can give you will depend on how many drafts have been turned in. Furthermore, if there’s some major problem with your paper, you’ll want to know this while you still have time to correct it.
Permissible Help: In addition to consulting me, you may get help from an outside reader. The Writing Center is located on the first floor of Fairchild Hall in room 1A82. It is open Monday through Friday, periods 2 to 6. They are also open from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m., Sunday through Thursday. The Writing Center keeps an online appointment schedule; you can access it by going to the Registrar’s website. Although it is best, especially during busy times of the semester, to make an appointment, the Writing Center will take walk-ins IF time permits. Your reader may check for all the hallmarks of good writing – e.g., grammatical correctness, organization, focus and clarity. Your reader may also ask substantive questions as a way of helping you express yourself more clearly and may raise objections to your thesis. However, it is decidedly not permissible for your reader to answer those substantive questions and objections he poses. Nor is it permissible for him to correct your description of a philosopher’s view. Your reader may, however, point out that your interpretation is controversial or misleading. Again, any help that you receive must be documented; in your documentation, be sure to indicate both the source of help and the kind of help you got from that source. If you have a friend read your paper, make sure your friend has high standards and is not afraid to correct you.
Suggested Topics
1. Pike argues that certain common assumptions jointly produce a conflict between God’s existence and human free will. Identify and explain (where necessary) the assumptions that produce this result. It should be clear how each of these assumptions contributes to the conflict between God’s existence and human free will. Using examples, illustrate the conflict. Then do one of the following:
- discuss Boethius’ solution, consider how Pike would respond (see the online version of his article for this, available via JSTOR), and discuss whether Pike is correct to reject Boethius’ solution
- discuss one or more possible solutions and evaluate each for their adequacy
2. Consider a specific version of the ontological argument. State and explain an objection to the ontological argument OTHER than Gaunilo’s island objection. Then, discuss how a proponent of this version of the ontological argument might or should respond to the objection. Finally, assess the damage done to the argument by the objection (you can do this by considering whether the response the proponent of the argument offers or the response you offer is adequate).
3. State and explain the moral argument for the existence of God – see either the article in your text or C.S. Lewis’ moral argument for the existence of God. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this argument and take a stance on its overall power.
Other possibilities: (a) discuss the evidence for miracles, viz., the question of whether there can ever be sufficient evidence for miracles – evidence sufficient to make the belief that a miracle has occurred rational, (b) discuss the debate between religious realists and religious non-realists (see the articles in your text), (c) State and explain Pascal’s Wager, then discuss whether Pascal is right when he claims that it is more rational to bet on God’s existing than to bet against there being a God, etc..
Dr. Smith
Paper Assignment 1
Due Date: T16, C.O.B.
Length: 5-7 pages, typed, double-spaced, using Times New Roman, 10-12 point font
Assignment: Choose an important issue in philosophy of religion that interests you. It should be clear from your paper why this issue is important. Frame the issue or question, then defend your own answer to the question OR subject another person’s argument to critical evaluation and defend your assessment of that person’s argument. A few topic suggestions are listed below; you may choose a topic that is on the list or you may write on some other topic.
Constraints:
You may not recycle a paper you’ve written for another class. Nor may you use this paper for a future class.
Your paper topic should be manageable; that is, it should be possible to write a good, 5-7 page paper on this topic. Your discussion should not be superficial, repetitive, or padded with filler.
Your topic should clearly fall within philosophy of religion. If you have any doubts about whether your topic is acceptable, please run it by me.
Point Value: 175
Documentation: Include a documentation statement at the end of your paper. If no help was received, simply type “No help of any kind was received on this paper”. If you did receive help, indicate who gave you the help and what kind or kinds of help you received. See page 2 of this document for my policy on permissible and impermissible help.
Other Specifications: The last 4 digits of your social security number should appear on the title page. Your name should not appear anywhere on your paper. This is to make sure that I do not know whose paper I am grading. Please staple your papers and number your pages.
Keep a back-up copy of your paper!!
Your paper must be submitted to my university email account.
