Reading: MacIntyre, Which God Ought we to Obey?, pp. 612-618
Reading Guide: The editors provide a summary of MacIntyre’s position, but not much detail. Most of you have probably encountered this question at some point: Are actions right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right? The Divine Command theorist argues that actions are right because God commands them. MacIntyre rejects the Divine Command theory, but tries to preserve some notion of the independence of God the lawgiver.
In the first section (The Nature of God’s Commands), MacIntyre begins with Freud’s “psychologically primitive version of the relation between beliefs about” morality and “beliefs about divine commands”, where the father’s commands are interpreted by the child as having divine authority. He contrasts “the God of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures” with the child’s vision of her father as god and with Jupiter. MacIntyre then considers whether it could be “right for someone to obey (the Jewish or Christian God -RS) and yet also to have justified regrets for so doing”, to be “divided in feelings and will” (613, 614). He contrasts R.M. Adams’ modified divine command theory with Occam’s unmodified divine command theory. Although MacIntyre is not a divine command theorist, he sides with Occam here: “it is logically impossible that it should be true of any action both that it is commanded by God and that it would not be wrong not to do it” (614). MacIntyre believes that both Occam and Adams have impoverished “moral theories”, theories that “are unlikely to be able to distinguish adequately between the claims to human allegiance made in the name of a variety of gods who allegedly issue commands to us” (614). After discussing what’s wrong with Adams’ view, he turns to the question of what assumption(s) we would need to add in order to “derive the conclusion ‘We ought to do what God commands’” (614). In the second section (Why Only Just Commands are Worthy of Obedience), he identifies the “crucial concept that is characteristically missing from divine command theories” (614). In the final section (How We Acquired our Understanding of a Just God), he discusses 3 historical stages of the concept of the divine; he may mean this historical story to apply only to Western civilization, for the 1st stage is recognizably that of ancient Greece. Each of the 3 stages represents “ideal types”, which I take to be his way of saying that he is not presenting his analysis of these stages or the transitions between stages as an accurate, complete historical account. I think it’s pretty clear what the difference is between a stage 1 (or “episode” 1) conception of the divine and a stage 2 conception of the divine. The stage 3 conception of the divine is of the Jewish or Christian God OR a god like the J-C God in important respects. The first paragraph of MacIntyre’s discussion of Stage 3 is quite important; this paragraph gives a good description of MacIntyre’s own position on the relationship between morality and divine commands. The last sentence of the paragraph is especially important. On p. 617, MacIntyre makes a claim that will probably seem surprising, especially if you raced through the previous paragraphs on Stage 3: “From the fact that we can at one stage in our progress towards God evaluate the divine claims, using a standard of justice acquired and elaborated independently of the knowledge of God, it does not follow that in so doing we are judging the Word of God by something external to it.” If you read Section 3 carefully (including the remaining few paragraphs), I think you’ll see why he says this.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Monday, April 26, 2010
L36 Reading Guide
Reading: Hick, “Religious Pluralism”, pp. 597-604
Reading Guide
Note: This is not a reading to try to rush through. You’ll get more out of it by reading it a bit more slowly.
The editors provide an overview of Hick’s position. Hick rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism.
Hick begins by noting that how we understand religious life affects the kinds of questions we ask about religion. From a traditional way of thinking about religion, the obvious question is “which is the true religion?” (p. 598). For Hick, however, this is not the right question, for it implies that one religion has special epistemic status; that is, one religion has dibs on the truth. On p. 599, he criticizes inclusivism, suggesting that “the old dogma (e.g., in Rahner’s case, Christianity) … has … been so emptied of content as no longer to be worth affirming”. Moreover, Hick thinks it is obvious that inclusivism is “logically” unstable (599). Rather, he thinks we should embrace pluralism. His initial definition of pluralism does not sufficiently distinguish pluralism from inclusivism, but the key difference is that for a pluralist there is no privileged access to the divine. He attributes the Christian’s unwillingness to substitute pluralism for inclusivism to “the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation, together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity” (599). On p. 600, he outlines what he takes to be “an acceptable Christian route to religious pluralism”. Here, he contrasts “all-or-nothing Christologies” (or substance Christologies) with “degree Christologies”. He notes that these “degree Christologies” have the “unintended consequence” of removing a barrier to Christians accepting pluralism. From pp. 601-604, Hick makes it clearer what pluralism commits one to and presents considerations that he thinks support pluralism. He admits that we have no “cosmic vision” that can establish that there is one Reality that all religions are tapping into. So, the pluralist cannot KNOW that all religions are accessing ultimate reality or that there even is an ultimate reality. He also admits that “religious experience is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis”. However, if one “treat(s) one’s own form of religious experience … as an experience of transcendent divine Reality … one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience” (601). Pluralism, rather than exclusivism or inclusivism, provides the best account of this diversity. On p. 602, Hick distinguishes between the Real an sich and “the Real as humanly experienced and thought”. He gives multiple examples of religions that make this distinction. He then distinguishes between religions that are personal (that appeal to a Deity or God) and religions that are non-personal (appeal to the Absolute). In large part, we can account for religious diversity by the fact that we cannot experience the Real as it is in itself, but must encounter it through the lens of our “conceptual framework”.
