Reading: Swinburne, "Why God Allows Evil", pp. 95-113 (handout)
Reading Guide: Tuesday, we'll start with a brief description of the standard free will defense so that it is clear how Swinburne's position improves upon the standard free will defense. Swinburne provides a free will defense with a bit of a twist. His thesis is stated at the bottom of p. 96. One of the important twists is that he makes it really clear that it is "free and responsible choice that is so valuable, not free will narrowly defined (p.98). He stresses that responsibility and usefulness are great goods, goods that we moderns may undervalue. In explicating the position that responsibility is a great good, he distinguishes between "genuine responsibility" and "limited responsibility" (p. 99). He then compares human parents to a divine parent (i.e., God). This theme of the responsibilities and privileges of parents is important, both in his defense of moral evils and his defense of natural evils. On p. 101, Swinburne argues that "in order to have a choice between good and evil (& thereby to have genuine responsibility - RS), agents need already a certain depravity, in the sense of a system of desires for what they correctly believe to be evil". Turning to the claim that usefulness is a great good, Swinburne argues that suffering is not "a pure loss" to those who suffer. On p. 102, he claims that "being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced upon you". He then discusses how suffering makes the sufferer useful and is thus a benefit to the sufferer. On pp. 103-107, he replies to two objections to his account of moral evil. In the course of responding to the second objection, Swinburne acknowledges that the benefit of Life may not, in particular cases, be sufficent "to outweigh the suffering" (106); still, we should "recall that it is an additional benefit to the sufferer that his suffering is the means whereby the one who hurt him had the opportunity to make a significant choice between good and evil ..." (106). This, of course, will not be much comfort to the sufferer. He closes the section on moral evil by acknowledging that there are limits (and sketching those limits) to God's right to allow some to suffer for the good of others.
At the bottom of p. 107, Swinburne begins to discuss the justification of natural evils. He argues that natural evils "make it possible for humans to have" free and responsible choice and "to make available to humans specially worthwhile kinds of choices" (107). After articulating two ways in which natural evils make these "specially worthwhile kinds of choices" available, he introduces the objection that natural evils are unnecessary overkill on God's part (109). After responding to this objection, he briefly discusses whether the suffering of animals can be justified, poses a thought-experiment, and identifies his "fall-back" position.
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I really like Swinburne's argument. One part I really liked was when he talks about Free and responsible choice. He says that it wouldn't make sense to have free will if we could only choose between two equally good things. Free will instead is the will to choose between good and evil. I think it is a good explination for the evil that humans create. One thing I was confused about was when he says that when God gave us free will there would be a natural possibility of evil, i.e. not determined in advance whether or not the evil will occur. This doesn't make sense to me because there is not a problem with free will if God is not all knowing, which this suggests.
I understand the argument that God is doing a great thing by delegating autority to humans. One objection I have, however, is that humans do such a bad job with the authority delegated to us that it seems we should no longe be granted it. True, a responible father can delegate authority to his son and allow his son to make mistakes, but he would be crueal to allow his son to make costly mistakes with authority he was not yet ready for.
As a whole Swinburne’s argument to me just doesn’t seem solid. I feel like there are a lot of holes in his argument and I almost felt like I was in church when I was reading it. He states that depravity itself is an evil which I don’t think I would agree with. For example I like to eat all the time, as in to excess, so why is it an evil that I should be deprived of a constant source of food? I feel like evil is too over used in his argument, like a person who hates someone and then kills them and takes pleasure in watching them die is evil but some dying because they live in Africa and can’t find food just seems like bad luck not really evil. Also isn’t it a limitation on God that he can’t create a world without evil where we choose freely good, granted that doesn’t make a lot of sense but still there is a limit put on God when he says good necessitates evil. Overall I feel like it was kind of a stretch when Swinburne wrote that God exhibits his goodness by letting us suffer…umm I just don’t know about that.