Audience: A reasonably intelligent person who is not in this class and has not read the authors you discuss should be able to understand their views by reading your paper. You will need to define any terms that would be unfamiliar to your target audience. If an author uses a term (e.g., ‘freedom’) in a non-standard sense, be sure to indicate how the author defines the term. In addition to describing the author’s view, you will need to explain why the author takes a particular stance on an issue. It is not enough to state an author’s argument; you must also explain the reasoning in your own words. I’m looking for evidence that you understand the philosophical issue you are discussing. I’m also looking for evidence of your ability to engage in sustained philosophical analysis.
Drafts: I am happy to meet with you to discuss your paper. I am also happy to read drafts; however, to ensure that I have time to give you useful feedback, you should get the draft to me at least 2 days before the paper is due. I can probably still read it after that point, but how much feedback I can give you will depend on how many drafts have been turned in. Furthermore, if there’s some major problem with your paper, you’ll want to know this while you still have time to correct it.
Permissible Help: In addition to consulting me, you may get help from an outside reader. The Writing Center is located on the first floor of Fairchild Hall in room 1A82. It is open Monday through Friday, periods 2 to 6. They are also open from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m., Sunday through Thursday. The Writing Center keeps an online appointment schedule; you can access it by going to the Registrar’s website. Although it is best, especially during busy times of the semester, to make an appointment, the Writing Center will take walk-ins IF time permits. Your reader may check for all the hallmarks of good writing – e.g., grammatical correctness, organization, focus and clarity. Your reader may also ask substantive questions as a way of helping you express yourself more clearly and may raise objections to your thesis. However, it is decidedly not permissible for your reader to answer those substantive questions and objections he poses. Nor is it permissible for him to correct your description of a philosopher’s view. Your reader may, however, point out that your interpretation is controversial or misleading. Again, any help that you receive must be documented; in your documentation, be sure to indicate both the source of help and the kind of help you got from that source. If you have a friend read your paper, make sure your friend has high standards and is not afraid to correct you.
Suggested Topics
1. Pike argues that certain common assumptions jointly produce a conflict between God’s existence and human free will. Identify and explain (where necessary) the assumptions that produce this result. It should be clear how each of these assumptions contributes to the conflict between God’s existence and human free will. Using examples, illustrate the conflict. Then do one of the following:
- discuss Boethius’ solution, consider how Pike would respond (see the online version of his article for this, available via JSTOR), and discuss whether Pike is correct to reject Boethius’ solution
- discuss one or more possible solutions and evaluate each for their adequacy
2. Consider a specific version of the ontological argument. State and explain an objection to the ontological argument OTHER than Gaunilo’s island objection. Then, discuss how a proponent of this version of the ontological argument might or should respond to the objection. Finally, assess the damage done to the argument by the objection (you can do this by considering whether the response the proponent of the argument offers or the response you offer is adequate).
3. State and explain the moral argument for the existence of God – see either the article in your text or C.S. Lewis’ moral argument for the existence of God. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this argument and take a stance on its overall power.
Other possibilities: (a) discuss the evidence for miracles, viz., the question of whether there can ever be sufficient evidence for miracles – evidence sufficient to make the belief that a miracle has occurred rational, (b) discuss the debate between religious realists and religious non-realists (see the articles in your text), (c) State and explain Pascal’s Wager, then discuss whether Pascal is right when he claims that it is more rational to bet on God’s existing than to bet against there being a God, etc..
Friday, February 5, 2010
Essay Questions for Exam 1 (T14 -- FRIDAY)
Essay Questions for Exam 1
1. State and explain Anselm’s argument for the existence of God. In your answer, be sure to identify the strategy of the argument and explain the logic of the argument. Discuss at least two of Gaunilo’s criticisms of Anselm’s argument. Indicate which criticism you find to be most effective. For the criticism you take to be most effective, indicate how a defender of Anselm’s argument might respond. Finally, take a stance on whether that response is effective; be sure to give reasons to support your position.
