Reading: Aquinas, “God Is Omnipotent” (pp. 138-140) & Mavrodes, “Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence” (pp. 141-143)
Aquinas
In this reading, Aquinas discusses how we should interpret or understand the claim that God is omnipotent. Does the claim that God is all-powerful entail that He is able to do anything and everything or are there some things even an omnipotent being cannot do?
For those of you who are not used to reading Aquinas, it may be helpful to outline the structure of this short excerpt from the Summa. Aquinas begins, as is his standard practice, by identifying objections. He indicates disagreement with the objections, then at “I answer that” begins to sketch his own position. After he finishes describing his position, he then responds directly to each objection.
“The Philosopher” = Aristotle
Aquinas begins to articulate his own position at the bottom of p. 138. At the top of p. 139, he tells us that “this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible”. But this claim needs further clarification, for there are different senses in which something is possible or impossible. For instance, it is physically impossible for me to pick up my car using my own brute strength; however, it is physically possible for a lot of people working together to pick up my car. However, if God can do all things just means that he can do all things that are physically possible for human beings to do, then that’s not that impressive.
Aquinas explores two interpretations of the claim that something is possible. We might mean that it is possible “in relation to some power”, either human or divine OR we might mean that it is possible “absolutely”. Aquinas rejects the first alternative. I’ve already partially explained above why we wouldn’t want to define God’s omnipotence “in relation to” human power. See the text for Aquinas’ explanation of why it is a mistake to define God’s omnipotence as the ability to “do all things that are possible to His power”. Having rejected the first alternative, Aquinas then explains what is meant by the claim that an omnipotent being can do anything that is “possible absolutely”. His initial explication may be a bit puzzling to some of you, but it becomes clearer as he goes on. Although he does not use this terminology, Aquinas is essentially saying that God can do anything that is logically possible. He then concludes that omnipotence doesn’t imply the ability to do things that are logically impossible; still, “it is more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them” (139).
At this point, Aquinas turns his attention to responding to the 4 objections he sketched on p. 138. The most interesting and informative of these is his response to Objection 2.
Mavrodes
Mavrodes begins by summarizing Aquinas’ position. He then contrasts two counter-examples to the doctrine of omnipotence:
(1) God “cannot draw a square circle”.
(2) God “cannot create a stone too heavy for Him to lift”.
He points out that Aquinas has a perfectly good explanation for why (1) is not a threat to God’s omnipotence. Ultimately, he thinks that Aquinas’ explanation also extends to (2). However, he thinks that (2) is “a more involved problem”. Here, he contrasts the claim that “x is able to draw a square circle” with the claim that “x is able to make a thing too heavy for x to lift”; the former claim, but not the latter, obviously “involve(s) a contradiction”. So, there appears to be a significant difference between these two claims. Mavrodes then argues that counterexample (2) does not force us to give up the doctrine of God’s omnipotence because omnipotence is not damaged by the inability to do “self-contradictory thing(s)” (142). Mavrodes must, then, establish that (2) involves a contradiction. Mavrodes’ main argument begins with “The specious nature of the problem may be seen in this way” (left-hand column, p. 142). Mavrodes notes that the objector can't, in articulating his objection, assume that God is NOT omnipotent, for then his argument would be circular. So, the objector must be understood as mounting a reductio argument. For those of you who don’t know or need a refresher, a reductio (aka reductio ad absurdum) seeks to demonstrate the falsity of a particular claim (“God is omnipotent”, “God exists”, “Human beings are naturally good”, etc. ) by assuming its truth and showing that the assumption that the claim is true produces an absurdity or a contradiction. Mavrodes claims that the objector can’t construct a successful reductio: “On the assumption that God is omnipotent, the phrase ‘a stone too heavy for God to lift’ becomes self-contradictory.” (142) Mavrodes unpacks this line of thought, then considers the possibility that someone might insist that the phrase “a stone too heavy for God (an omnipotent being) to lift” is NOT a contradiction in terms. Mavrodes argues that even if we assume the objector is right, this does not undermine the doctrine of God’s omnipotence. The last few paragraphs propose a different way of understanding why (2) is a specious challenge to God’s omnipotence.
