Reading: “The Evidential Argument from Evil”, pp. 324-330 (pp. 354 & following in 3rd edition)
Reading Guide
You may remember that when we initially presented the problem of evil, I distinguished between the Logical problem of evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil. The readings we have looked at so far have focused on the logical problem of evil, i.e., the claim that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, “wholly good” God. In this article, Rowe presents a version of the Evidential Problem of Evil; he argues that even if we cannot prove that evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God, the existence of evil is evidence that God does not exist. More precisely, the existence of evil for which there seems to be “no morally sufficient reason” is evidence against the existence of God. Thus, we have “rational grounds for believing” that God does not exist.
In the introduction, Rowe lays out what he will do and distinguishes between theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “narrow sense” and theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “broad sense”. In the narrow sense, theism, atheism and agnosticism are positions regarding the existence of “a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good” (325). In this article, Rowe focuses on the narrow sense; thus, he is not at all concerned here with whether the world is utterly devoid of “divine being or divine reality”.
In section I, Rowe presents his argument from evil for atheism. He helpfully states the argument in premise-conclusion form on p. 325 (R-H column). He carefully unpacks the 2nd premise (the premise that God would not allow “intense suffering” unless He “could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”). He thinks that theists will accept premise 2. The premise theists will reject is the first premise, which states that there are evils in this world “which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (325). Although Rowe does not think anyone could prove that premise 1 is true OR false, he does think that it is reasonable to believe that there are such evils. He makes this argument on pp. 326-327.
In section II, Rowe considers how a theist might respond to the 1st premise of his argument for evil. While he recognizes that some theists might be “content” to argue that “we have no good reasons for accepting (1) as true”, he notes that the theist “is … committed to the view that (1) is false” (328). For that reason, he focuses on responses designed to show that (1) is false. At the bottom of p. 328 (L-H column), he considers one version of a direct attack on (1) – this version is similar to Hick’s theodicy. At the top of the Right Hand column, he gives two reasons why direct attacks “cannot succeed” (328). On pp. 328-329, he presents a version of an indirect attack on (1); he dubs this “the G.E. Moore shift”. You may find this a little difficult to follow in spots, but the central idea should be clear enough. The theist’s indirect attack is presented on p. 329 (left-hand column) – for those of you who have the earlier edition, just look for the passage where it says “not-3”, followed by 2, therefore, “not-1”.
In section III, Rowe distinguishes between three different responses an atheist might have to this move; he calls them “unfriendly” atheism, “indifferent” atheism, and “friendly” atheism. Rowe then defends the position of friendly atheism, i.e., the position that “some theists are rationally justified in believing that God exists” (329). His argument for friendly atheism begins from the assumption that a person can be justified in holding a false belief; this, by the way, is non-controversial in epistemology. Justification does not guarantee truth. Before considering what reasons the theist might proffer to support his belief in God, Rowe gives an example of a justified belief that is nonetheless false. He then suggests that the friendly atheist can even claim, consistent with his atheism, that modern theists, “people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science”, can be rationally justified in believing that God exists. As he himself notes, this position will not set well with many atheists, but it may nonetheless be a tenable position.
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I'm happy to finally read someone who shares my sentiments. In my mind, either God does not exist, or he is not as powerful or knowledgeable as popular theology dictates. Rowe says that some great evils occur that cause no greater good. As an all good and powerful god would not allow that. Since events such as that happen, (I usually site the holocaust, but Rowe sites smaller scale but still monstrous evils) Rowe figures that God doesn't exist. I also like the fact that he takes a route most other theologians have not taken in regards to proving or disproving God. Rowe approaches the whole question with formal logic. I feel like this adds some validity to his argument. Although I have a huge bias in favor of his argument over other ones because he shares my general idea of God's existence.
