Reading: Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God”, pp. 333-339
Adams argues that standard solutions to the problem of evil cannot successfully deal with “horrendous evils”, i.e., “evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good on the whole” (334). The main problem with standard solutions is that their justifications of evil are “generic and global” (335, emphasis in the original). Such justifications have little or no power in the face of the concern that “God cannot be said to be good or loving to any created persons the positive meaning of whose lives He allows to be engulfed in and/or defeated by evils” (336, emphasis in the original). Moreover, Adams maintains that appealing to global, generic justifications for evil doesn’t “make the participant’s life more tolerable, more worth living for him/her” and may even make it worse (336). She considers the suggestion that we should “let the above-mentioned generic and global reasons cover divine permission of nonhorrendous evils, and find other reasons compatible with perfect goodness why even an omnipotent, omniscient God would permit horrors”(337), but rejects this as a non-starter. In her view, “we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile lives for human participants in them” (337). Even so, the Christian’s belief in an “all-wise and all-powerful God” who loves each of us is not “positively irrational” (337).
If we can’t “conceive of” reasons why God, as described on p. 337, would permit horrendous evils, then the only alternative is to “show how” God defeats these horrendous evils “within the context of the individual’s life” and “give(s) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338). But this cannot be done by appealing to reasons that are “religion-neutral” (339). Rather, it has to be done by appealing to Christian values: “it is not only legitimate, but, given horrendous evils, necessary for Christians to dip into their richer store of valuables to exhibit the consistency” of the existence of God and the existence of evil (339). In section 4.3, she explains how God could both “engulf” and defeat horrendous evils experienced or done by an individual and “giv(e) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338).
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21 comments:
I have a tough time agreeing with this argument due to its focus on perception. Adam presents several examples of what she would consider to be the paradigmatic horrors, aka the horrendous evils that create the basis for her argument. I'm curious as to where she created such a list? Are these merely from her own interpretation or is there a set rule for what does and does not constitute as a horrendous evil? Everyone may agree that certain actions would fall under the category of horrendous evil; however, what are we to do with Adam's argument when people disagree on whether or not an action is considered a horrendous evil? One action may in fact cause a person to doubt whether on the whole their life was good while another could consider the same action in their life as a far lesser evil or perhaps not an evil at all. Would this action then fall under lesser evils which may be solved by other theologians? I disagree with the claim made by Adams that all legitimate excuses to why God would allow evil in the world arise from ignorance or weakness and feel that Hick gives a much more persuasive argument as to why evil must exist in the world.
My impression is that hands down this is the best response to the problem of evil thus far. Adams correctly identifies the need for not only a total good for humanity as a whole, but a total good for each individual sufferer. Fairly early in the paper, she addresses the issue head-on by discussing a list of horrendous evils and avoids referring to evil in the ethereal sense of some of the other authors. First, I will recognize that I do not really expect a skeptic to buy this explanation, nor would I expect many sufferers of horrendous evils to accept this view, but as a believer it is really the only argument I have seriously heard discussed in my faith background, perhaps because it is compatible with Biblical passages such as those found in the book of Job. What makes this argument so strong, and allows it to provide a response to the skeptic, is that it accounts for the instances where believers experience a horrendous evil yet continue to view their lives as good to him/her on the whole, even in instances where an external viewer can see no reason for this to be the case. None of the atheologians thus far have attempted to address this issue.
Adams begins her argument by first laying out previous arguments posed on the subject and then openly defining the terms for discussion, but the remainder of the article is fails to make any substantive progress on the issue. The basis of her entire argument is centered around on two overarching ideals: An all-wise and all-powerful God who loves his creations would (1) defeat any experienced horrors within the context of the participant's life and (2) give each created person a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole. Adams' argument assumes entirely too much on the state of equality and justice in creation. Why should human beings be automatically entitled to a good life? Even in the face of horrendous evils, the fact of the matter remains solely in the realm of chance. Hick is careful to explain the possible purpose of such indiscriminate natural evil in his article and the same concept can equally apply to moral evils. Adams relies heavily on emotionally charged imagery in order to convey a mute point. The Christian notion of God's goodness should not be held to such a narrowly defined standard. She is only able to cover herself with the section on human understanding of God's motivating reasons. Like many Christian writers, Adams seems to fall back on the classic catch phrase "we cannot know God's ways" to fill in any logical gaps in her philosophical analysis. In conclusion, Adams' argument for justifying evil is weak and needs much more development.