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While I find the arguments by Aquinas convincing and find the responses by Mavrodes particularly clever, especially his response to the die-hard objector, I have another question regarding God’s omnipotence that neither Aquinas nor Mavrodes makes a motion to address. Now perhaps it is my own naiveté or perhaps the question is just not interesting because it implies philosophy itself is incapable of inquiry into the nature of God, but if an omnipotent being created the universe and not only the matter it is composed of but also the laws of nature themselves, is it not also possible that the reason that governs philosophy is also a construct. That being the case, a square circle may not be a contradiction in terms within an unfamiliar logical system in a similar way that a triangle with angles that add to greater than 180 degrees is not contradictory in non-Euclidean geometry.
I would like to ask Mavrodes what he thinks about the fact that in creating the world, God created the rules that govern the world. If God created the rules that govern the world we live and we do not fully understand all the laws that govern the world. How can we say that God cannot draw a square circle or that he can create a rock that is too big for him to lift. It seems as though the arguement is not fully addressed.
The Reply to Objection 2 in Thomas Aquinas' literary work appears to hold the most viable response to any of the objections set forth. The idea that sin is an act of some kind is absolutely true; however, the failure of the objection is seeing that while God created the idea of sin and what it is to sin, humans have construed sin to mean anything that a human would consider an act of evil. Thus to sin is doing a human act which God is not capable of. In addition, what humans consider evil is not necessarily in line with what God would deem as evil unless scripted in his commandments. The bottom line is that a divine act should always be considered good and free of what humans consider to be sin. I'm curious, however, as to Mavrodes description of a "self-contradictory" phrase and what specifically his meaning is behind such a description. Is it his interpretation which makes the sentence contradictory or does the phrase become self-contradictory when the definition of omnipotence is disected?
I thought that Aquinas’ response to Objection 2 was interesting. He states that “to sin is to fall short of a perfect action.” But this makes me wonder what he means by sin. Is sin an action of evil or an act that contains no good? Is evil just the opposite of good or it the lack of good?
After reading Mavrodes and the problem of a stone that is too heavy for God I started to wonder if God is all powerful then can he make himself not all powerful? I wonder if that is a contradictory statement he claims the first one is?
Although the primary purpose of these responses is to share our own personal interpretations and feelings after reading the assigned material, I found that my main thoughts were focused on possible responses from other members in our modern society. Uneducated religious zealots of any faith group would be automatically stumped by such a simple question. Faith may be a vital trait among members of any organized religion, but blind faith falls prey to an inherent lack of logical support. Mavrodes' coherent and rational method of addressing the issue of divine omnipotence starkly contrasts with such an ignorant approach to religious belief. Reading such a focused and logical argument as our first assignment has me to even higher expectations than previously imagined for the remainder of the course.
Movrodes argument that God cannot draw a square circle is particularly interesting because it seems to be a bold claim to say God cannot do something. Maybe God can draw a square circle and it is something that we cannot conceive of. So does Movrodes believe that God can’t be omnipotent stricltly because our minds can think of something that we think God can’t do? If he claims God is a divine being then he is leaving out the fact our minds are miniscule compared to a perfect, all knowing, all powerful God, so who are we to say he cannot do something?
Aquinas's reply to objection 2 convinces me that God's inability to sin does not take away claims of his ominpotence. Since sin is imperfection, God, who is believed to be a perfect being, cannot take part in a lesser action such as sin. However, I disagree with the notion that if God commits an act of evil, that act would somehow become good. Wouldn't a kind and loving god abstain from any acts of evil? If God came to Earth and burned down an orphanage would we not consider that an act of evil despite the nature or identity of the perpetrator? The label "Evil" is not dependent on the person committing the act, but on the act itself.
Mavrodes contends that people who doubt God's omnipotence with the stone argument fail because they are putting God to the test with a self-contradictory situation. I believe that another solution is possible. In Catholicism, there is the idea of a trinity, wherein The Father, Jesus, and the Holy Spirit exist as one God. This being the case, their are multiple persons who could be capable of multiple actions simultaneously. For example, God the father could create a stone that he himself could not lift while Jesus could have beyond infinite lifting capability. In this situation, God (the trinity) could feasibly lift a stone that another piece of him would be incapable of lifting. Each part of the trinity covers for one another to form a system of omnipotence.