As a whole Swinburne’s argument to me just doesn’t seem solid. I feel like there are a lot of holes in his argument and I almost felt like I was in church when I was reading it. He states that depravity itself is an evil which I don’t think I would agree with. For example I like to eat all the time, as in to excess, so why is it an evil that I should be deprived of a constant source of food? I feel like evil is too over used in his argument, like a person who hates someone and then kills them and takes pleasure in watching them die is evil but some dying because they live in Africa and can’t find food just seems like bad luck not really evil. Also isn’t it a limitation on God that he can’t create a world without evil where we choose freely good, granted that doesn’t make a lot of sense but still there is a limit put on God when he says good necessitates evil. Overall I feel like it was kind of a stretch when Swinburne wrote that God exhibits his goodness by letting us suffer…umm I just don’t know about that.
As a staunch believer in moral free will, I find that Swinburne's argument stands as the most rational response to the question of evil in the world. Free will gives humanity a purpose for existing. Without the freedom of choice, mankind would have no real uniquely defining characteristic. Of all these considerations, I find the classic dilemma of evil the most difficult to accept. Swinburne equates evil with physical and psychological suffering throughout his argument. If this equality is taken as truth, then evil itself becomes highly relative to the individual. A firm philosophical argument must be approached in the same manner as a math problem. Variables (terms) must first be defined before an equation (philosophical argument) can be developed. I find that the philosophers commenting on this subject have not adequately defined the terms "good" and "evil."
Swinburne's conclusion on heaven and eternal reward also seems fundamentally lacking. By asserting that a world in which free will exists due to the existence of both good and evil is the best world for individual purpose, why would anyone truly desire heaven AFTER this life? He argues that heaven may serve to restore some sort of eternal equilibrium, but this assumes far too much about justice throughout all of creation. An eternal existence in heaven would be severely lacking in individual purpose.
I find Swinburne's argument wholly unconvincing. He has outlined the free will defense the best we've read so far in my opinion, but he still has yet to address the macro-level existence of evil. He begins by outlining moral and natural evils which are essentially means through which people suffer. I really wanted to pull my hair out though when he said "Unending unchosen suffering would indeed to my mind provide a very strong argument against the existence of God." It would seem that he's overlooked the existence of hell. It's precisely and described as a place of eternal unending suffering and hell is not a human creation either, God created it!
I don't find this argument very convincing. He leaves large holes in his writing. I keep thinking back to Mackie... if God was truely omnipotent, couldn't he let us feel the gratificaiton of moral responsibility with out having to suffer through all the evil? Swineburn accounts for some evils, moral and natural, but all his examples are pretty minor. What about moral evils like the Holocaust? What good came from that? I would argue little to none. The genocide in the Sudan, this list could go on and on. Again, I find myself countering his argument with Mackie, what about the second order of evil. For example when hurricane Katrina hit, there were people robing and looting and shooting at each other. Why did God let it happen? for what good? because there was a lot of bad as well.
I really like the approach that Swinburn takes towards the concept of evil in the world which God created. What I find to be the most appealing is the fact that God can only allow humans to share in the creative activity of God by entertaining some evil in the world. While God allows much rejoice and pleasure throughout a human life, humans are only able to truly appreciate all that they have been given if they experience or at least understand some concept of evil. I also appreciate the argument made contending that certain evils are merely a matter of perception. Considering that it is humans who attribute certain things to evil, first identifying this aspect by Swinburn is extremely effective.
I agree with many of the posters. At first glance, this seems as one f the better arguments we've read. It's comprehensive and provides good examples- however, how can you explain the God of Abraham he describes in the paper if we are to believe an Old Testament God intervened with the world at will? I also noticed, like Dave, that he completely ignored the existence of Hell, a place to which God is supposed to damn those unworthy of Heaven. Also, I couldn't help but thinking while he described that evils that occur in the world are an opportunity to be good that it was like a friend setting up something to make his other friend look like a hero, almost a conspiracy with God. (I can't think of a good example right now).
Also, if we're supposed to have free will, doesn't the idea of the existence of God still in some way deprive us of that will? He talked about how direct intervention by God by telling us the consequences of our actions would change a person so that they no longer could choose evil- isn't the idea of God then prohibitive on our free will, at least in society? Either Swinburne is wrong and someone who "heard God" would still live a human life (I mean, even men and women of God sometimes choose to commit evils!) or any idea of the existence of God impinges on our free will.