I'm having a hard time reading this so I could be completely off on my comment, but the biggest issue for me with Adams' writing is where she says that "the good of beatific face-to-face intimacy with God would engulf even the horrendous evils." I guess I still can't quite understand completely what she means by "engulf." For some reason though, Star Wars popped into my mind while thinking about this. Everyone knows the dark side is stronger than the light side in the real (Star Wars) world, but the light side is still able to defeat the dark side by calling upon the help of the "ghosts" of dead Jedis. I think this analogy is in the right ball park, but I think I'll sleep on it.
I don't really agree with this argument partly because I don't necessarily see why there must be an individual justification for evils in addition to an all encompassing one. I think it would be at least conceivable in any given circumstance that a great evil taken from an individual perspective could be construed as resulting in an ultimate good for someone else or for another group. Lessons learned comes to mind but obviously that isn't the strongest example.
I like the Job approach that Adam's takes. It is a better fit with me than the other solutions that have been offered. Like others though I am not fully satisfied with this solution. Job was handed to Satin to prove his loyalty to God. If our relationship with God can overcome evil, which Adam's suggests, then there would be no evil like the holocost or rapes. If my wife was being raped I would do everything in my power to stop it. If God is a loving god would you not logically assume he would want to do the same. Yet those people are not stopped and for many people they carry the emotional scars for the rest of their life. I know of someone who has problems in her relations with her husband because of things her father did to her as a young teen. I think there are too many holes in this propostion.
I can't help but be dissatisfied and left wanting for something more. I understand her approach, in that horrific evils need a different explanation than the ones we've been giving for the smaller evils, and that makes sense. Since the entire thing hinges on a Christian view of God, again, I feel as though something is being left out. I can follow the argument, and feel that it's relatively well laid out, but this entire argument seems to fall on the "We can't know God or his ways, so really we just accept evil as part of a grander plan." Bull. I can't accept that as an argument. I also had a problem with the idea that simply living in a world where we can "know" God, or "experience" God (before death or after it, I suppose) is the great good which counteracts the Holocaust. Sorry, I don't think so. Just like Ed said- ask them, and see if they think it does them much good.
I thought Adam’s argument was unique and I understand how it would work. But there are a few things that aren’t clear to me. Adams seems to say that horrendous sufferings in our lives is compatible with an omnipotent and benevolent God because these experiences bring us into a loving an intimate relationship with Him. This makes me wonder though about the people in the world who have experienced awful horrible things and have gone out and done worse actions, or given up on the idea of God, or who simply just suffered for the rest of their lives because of such a horrendous evil happening to them. I wonder what Adams would say about these people, the people whose lives ridden with evil just make them turn away from God; how does God's love outweigh the evil in these people’s lives?
the previous anonymous post was mine, oops
I find almost the entirety of Adams' argument a moot point because it hinges on a speculative and subjective scale of evil. Like several have already mentioned here, the problem is in defining what exactly a "horrendous" evil is. I would argue that it's all relative because the effects these evil have on us is the real defining aspect which quantifies their evil. The reason I find her article to be essentially moot is because one can't simply address a scale of evil, one must address evil as a whole.
This argument does not work at all for me. I especially dislike where Adams agrees with Plantinga on page 337 stating "where horrendous evils are concerned, not only do we not know God's actual reason for permitting them, we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason." Stating this just proves the point that you can't know a God's reasons, which is in and of itself very shaky. It seems she is just another theist trying to prove that there is a greater plan after evil...an excuse in my book.
Like Edward I dont like this argument. I think Adams does not address for situations of ultimate suffering. There are some situations where there can be no great individual good taken from it.
I agree with Laura, how can a person who only suffers evil be content with this argument? I can understand if someone suffers some evil, because as a whole it may be for the good. What about those little kids who lose their parents when they are little and grow up in abusive foster homes and eventually get killed by one of the families? Stories like this in the news make me wonder what good could come out of this.
Edward: Adams answers your question. It's not that the sufferer or the doer "takes something (positive) away" from Auschwitz. Rather, she claims that a good God would render each person's life "a great good on the whole" TO THAT PERSON by bringing each and every one of us into communion with him.
Matt Rice: We addressed your first concern in class. As for the last concern, Adams ISN'T saying that all legitimate reasons why God would allow evil must be attributed to divine weakness or ignorance. She's describing what OTHER people have said.