Reading Guide
Note: This is not a reading to try to rush through. You’ll get more out of it by reading it a bit more slowly.
The editors provide an overview of Hick’s position. Hick rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism.
Hick begins by noting that how we understand religious life affects the kinds of questions we ask about religion. From a traditional way of thinking about religion, the obvious question is “which is the true religion?” (p. 598). For Hick, however, this is not the right question, for it implies that one religion has special epistemic status; that is, one religion has dibs on the truth. On p. 599, he criticizes inclusivism, suggesting that “the old dogma (e.g., in Rahner’s case, Christianity) … has … been so emptied of content as no longer to be worth affirming”. Moreover, Hick thinks it is obvious that inclusivism is “logically” unstable (599). Rather, he thinks we should embrace pluralism. His initial definition of pluralism does not sufficiently distinguish pluralism from inclusivism, but the key difference is that for a pluralist there is no privileged access to the divine. He attributes the Christian’s unwillingness to substitute pluralism for inclusivism to “the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation, together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity” (599). On p. 600, he outlines what he takes to be “an acceptable Christian route to religious pluralism”. Here, he contrasts “all-or-nothing Christologies” (or substance Christologies) with “degree Christologies”. He notes that these “degree Christologies” have the “unintended consequence” of removing a barrier to Christians accepting pluralism. From pp. 601-604, Hick makes it clearer what pluralism commits one to and presents considerations that he thinks support pluralism. He admits that we have no “cosmic vision” that can establish that there is one Reality that all religions are tapping into. So, the pluralist cannot KNOW that all religions are accessing ultimate reality or that there even is an ultimate reality. He also admits that “religious experience is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis”. However, if one “treat(s) one’s own form of religious experience … as an experience of transcendent divine Reality … one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience” (601). Pluralism, rather than exclusivism or inclusivism, provides the best account of this diversity. On p. 602, Hick distinguishes between the Real an sich and “the Real as humanly experienced and thought”. He gives multiple examples of religions that make this distinction. He then distinguishes between religions that are personal (that appeal to a Deity or God) and religions that are non-personal (appeal to the Absolute). In large part, we can account for religious diversity by the fact that we cannot experience the Real as it is in itself, but must encounter it through the lens of our “conceptual framework”.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Reading Guide L35 -- Rahner, Dalai Lama
Reading: Rahner, “Religious Inclusivism”, pp. 588-595 & Dalai Lama, “Buddhism and Other Religions”, pp. 577-581
Note: The primary reading for next class is Rahner; the Dalai Lama piece is meant to complement the Rahner reading. The editors give a good summary of the Dalai Lama “interview” (I’m not sure it’s a real interview). The editors also give a good overview of Rahner, but I will add a few observations here.
Reading Guide to Rahner: The first few paragraphs of the Rahner are, if read too quickly, hard to understand, but the next few pages are much easier. Rahner begins by noting that Catholics (and, indeed, all Christians) can no longer ignore the fact of religious diversity. Given cross-cultural influence, the issue of how to respond to religious pluralism (the fact that there are so many different, incompatible religions) is more pressing than ever. He then discusses how Christians should respond to this fact. In the section titled First Thesis, he acknowledges that Christianity was not always “the religion which binds men to God”; he then argues that although Christianity is “the absolute and only religion for all men”, it is not the case that all men are now under an “absolute obligation” to encounter God through Christianity. He contrasts this position with the “normal” or traditional position on Christianity, which says that from the time of the Apostles, all are bound to approach God through Christ; the implication of this normal position is that anyone who does not acquire “saving faith” in Christ is condemned. Second Thesis: prior to the point where Christianity is an absolute obligation, non-Christian religions are lawful (see the text for what he means). This section of the article repays close reading. It will help to notice that Rahner is making a few important assumptions: (a) Christianity, properly understood, commits the faithful to believing that God desires that all men be saved and thus provides adequate opportunity for each to be saved; (b) if (a) is true, then that implies that Christianity cannot always and everywhere be the only way to achieve salvation; (c) religion is inherently a social phenomenon, at least as it has been and is in practice a social institution. Rahner is also making implicit assumptions about how a just God would interact with men and about the conditions of being morally responsible for having rejected God. Third Thesis: Christians should regard members of non-Christian religions as “anonymous Christians”. Nonetheless, Christians should still proselytize. Fourth Thesis: it is not presumptuous, but humble, to view non-Christian believers as “anonymous Christians”; we should not expect religious diversity to die out any time soon.