I like Rowe, he's not out to definitly prove anything. He isnt a in your face atheist. He just sets up proof, "reasonable belief", or evidence for a logically possible situations. I also like the fact that he uses sound logic. His arguement doesnt jump here to there. it is easily followed and well defined.
Although I liked Hick's argument for the existence of evil, there was still the question about horrific evils (in my mind). Rowe's writing is a step up from this and he does a very good job at addressing this question, but obviously arrives at the opposite conclusion. One thing I especially like from Rowe's writing is that he says "it is reasonable for us to believe" that God does not exist, instead of just saying that God does not exist period. It sounds much more professional and less stuck-up.
I really like that Rowe defines what he means by the terms he is going to use. I also like that he gives arguments for both sides. Although he does not believe the theists point, he still presents the idea that there may be a rational defense against atheism based on the existance of evil. I also like in part 1 that he says even if evil is for a greater good, it is still evil. One part i agree with is where he says there is no good great enough to justify a child suffering. There are thousands of children at St. Jude (and all over the world) suffering and dying from cancer. Even if humans are stepping in to help (the good), I do not think it is justifiable. It's terrible no matter what way you want to look at it.
I would like to go over in class what Rowe does in the first column of 326. He seems to shrug the burden of proof but I’m not sure what he does is fair (I may just need a better explanation). I like the description of the Moore shift, it is quite interesting. Finally, I also like his position of friendly atheism which seems to be a useful position if he is to get along with co-workers.
I think it's important to note here that Rowe has not set out to definitively prove anything (1) because the nature of his argument will not allow it (evidentiary arguments for/against the existence of God tend to harbor an element of speculation) and (2) he uses the phrase rationally justified in place of true. Most of us are not looking for justification based on rationality. Most people want their beliefs to be based on truth. In my opinion his argument is fairly convincing and is probably something that lies in the back of most theists heads, particularly in times of immense suffering. However, it is not convincing enough to cast doubt upon the beliefs of theists. It might only tend to sway the thoughts of those indifferent minds which, to me, is neither here nor there.
I had a hard time following the "Moore Shift", but other than that, this argument was exceptionally well laid out and easy to follow. We use the idea "beyond a reasonable doubt" in court, why can't it apply to the philosophy of religion? I like his positions on the different kinds of atheists, since you do see that in the atheistic community, and it's important to distinguish among them. I think the fawn example was very well thought out and presented, and that the theist might read this and reconsider their position, and if they don't, at least they'll come out of it with a stronger belief. He does not set out to prove anything, or disprove for that matter, since he knows that his argument wouldn't support it: he says himself that we can never truly know if one of his premises is true or false, just that it is reasonable to believe it (back to "reasonable doubt"). I most definitely like that about this article: there are reasons to believe in and justify either position, but here's why it is "more reasonable" to be an atheist. Well done, in my opinion.
Although he is defending a very controversial stance in this article, Rowe is respectful enough to justify opposing beliefs. The article contains a formally developed logical argument evidencing the nonexistence of God, but Rowe still allows his audience opposing philosophical considerations. He remains open in admitting that neither side can be undeniably proven to be true.
I really appreciate the openness that Rowe appears to have to both sides of the argument. While, of course, his claims do sway towards the nonexistence of God and the views of athiests, Rowe does a good job of presenting opposing viewpoints which helps give his article some legitimacy. He doesn't appear to really be a hardliner at all. I especially like how Rowe examines just how a theist would respond to the athiestic claims made throughout his paper. I would be willing more to accept the "friendly" athiest approach in saying that it is still rational to believe in that which others clearly hold an opposite belief.
I am on board with Rowe's piece. The idea of pointless evils plays a large part in my thoughts on religion. I agree with him in that many evils are pointless and there is a very slim chance, probably no chance that those evils contribute to a greater good. For those that are deemed insane, would the counterargument be that they are insane for some greater good. Would Ted Bundy be thought of as a piece of the puzzle creating the greater good? If so then why should a Christian ever prosecute or fight anyone?
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