Jarrod, I agree that Adams' argument won't convince the skeptic, but then, it's not really meant to convince the skeptic that a good, omnipotent God exists. I think Adams does have something to say to the skeptic. I'll address that either in my response to Logan or in my post about Logan's post-class question.
Matt Reynolds: Are some human beings undeserving of a life that is ON THE WHOLE good? If so, which ones? Perhaps you have in mind the Hitlers, Stalins, Bundys, and Dahmers of the world. You seem to be assuming that some people aren't worthy of being redeemed. That may be true, but from an orthodox Christian point of view, no one is worthy of being redeemed. Rather, God mercifully redeems some of us. More to the point, does Adams say that we are ENTITLED, as a matter of justice, to a life that is a great good to us? Adams may think that God owes us a life that is a "great good on the whole" (that we are ENTITLED to such a life), but my impression was that she was making a point about LOVE, not justice. Perhaps a JUST God would allow some of us to have lives that are engulfed by evil. On her view, however, a LOVING God wuold not do so. So, the point to target is her conception of divine love.
Dan, I think by "engulf", she means "swallow up". That is, the face-to-face communion with God will make the evils we went through seem relatively insignificant. Once a person has this transcendent good, he can't help but see his own life as a great good. Later, she says that communion with God "defeats" evil in the sense discussed in class.
Brennan: allowing one person to suffer greatly for the benefit of another seems unjust, especially when the suffering is on the scale of the Holocaust or other horrendous evils. Think back to when you took 310. One reason why so many people find the theory of utilitarianism disturbing is that utilitarian maximization may well require that we sacrifice some people's good (e.g., enslave them, put them unjustly to death for the sake of public peace, torture innocent people, allow some people to suffer great deprivation for the greater good) in order to benefit OTHER people. If this seems unjust when done by one human to another human, it will also seem unjust when done by God to human beings. Now, you might, of course, argue that different standards apply to God because God is our creator & thus has even more rights over us than a human parent. Swinburne makes this point, but says that even God's right over us is limited. Still, it's troubling that God's right, as described by Swinburne, is so extensive. It's also troubling that Swinburne ascribes to God the right to allow some people to suffer so much that the gift of life is swamped by the suffering they endure. At that point, whatever benefit they get from suffering is far outweighed by the evil of the suffering itself. I think that this is just the sort of thing that Adams finds disturbing. Maybe God is within his rights allowing people to suffer horrendous evils and never defeating those horrendous evils, but that kind of God doesn't seem to be a LOVING God. For what it's worth, Adams doesn't seem to be saying that it would be unjust for God not to defeat horrendous evils; rather, her point seems to be that a LOVING God would defeat horrendous evils.
Caleb: you seem to have an even more demanding understanding of LOVE than does Adams. How could a loving God allow these evils in the first place? Even if he ultimately defeats them, it's still in your view troubling. I can sympathize with that.
Logan: we already talked about part of what concerns you, so I won't address that here. Regarding those who suffered in the Holocaust, you can't ask them whether communion with God is such a great good that it makes their lives on the whole a great good. Here's why: if they're alive, they haven't yet experienced this great good. If they're dead, they may be experiencing it, but we can't talk to dead people.
Whitney -- I liked your comment. Adams didn't make this clear in the selection we read, but she believes that ultimately each and every one of us will enter into communion with God.
Dave -- As we said in class, her standard for horrendous evils is not subjective. Rather, it's "objective, but relative to the individual". It's relative to the individual in that "nature and experience endow people with different strengths"; thus, an evil that would "crush" most people might not crush an especially strong person. It's objective because the person's own judgment of whether or not X is a horrendous evil is not decisive. As Adams notes, some people have a very low threshold for judging an experience to be an evil or to be a horrendous evil. What the person himself thinks is "a major consideration", but it is not always decisive. A person can be wrong about whether an evil she has experienced is in fact horrendous. As for addressing evil as a whole, you may be right. However, does one have to address evil as a whole in each article?
Jason -- we discussed this concern in class. I don't think I can add much more by way of easing your concern. I don't think she's making an excuse here. I think she's unsatisfied with others' efforts to identify possible reasons God might have for allowing evil and she's been unable to find reasons that are more compelling. That said, she may be giving up too soon.
Laura & Katie -- Adams would say that for each and every person, there is a transcendent good, viz., the good of being brought into eternal communion with God. Now, this, of course, is an item of faith, not something that she has proven or even could prove. But if everyone is brought into eternal communion with God and IF this is the kind of good that is transcendent, THEN everyone does, if not before death, at least after death, come to see his own life as being on the whole a great good.