Just a thought.
Swinburne's argument is considerably less convincing than that which he aims to refute. I think this is mainly because Mackie's argument is ultimately reliant upon logic whereas Swinburne seems to bring in a considerable amount of theoretics ad speculation. I found his argument for the existence of natural evil particularly less convincing. God caused the Earthquake in Haiti because the choice that it gives the US to perform humanitarian relief constitutes a good of higher magnitude than the evil from which it originated. This notion, to me, seems inexplicable.
Swinburne's argument for why God allows evil was one of the most convincing arguments I have read in the class so far and I especially like how he points out that if someone knew with real certainty that there was a god, this knowledge would put a major limit on his freedom of choice. However, Swinburne loses most of his credibility with me when he says that "we all have a natural inclination to wish to be thought well of by everyone" (p 108). (I am assuming that "natural inclination" means not effected by outside forces) So how would he explain the behavior of people in a lawless state, i.e. no government or rules? I don't think that after a natural disaster, looters think about how other people will look at them for stealing a tv. Or suicide bombers worry about how Americans feel when they blow themselves up and kill our troops and even their own people. I completely disagree with Swinburne on this issue because I feel that a human being's only true natural inclination is preserve his/her own life.
To quickly comment on Dan's post. I agree that human's have a natural inclination toward the preservation of their own lives. However, this inclination, too, seems to be refuted by one of the examples you brought forth. For why would any rational individual whose only inate inclination is self preservation willingly take his life as a suicide bombing? Perhaps Swinburne was onto something when he granted a human inclination toward maintining a positive reputation. In fact, in a way, these two natural inclinations can be said to be one in the same. i.e. self preservation entails not only the preservation of one's life but also his reputation. To briefly comment on Swinburne's suffering argument... I find it difficult to believe that God must grant natural evil and human evil in order to create enough good in the world to outweigh the evil. It just doesnt seem logical. Wouldnt the evil that humans inflict on themselves be enough to satisfy this balance?
LOGAN's QUESTION: At the end of last class, Logan was concerned about the fact that Adams, at the end of the day, is speaking to Christians, and a sub-group (those who believe in universal salvation) at that. She wondered whether Adams had anything to say to non-Christians. Remember that Mackie is one of Adams' targets. Mackie says that "essential doctrines of Christianity" (viz., the 5 propositions he lists) are inconsistent. On his view, then, theism, by which he seems to mean Christian theism, is internally incoherent. Adams makes the important point that IF Mackie, one of many atheologians, is to support this charge, he has to consider what Christians ACTUALLY believe. In her article, Adams presents what she thinks is an internally consistent Christian perspective that reconciles the existence of God with the existence of evil, without giving up anything that is "essential to theism". I think she would reject Mackie's contention that a theist must believe that a "wholly good being eradicates evil insofar as it can" (paraphrase of Mackie). In her description of God, God is not ERADICATING evil (preventing or wiping out evil), but rather DEFEATING evil. So, she's certainly giving up this proposition, but, so far as I can see, there's no reason why a Christian HAS to endorse this claim. Having rejected this proposition, she has at MOST 4 propositions to reconcile. (I say "at most" because I'm not sure that she accepts Mackie's understanding of omnipotence. Her solution in no way depends on any particular und. of omnipotence.) The way in which she chooses to reconcile the existence of God with the existence of evil is to argue that a Loving God would not allow horrendous evils to go undefeated. (Hidden Assumption: A morally perfect, all-good God would be a loving God.) She doesn't need to show that IN FACT her explanation of HOW God makes each person's life a GREAT GOOD is correct. She has rebutted Mackie provided only that her solution (a) renders the existence of evil compatible with the existence of God and (b) is internally coherent. Of course, she draws on Christian values and Christian assumptions, but she's entitled to do this because she's trying to show that Mackie is wrong when he says that theism is internally incoherent and thus cannot proffer a solution to the problem of evil. This is worth doing even if one thinks that she ought to have done more (e.g., given the skeptic a resolution that he can accept without having to buy into Christian assumptions).
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