As is perhaps evident from this reading guide, the most difficult part of the reading is the Second Thesis; this is also the meatiest part of the reading.
Note: The primary reading for next class is Rahner; the Dalai Lama piece is meant to complement the Rahner reading. The editors give a good summary of the Dalai Lama “interview” (I’m not sure it’s a real interview). The editors also give a good overview of Rahner, but I will add a few observations here.
Reading Guide to Rahner: The first few paragraphs of the Rahner are, if read too quickly, hard to understand, but the next few pages are much easier. Rahner begins by noting that Catholics (and, indeed, all Christians) can no longer ignore the fact of religious diversity. Given cross-cultural influence, the issue of how to respond to religious pluralism (the fact that there are so many different, incompatible religions) is more pressing than ever. He then discusses how Christians should respond to this fact. In the section titled First Thesis, he acknowledges that Christianity was not always “the religion which binds men to God”; he then argues that although Christianity is “the absolute and only religion for all men”, it is not the case that all men are now under an “absolute obligation” to encounter God through Christianity. He contrasts this position with the “normal” or traditional position on Christianity, which says that from the time of the Apostles, all are bound to approach God through Christ; the implication of this normal position is that anyone who does not acquire “saving faith” in Christ is condemned. Second Thesis: prior to the point where Christianity is an absolute obligation, non-Christian religions are lawful (see the text for what he means). This section of the article repays close reading. It will help to notice that Rahner is making a few important assumptions: (a) Christianity, properly understood, commits the faithful to believing that God desires that all men be saved and thus provides adequate opportunity for each to be saved; (b) if (a) is true, then that implies that Christianity cannot always and everywhere be the only way to achieve salvation; (c) religion is inherently a social phenomenon, at least as it has been and is in practice a social institution. Rahner is also making implicit assumptions about how a just God would interact with men and about the conditions of being morally responsible for having rejected God. Third Thesis: Christians should regard members of non-Christian religions as “anonymous Christians”. Nonetheless, Christians should still proselytize. Fourth Thesis: it is not presumptuous, but humble, to view non-Christian believers as “anonymous Christians”; we should not expect religious diversity to die out any time soon.
As is perhaps evident from this reading guide, the most difficult part of the reading is the Second Thesis; this is also the meatiest part of the reading.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
L34 Reading Guide (Griffiths)
Reading: Griffiths, “The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines”, pp. 581-587
Reminder: Matt Reynolds is presenting tomorrow.
Recommendation: Since Griffiths refers a couple of times to pluralism, you may find it helpful to read the editors’ introduction to this section (pp. 573-576) or at least to read the description on p. 575 of pluralism. Each of the 3 philosophical articles (defending, respectively, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), refers to at least one of the other two positions.
Reading Guide: Using examples drawn from both Christianity and Buddhism, Griffiths discusses “the five most important dimensions of religious doctrine” (582). Religious doctrines serve as community rules, determine community boundaries (who is part of the community & who isn’t), shape and are shaped by “the spiritual experience of the communities that profess them” (583), “make members” through education and evangelism, and express what the community takes to be “salvifically significant truths” (585). Given these functions or dimensions of religious doctrines, one should not expect religious communities to abandon their universalist and exclusivist claims unless one can offer them “vital and pressing reasons” for doing so. Griffiths concludes with a short section on the uniqueness of Christianity, but he could just as easily have concluded with a section on the uniqueness of Buddhism, Islam, or some other religion. Those of you who have taken Comparative Religions or have direct experience of some other religious tradition should feel free to bring up examples of doctrines within those traditions that serve one or more of the functions listed above.
Reminder: Matt Reynolds is presenting tomorrow.
Recommendation: Since Griffiths refers a couple of times to pluralism, you may find it helpful to read the editors’ introduction to this section (pp. 573-576) or at least to read the description on p. 575 of pluralism. Each of the 3 philosophical articles (defending, respectively, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), refers to at least one of the other two positions.
Reading Guide: Using examples drawn from both Christianity and Buddhism, Griffiths discusses “the five most important dimensions of religious doctrine” (582). Religious doctrines serve as community rules, determine community boundaries (who is part of the community & who isn’t), shape and are shaped by “the spiritual experience of the communities that profess them” (583), “make members” through education and evangelism, and express what the community takes to be “salvifically significant truths” (585). Given these functions or dimensions of religious doctrines, one should not expect religious communities to abandon their universalist and exclusivist claims unless one can offer them “vital and pressing reasons” for doing so. Griffiths concludes with a short section on the uniqueness of Christianity, but he could just as easily have concluded with a section on the uniqueness of Buddhism, Islam, or some other religion. Those of you who have taken Comparative Religions or have direct experience of some other religious tradition should feel free to bring up examples of doctrines within those traditions that serve one or more of the functions listed above.