LOGAN's QUESTION: At the end of last class, Logan was concerned about the fact that Adams, at the end of the day, is speaking to Christians, and a sub-group (those who believe in universal salvation) at that. She wondered whether Adams had anything to say to non-Christians. Remember that Mackie is one of Adams' targets. Mackie says that "essential doctrines of Christianity" (viz., the 5 propositions he lists) are inconsistent. On his view, then, theism, by which he seems to mean Christian theism, is internally incoherent. Adams makes the important point that IF Mackie, one of many atheologians, is to support this charge, he has to consider what Christians ACTUALLY believe. In her article, Adams presents what she thinks is an internally consistent Christian perspective that reconciles the existence of God with the existence of evil, without giving up anything that is "essential to theism". I think she would reject Mackie's contention that a theist must believe that a "wholly good being eradicates evil insofar as it can" (paraphrase of Mackie). In her description of God, God is not ERADICATING evil (preventing or wiping out evil), but rather DEFEATING evil. So, she's certainly giving up this proposition, but, so far as I can see, there's no reason why a Christian HAS to endorse this claim. Having rejected this proposition, she has at MOST 4 propositions to reconcile. (I say "at most" because I'm not sure that she accepts Mackie's understanding of omnipotence. Nor, it seems, is it essential to theism that an omnipotent being be able to do even the logically impossible.) The way in which she chooses to reconcile the existence of God with the existence of evil is to argue that a Loving God would not allow horrendous evils to go undefeated. (Hidden Assumption: A morally perfect, all-good God would be a loving God.) She doesn't need to show that IN FACT her explanation of HOW God makes each person's life a GREAT GOOD is correct. She has rebutted Mackie provided only that her solution (a) renders the existence of evil compatible with the existence of God and (b) is internally coherent. Of course, she draws on Christian values and Christian assumptions, but she's entitled to do this because she's trying to show that Mackie is wrong when he says that theism is internally incoherent and thus cannot proffer a solution to the problem of evil. This is worth doing even if one thinks that she ought to have done more (e.g., given the skeptic a resolution that he can accept without having to buy into Christian assumptions).
March 11, 2010 12:50 PM
LOGAN's QUESTION: At the end of last class, Logan was concerned about the fact that Adams, at the end of the day, is speaking to Christians, and a sub-group (those who believe in universal salvation) at that. She wondered whether Adams had anything to say to non-Christians. Remember that Mackie is one of Adams' targets. Mackie says that "essential doctrines of Christianity" (viz., the 5 propositions he lists) are inconsistent. On his view, then, theism, by which he seems to mean Christian theism, is internally incoherent. Adams makes the important point that IF Mackie, one of many atheologians, is to support this charge, he has to consider what Christians ACTUALLY believe. In her article, Adams presents what she thinks is an internally consistent Christian perspective that reconciles the existence of God with the existence of evil, without giving up anything that is "essential to theism". I think she would reject Mackie's contention that a theist must believe that a "wholly good being eradicates evil insofar as it can" (paraphrase of Mackie). In her description of God, God is not ERADICATING evil (preventing or wiping out evil), but rather DEFEATING evil. So, she's certainly giving up this proposition, but, so far as I can see, there's no reason why a Christian HAS to endorse this claim. Having rejected this proposition, she has at MOST 4 propositions to reconcile. (I say "at most" because I'm not sure that she accepts Mackie's understanding of omnipotence. Her solution in no way depends on any particular und. of omnipotence.) The way in which she chooses to reconcile the existence of God with the existence of evil is to argue that a Loving God would not allow horrendous evils to go undefeated. (Hidden Assumption: A morally perfect, all-good God would be a loving God.) She doesn't need to show that IN FACT her explanation of HOW God makes each person's life a GREAT GOOD is correct. She has rebutted Mackie provided only that her solution (a) renders the existence of evil compatible with the existence of God and (b) is internally coherent. Of course, she draws on Christian values and Christian assumptions, but she's entitled to do this because she's trying to show that Mackie is wrong when he says that theism is internally incoherent and thus cannot proffer a solution to the problem of evil. This is worth doing even if one thinks that she ought to have done more (e.g., given the skeptic a resolution that he can accept without having to buy into Christian assumptions).
March 11, 2010 12:50 PM
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