2. State and explain Paley’s version of the Argument from Design. Be sure to identify and explain Paley’s strategy. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of Paley’s argument; it should be clear to the reader why a particular feature of his argument counts as a strength or weakness. For any weaknesses that you identify, discuss how Paley’s argument could be made stronger. Finally, discuss whether the new-and-improved version of Paley’s argument is successful. Be sure to support your overall assessment of the new-and-improved version of the Argument from Design.
3. State and explain the apparent conflict between God’s omniscience and human freedom. Then explain Boethius’s proposed solution. In your considered opinion, does Boethius’s solution eliminate the conflict between God’s omniscience and human freedom? Explain and support your answer.
4. Anne Minas argues that a divine being cannot forgive. Discuss how Minas argues for her position, then subject her argument to critical evaluation. Specifically, identify the parts of her argument that you believe are correct and the parts that you believe are mistaken. It should be clear to the reader why you think that parts of her argument are successful and other parts are not successful. Based on your analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of her argument, come to a reasoned conclusion regarding the overall strength of her argument.
Note: We did not discuss all aspects of Minas’ argument. For instance, we did not discuss her argument that God cannot be injured and thus cannot be wronged.
You are not responsible for this aspect of her argument on the exam. However, you may discuss this part of her argument in the essay; just make sure that you have a good understanding of this part of her article.
5. Alvin Plantinga argues that belief in God can be properly basic. Explain what it means for a belief to be basic and why Plantinga believes that belief in God can be properly basic. In order to fully explain why Plantinga believes that belief in God can be properly basic, you will need to explain why he rejects the foundationalist’s strong criteria for basicality. State and explain one major objection to Plantinga’s argument. If Plantinga provides a response to this objection, explain and evaluate the merits of his response. If Plantinga does not provide a response to this objection, consider how he might respond and evaluate the merits of that predicted response.
1. State and explain Anselm’s argument for the existence of God. In your answer, be sure to identify the strategy of the argument and explain the logic of the argument. Discuss at least two of Gaunilo’s criticisms of Anselm’s argument. Indicate which criticism you find to be most effective. For the criticism you take to be most effective, indicate how a defender of Anselm’s argument might respond. Finally, take a stance on whether that response is effective; be sure to give reasons to support your position.
2. State and explain Paley’s version of the Argument from Design. Be sure to identify and explain Paley’s strategy. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of Paley’s argument; it should be clear to the reader why a particular feature of his argument counts as a strength or weakness. For any weaknesses that you identify, discuss how Paley’s argument could be made stronger. Finally, discuss whether the new-and-improved version of Paley’s argument is successful. Be sure to support your overall assessment of the new-and-improved version of the Argument from Design.
3. State and explain the apparent conflict between God’s omniscience and human freedom. Then explain Boethius’s proposed solution. In your considered opinion, does Boethius’s solution eliminate the conflict between God’s omniscience and human freedom? Explain and support your answer.
4. Anne Minas argues that a divine being cannot forgive. Discuss how Minas argues for her position, then subject her argument to critical evaluation. Specifically, identify the parts of her argument that you believe are correct and the parts that you believe are mistaken. It should be clear to the reader why you think that parts of her argument are successful and other parts are not successful. Based on your analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of her argument, come to a reasoned conclusion regarding the overall strength of her argument.
Note: We did not discuss all aspects of Minas’ argument. For instance, we did not discuss her argument that God cannot be injured and thus cannot be wronged.
You are not responsible for this aspect of her argument on the exam. However, you may discuss this part of her argument in the essay; just make sure that you have a good understanding of this part of her article.
5. Alvin Plantinga argues that belief in God can be properly basic. Explain what it means for a belief to be basic and why Plantinga believes that belief in God can be properly basic. In order to fully explain why Plantinga believes that belief in God can be properly basic, you will need to explain why he rejects the foundationalist’s strong criteria for basicality. State and explain one major objection to Plantinga’s argument. If Plantinga provides a response to this objection, explain and evaluate the merits of his response. If Plantinga does not provide a response to this objection, consider how he might respond and evaluate the merits of that predicted response.