I developed the preceeding idea after watching this video that offered a solution to the question, "Could Jesus microwave a burrito so hot that he himself could not eat it?" Enjoy.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42F01Zj-lFM
This particular passage from Aquinas I have read before- twice- and his language is still kind of confusing. I always felt that Aquinas had good- but not always satisfying-answers to these philosophical inquiries. I was never convinced. Mavrodes, on the other hand, gives us a far more convincing argument as to why the "contradiction" argument doesn't particularly hold water, but he only touches on that part of the question of whether or not God is omnipotent. The idea of self-contradiction is not something I had previously taken from the Aquinas reading and I find it particularly interesting, leaving us with no real answer because of the scenarios and issues human beings conjure up in this art of philosophy- we only know that, like Mavrodes said, God is either omnipotent or He isn't.
As far as the square circle goes, the point is only this: since God created the ideas and forms of the circle and the square, they cannot be changed, lest they turn into another form. Even God cannot break these laws. If God is perfect, he cannot then be imperfect. He can not be a contradiction, nor create contradiction, mainly because of his implied and assumed perfection. He is completely, entirely and wholly perfect (in this idea of God). He cannot change things he created willy-nilly, regardless of what the Old Testament may lead us to believe (even then, you could say the miracles of the Old Testament were not contradictions, but changes God could make. He did not make a rocky river, but he changed the composition of it.. see the difference?) If we were to assume an imperfect being, then we might have some problems here... I wonder what would happen?
Thanks for your thoughtful responses.
In response to a question Jarrod asked after class last time, Aquinas' response to the problem of evil rests on the claim that evil is a privation of good.
Having talked to our resident Aquinas expert, I'd like to address Thomas' reasons for rejecting the doctrine that omnipotence entails being able to do anything whatsoever (including what is logically impossible). Aquinas believed that the principle of non-contradiction is constitutive of rational nature. So, God's mind is in part constituted by the principle of noncontradiction. As rational creatures ourselves who are made in the image of God, our natures are also in part constituted by the principle of noncontradiction. This is a fundamental presupposition of being a rational being. Even though we're made in the image of God, we can't assume that His rationality is just like ours, for we are imperfect creatures. God is fully rational; we are not. Still, Aquinas believed that our rationality and God's rationality are similarly structured. Ultimately, it is God's nature as a rational being that results in his "inability" to create a square circle or to make a stone so big that He cannot lift it. I put the word inability in scare quotes because Aquinas explicitly rejects the notion that this inability counts as a defect in God's power: "For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence; not indeed because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. ... Hence it is more appropriate to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them." (139)
Some of you seemed to want to hang on to the doctrine that God can do anything, even the logically impossible. Rather than focus on the specific examples of divine failure raised in the Mavrodes article, it might be best to think generally about the question of divine failure. Can God fail? Many Christians would say "No". Does God's inability to fail entail that He is not omnipotent? IF you think omnipotence entails the ability to do ANYTHING and EVERYTHING, then you must say either that God can fail or that He is not omnipotent. Both of these are big bullets to bite. Aquinas, however, has a way out BECAUSE he does not define omnipotence as entailing the ability to do anything and everything. He conceives of omnipotence as a perfection. Is it a mark of imperfection that God cannot fail? Surely not. If we don't think of God's inability to fail as an imperfection, then His inability to fail does not diminish His omnipotence. This suggests that omnipotence is not properly conceived of as the ability to do everything, even to fail.
Dr. Carey brought up an interesting psychological fact. When Christians pray, they often ask God to prevent bad things from coming about in the future (e.g., please don't let my wife find out that I cheated on her). They don't pray "Please make it the case that I did not cheat on my wife yesterday" or, to take a more trivial example, "Please make it the case that I wasn't late to work this morning after all". The fact that Christians don't ask God to reverse the past suggests that they are tacitly assuming that God can't reverse the past. This doesn't prove anything; it's just interesting that even those who insist that God can do ANYTHING don't typically ask Him to reverse the past. By the way, this comports with my experience. I've never heard ANYONE ask God to reverse the past. If anyone did, I think the general reaction would be "Huh?".
Whitney, I too found Aquinas' discussion of sin interesting. As I noted in my previous comment, Aquinas considers evil to be a privation of good rather than the opposite of good.
Edward, Aquinas would not endorse the Divine Command Theory of morality. Regarding your speculation about the Trinity, I think this line of thought relies on treating the 3 persons as completely separate beings who are not ultimately one being. I doubt this fits the orthodox interpretation of the Trinity -- one God, 3 persons.
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