L12 Reading Guide: Pargetter's Response to Plantinga
Reading:
Plantinga Supplement - sent by email on Thursday
Plantinga, pp. 252-254 (the section on The Great Pumpkin Objection)
Pargetter, “Experience, Proper Basicality, and Belief in God”, pp. 256-260
Note: Your responses should focus on Pargetter’s critique.
Reading Guide to Pargetter
Pargetter compares Plantinga’s description of how many theists believe in God to the way in which Obi-Wan Kenobi believed in the Force. Pargetter helpfully gives you several examples of direct experiences that Plantinga thinks induce many religious people to believe in God.
The first section of Pargetter’s article concerns defeaters for the belief that God exists. I think the concept of a defeater is clear enough, but if you need help, the Glossary at the back of your text has an excellent definition. Pargetter considers 3 possible defeaters for the religious believer’s belief that God exists:
1. the prevalence of sophisticated atheism
2. the existence of evil
3. many people who are in the same or similar position as the religious believer who claims to have direct experience of God have never felt the presence of God
Pargetter claims that none of these facts can count as a defeater for the religious believer who claims to have experienced the presence of God. He argues that in order to determine whether belief in God is properly basic, we have to turn to a holistic evaluation of the religious believer’s system or network of beliefs (what Plantinga called the “noetic structure”). Specifically, we have to compare the religious believer’s system of beliefs to the system of beliefs he would have were he “to reject the belief that God exists” (259). On p. 260, Pargetter lists a few criteria by which to judge whether one system of beliefs is, holistically speaking, more rational than another.
Plantinga Supplement - sent by email on Thursday
Plantinga, pp. 252-254 (the section on The Great Pumpkin Objection)
Pargetter, “Experience, Proper Basicality, and Belief in God”, pp. 256-260
Note: Your responses should focus on Pargetter’s critique.
Reading Guide to Pargetter
Pargetter compares Plantinga’s description of how many theists believe in God to the way in which Obi-Wan Kenobi believed in the Force. Pargetter helpfully gives you several examples of direct experiences that Plantinga thinks induce many religious people to believe in God.
The first section of Pargetter’s article concerns defeaters for the belief that God exists. I think the concept of a defeater is clear enough, but if you need help, the Glossary at the back of your text has an excellent definition. Pargetter considers 3 possible defeaters for the religious believer’s belief that God exists:
1. the prevalence of sophisticated atheism
2. the existence of evil
3. many people who are in the same or similar position as the religious believer who claims to have direct experience of God have never felt the presence of God
Pargetter claims that none of these facts can count as a defeater for the religious believer who claims to have experienced the presence of God. He argues that in order to determine whether belief in God is properly basic, we have to turn to a holistic evaluation of the religious believer’s system or network of beliefs (what Plantinga called the “noetic structure”). Specifically, we have to compare the religious believer’s system of beliefs to the system of beliefs he would have were he “to reject the belief that God exists” (259). On p. 260, Pargetter lists a few criteria by which to judge whether one system of beliefs is, holistically speaking, more rational than another.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
L11 Reading Guide
Reading: Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology”, pp. 246-254
Plantinga is a well-respected epistemologist who has for many years taught at the University of Notre Dame. In addition to epistemology, he also specializes in metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Plantinga is also a Calvinist, writing in the Reformed tradition.
Although Plantinga has argued for the existence of God elsewhere, in this article he argues that belief in God is rational even if our belief in God is not based on other beliefs: “a person is entirely within his epistemic rights, entirely rational, in believing in God, even if he has no argument for this belief and does not believe it on the basis of other beliefs he holds”(249). Put another way, belief in God “can properly be taken as basic” (249).
The first few pages of the article consist of a discussion of the Reformed tradition. I think these pages are pretty easy to follow. The section on Foundationalism is more difficult. Plantinga opens this section by observing that the Reformers, in holding that belief in God is properly basic, are implicitly rejecting classical foundationalism. He maintains that the Reformers are correct to reject classical foundationalism.
Epistemology is the area of philosophy that focuses on questions of knowledge and justification: What is knowledge? When am I justified in believing a particular proposition to be true? How do we come to know? What kinds of processes are truth-preserving or truth-destroying? What are the limits of human knowledge?, etc.. To be justified in believing a proposition is to have sufficient conditions for believing it be true. Foundationalism is a theory of knowledge and justification. Foundationalists distinguish between basic beliefs and beliefs that are derived from basic beliefs. For foundationalists, a belief counts as knowledge (alternatively, a belief is justified) if it is either a basic belief OR is derived from a basic belief by a sound argument.
Plantinga distinguishes between weak foundationalism and strong foundationalism. Weak foundationalism is the position described above. Strong foundationalism adds criteria for determining whether a belief is basic. Classical Foundationalism is weak foundationalism coupled with VERY STRICT criteria for basic beliefs.
More explicitly, classical foundationalism is:
Weak Foundationalism (to count as an item of knowledge or to count as justified, a belief must be either basic or based on a basic belief)
PLUS
EITHER the claim that beliefs are basic only if they are “either self-evident or evident to the senses” (Aquinas)
OR the claim that beliefs are basic only if they are indubitable – cannot be doubted because they cannot be false (Descartes)
The problem with classical foundationalism, as Plantinga sees it, is that its criteria for basic beliefs are far too strong. Those of you who’ve read Descartes may remember that Descartes runs into trouble precisely because he assumes that beliefs must be indubitable or derived from indubitable beliefs if they are to count as knowledge; this leaves him with the conclusion that the only items of knowledge are things like “I (the thinker) exist” and “I seem to see a bird flying”. “I seem to see a bird flying” in no way guarantees that there is a bird flying, so it turns out that we can’t know anything about the external world (including whether there are other people like us who think, have desires, etc.). To escape this conclusion, Descartes could back away from his strong position on knowledge and weaken his criterion for basic beliefs. Instead, Descartes argues for God’s existence. If Descartes’ arguments for God’s existence fail, then we’re left with the position that we can’t know anything about the external world.
In the final section of the article, Plantinga responds to The Great Pumpkin Objection: “If belief in God is properly basic, why can’t just any belief be properly basic?”. For example, why can’t Linus’ belief in the Great Pumpkin be properly basic?
Plantinga rightly notes that rejecting classical foundationalism’s strong criteria for basic belief does not entail the absurd position that “just any belief” can “be properly basic” (253). He points out that “the modern foundationalist’s criterion for proper basicality” is “self-referentially incoherent” - it “is neither self-evident nor incorrigible”; thus, “the classical foundationalist” and the modern foundationalist cannot consistently hold that their criterion for basicality is itself basic. So, by the foundationalist’s own theory, this criterion of basicality must be deduced from basic beliefs.
Plantinga doubts that ANY criterion of basicality can be derived from a set of premises, each of which is either self-evident or incorrigible. So, any criterion or set of criteria of basicality must be arrived at via induction. After outlining how this would work, Plantinga gives a counter-example to the classical foundationalist’s criteria for basicality. Plantinga concludes that “the Reformed epistemologist can properly hold that belief in the Great Pumpkin is not properly basic” while also “hold(ing) that belief in God is properly basic “ -- “even if he has no full fledged criterion of basicality” (254).
Plantinga is a well-respected epistemologist who has for many years taught at the University of Notre Dame. In addition to epistemology, he also specializes in metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Plantinga is also a Calvinist, writing in the Reformed tradition.
Although Plantinga has argued for the existence of God elsewhere, in this article he argues that belief in God is rational even if our belief in God is not based on other beliefs: “a person is entirely within his epistemic rights, entirely rational, in believing in God, even if he has no argument for this belief and does not believe it on the basis of other beliefs he holds”(249). Put another way, belief in God “can properly be taken as basic” (249).
The first few pages of the article consist of a discussion of the Reformed tradition. I think these pages are pretty easy to follow. The section on Foundationalism is more difficult. Plantinga opens this section by observing that the Reformers, in holding that belief in God is properly basic, are implicitly rejecting classical foundationalism. He maintains that the Reformers are correct to reject classical foundationalism.
Epistemology is the area of philosophy that focuses on questions of knowledge and justification: What is knowledge? When am I justified in believing a particular proposition to be true? How do we come to know? What kinds of processes are truth-preserving or truth-destroying? What are the limits of human knowledge?, etc.. To be justified in believing a proposition is to have sufficient conditions for believing it be true. Foundationalism is a theory of knowledge and justification. Foundationalists distinguish between basic beliefs and beliefs that are derived from basic beliefs. For foundationalists, a belief counts as knowledge (alternatively, a belief is justified) if it is either a basic belief OR is derived from a basic belief by a sound argument.
Plantinga distinguishes between weak foundationalism and strong foundationalism. Weak foundationalism is the position described above. Strong foundationalism adds criteria for determining whether a belief is basic. Classical Foundationalism is weak foundationalism coupled with VERY STRICT criteria for basic beliefs.
More explicitly, classical foundationalism is:
Weak Foundationalism (to count as an item of knowledge or to count as justified, a belief must be either basic or based on a basic belief)
PLUS
EITHER the claim that beliefs are basic only if they are “either self-evident or evident to the senses” (Aquinas)
OR the claim that beliefs are basic only if they are indubitable – cannot be doubted because they cannot be false (Descartes)
The problem with classical foundationalism, as Plantinga sees it, is that its criteria for basic beliefs are far too strong. Those of you who’ve read Descartes may remember that Descartes runs into trouble precisely because he assumes that beliefs must be indubitable or derived from indubitable beliefs if they are to count as knowledge; this leaves him with the conclusion that the only items of knowledge are things like “I (the thinker) exist” and “I seem to see a bird flying”. “I seem to see a bird flying” in no way guarantees that there is a bird flying, so it turns out that we can’t know anything about the external world (including whether there are other people like us who think, have desires, etc.). To escape this conclusion, Descartes could back away from his strong position on knowledge and weaken his criterion for basic beliefs. Instead, Descartes argues for God’s existence. If Descartes’ arguments for God’s existence fail, then we’re left with the position that we can’t know anything about the external world.
In the final section of the article, Plantinga responds to The Great Pumpkin Objection: “If belief in God is properly basic, why can’t just any belief be properly basic?”. For example, why can’t Linus’ belief in the Great Pumpkin be properly basic?
Plantinga rightly notes that rejecting classical foundationalism’s strong criteria for basic belief does not entail the absurd position that “just any belief” can “be properly basic” (253). He points out that “the modern foundationalist’s criterion for proper basicality” is “self-referentially incoherent” - it “is neither self-evident nor incorrigible”; thus, “the classical foundationalist” and the modern foundationalist cannot consistently hold that their criterion for basicality is itself basic. So, by the foundationalist’s own theory, this criterion of basicality must be deduced from basic beliefs.
Plantinga doubts that ANY criterion of basicality can be derived from a set of premises, each of which is either self-evident or incorrigible. So, any criterion or set of criteria of basicality must be arrived at via induction. After outlining how this would work, Plantinga gives a counter-example to the classical foundationalist’s criteria for basicality. Plantinga concludes that “the Reformed epistemologist can properly hold that belief in the Great Pumpkin is not properly basic” while also “hold(ing) that belief in God is properly basic “ -- “even if he has no full fledged criterion of basicality” (254).
Monday, February 1, 2010
L10 Reading Guide, Betty and Cordell
Reading: Betty and Cordell, “The Anthropic Teleological Argument”, pp. 222-230
Reading Guide: Last class, a few of you pointed out that the teleological argument becomes more powerful if it is applied at a different level, the level of explaining how evolution could have even gotten started. In this article, Betty and Cordell focus on the origins of a universe like ours; they pay special attention to the origins of intelligent life. They give 4 different arguments, but only 2 are included in your text.
The first type of argument included in your text is that from cosmology (pp. 222-226). Here, they look at 3 different theories that address the universe’s beginnings – The Big Bang, the grand unification theory and superstrings. They regard the Big Bang argument as the most “intuitive” and thus weakest because “it does not lend itself to … a probability calculus” (223). After briefly describing each of these 3 theories, they introduce the Anthropic Principle: “if the universe were in fact different in any significant way from the way it is, we wouldn’t be here to wonder why it is the way it is” (Schwartzenburg, quoted in B & C, p. 224). Had any of “the values of a few basic physical constants” been much different than they are, this would have precluded “the possibility of life evolving later” (p. 224). The probability of each of these constants simultaneously being exactly as they are is miniscule. By comparison, “the odds against a Cosmic Designer” may be significantly lower.
Betty and Cordell then consider three objections to the view that a Cosmic Designer is more probable than randomness. According to B & C, the first two objections, although not decisive, are at least “not intrinsically implausible”; the third objection, is, however, “intrinsically implausible” (226). The first objection is that our vision is too narrow; “intelligent life might have evolved out of a very different kind of universe, and not just the one we know” (225). The second objection postulates that this is but one of many universes; “given enough universes, it is not unlikely that one would come along which had the right ingredients for life” (225). B & C view the possibilities referenced by these two objections as unlikely; however, since these possibilities can’t be ruled out, they turn to what they consider to be an even more powerful argument for a Cosmic Designer, namely, the argument from Biochemical Complexity (pp. 226-229). Here, they focus on the difficulties associated with explaining “the earliest, simplest life forms on Earth” (227). Based on the work of Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, they conclude that the odds of the biochemical ingredients of life all coming together at once are infinitesimal. They also cite the failure of thousands of experiments to “simulate earth’s primitive geological condition … and atmosphere” (228). Finally, they cite the work of Sidney Fox. I’ll have to look to be sure, but I’m guessing that they cite Fox because the scientific community might dispute Thaxton’s neutrality. The last section, “What God Might Be”, is rather speculative.
Reading Guide: Last class, a few of you pointed out that the teleological argument becomes more powerful if it is applied at a different level, the level of explaining how evolution could have even gotten started. In this article, Betty and Cordell focus on the origins of a universe like ours; they pay special attention to the origins of intelligent life. They give 4 different arguments, but only 2 are included in your text.
The first type of argument included in your text is that from cosmology (pp. 222-226). Here, they look at 3 different theories that address the universe’s beginnings – The Big Bang, the grand unification theory and superstrings. They regard the Big Bang argument as the most “intuitive” and thus weakest because “it does not lend itself to … a probability calculus” (223). After briefly describing each of these 3 theories, they introduce the Anthropic Principle: “if the universe were in fact different in any significant way from the way it is, we wouldn’t be here to wonder why it is the way it is” (Schwartzenburg, quoted in B & C, p. 224). Had any of “the values of a few basic physical constants” been much different than they are, this would have precluded “the possibility of life evolving later” (p. 224). The probability of each of these constants simultaneously being exactly as they are is miniscule. By comparison, “the odds against a Cosmic Designer” may be significantly lower.
Betty and Cordell then consider three objections to the view that a Cosmic Designer is more probable than randomness. According to B & C, the first two objections, although not decisive, are at least “not intrinsically implausible”; the third objection, is, however, “intrinsically implausible” (226). The first objection is that our vision is too narrow; “intelligent life might have evolved out of a very different kind of universe, and not just the one we know” (225). The second objection postulates that this is but one of many universes; “given enough universes, it is not unlikely that one would come along which had the right ingredients for life” (225). B & C view the possibilities referenced by these two objections as unlikely; however, since these possibilities can’t be ruled out, they turn to what they consider to be an even more powerful argument for a Cosmic Designer, namely, the argument from Biochemical Complexity (pp. 226-229). Here, they focus on the difficulties associated with explaining “the earliest, simplest life forms on Earth” (227). Based on the work of Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, they conclude that the odds of the biochemical ingredients of life all coming together at once are infinitesimal. They also cite the failure of thousands of experiments to “simulate earth’s primitive geological condition … and atmosphere” (228). Finally, they cite the work of Sidney Fox. I’ll have to look to be sure, but I’m guessing that they cite Fox because the scientific community might dispute Thaxton’s neutrality. The last section, “What God Might Be”, is rather speculative.
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