Sunday, April 18, 2010
L33 Reading Guide (Dawkins)
Reading: Dawkins, “Science Discredits Religion”, pp. 523-526
Optional Link (if you’re interested in seeing more about a Catholic perspective on evolution): http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05654a.htm
Reading Guide: This is a short, clear reading. Unlike Gould, Dawkins is not at all conciliatory to religious belief. After arguing that religion has no “special expertise to offer us on moral questions”, he argues that the Pope’s message on evolution itself intrudes into the domain of science. (The passage he quotes here is the passage I referred to or quoted in class last time.) He then identifies other ways in which the Catholic Church intrudes into the domain of science. Basically, he denies that religion and science inhabit separate domains - at least in practice. As you read, think about how Gould might respond to Dawkins’ claims and how Christians might respond to Dawkins.
Terminology: Some of you may be unfamiliar with the term “speciesism”. The term, as you will gather, is derogatory; those who believe that humans are importantly different from the rest of the animal kingdom and therefore deserving of special consideration are referred to as “speciesists” by animal rights activists, some evolutionists, and others who see no morally significant difference between human beings and other animals. Such critics compare those who invest species with special significance to racists and sexists. The idea here is that species does not in itself make a moral difference, any more than race or sex makes a moral difference. Two points are relevant here: (1) It is speciesist to claim for human beings special consideration that we are not willing to extend to non-human animals who, like us, have the properties that make us deserving of special consideration. (2) It is said to be speciesist to insist that human beings who no longer have the capacities that distinguish us from most of the rest of the animal kingdom be given the same protections as normal human beings; given that they are not superior to other animals, why should they be treated as if they were? (This has implications for the debate over euthanasia.)
Optional Link (if you’re interested in seeing more about a Catholic perspective on evolution): http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05654a.htm
Reading Guide: This is a short, clear reading. Unlike Gould, Dawkins is not at all conciliatory to religious belief. After arguing that religion has no “special expertise to offer us on moral questions”, he argues that the Pope’s message on evolution itself intrudes into the domain of science. (The passage he quotes here is the passage I referred to or quoted in class last time.) He then identifies other ways in which the Catholic Church intrudes into the domain of science. Basically, he denies that religion and science inhabit separate domains - at least in practice. As you read, think about how Gould might respond to Dawkins’ claims and how Christians might respond to Dawkins.
Terminology: Some of you may be unfamiliar with the term “speciesism”. The term, as you will gather, is derogatory; those who believe that humans are importantly different from the rest of the animal kingdom and therefore deserving of special consideration are referred to as “speciesists” by animal rights activists, some evolutionists, and others who see no morally significant difference between human beings and other animals. Such critics compare those who invest species with special significance to racists and sexists. The idea here is that species does not in itself make a moral difference, any more than race or sex makes a moral difference. Two points are relevant here: (1) It is speciesist to claim for human beings special consideration that we are not willing to extend to non-human animals who, like us, have the properties that make us deserving of special consideration. (2) It is said to be speciesist to insist that human beings who no longer have the capacities that distinguish us from most of the rest of the animal kingdom be given the same protections as normal human beings; given that they are not superior to other animals, why should they be treated as if they were? (This has implications for the debate over euthanasia.)
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Essay Questions for the Exam
Phil 402
Exam 2 Essay Questions
1. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Hick’s soul-making theodicy. In your discussion, briefly explain how Hick’s theodicy differs from a traditional, Augustinian theodicy. Finally, state and explain a major objection to Hick’s theodicy, indicate how he might respond to this objection, and discuss the adequacy of his response (or the response you have provided for him).
2. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Swinburne’s version of the free will defense. In your discussion, be sure to identify at least one serious objection to Swinburne’s account and take a stance on whether there is a good defense against this objection. (The good defense or response could be one Swinburne himself offers or one that is consistent with Swinburne’s overall approach.)
3. Clifford maintains that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (99). State and explain Clifford’s argument for this thesis, then identify and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of his argument. Based on your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his argument, does Clifford’s argument establish that religious belief is “wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone”? Explain and support your answer.
Note: You may use James in your discussion, but you are not required to do so.
Exam 2 Essay Questions
1. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Hick’s soul-making theodicy. In your discussion, briefly explain how Hick’s theodicy differs from a traditional, Augustinian theodicy. Finally, state and explain a major objection to Hick’s theodicy, indicate how he might respond to this objection, and discuss the adequacy of his response (or the response you have provided for him).
2. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Swinburne’s version of the free will defense. In your discussion, be sure to identify at least one serious objection to Swinburne’s account and take a stance on whether there is a good defense against this objection. (The good defense or response could be one Swinburne himself offers or one that is consistent with Swinburne’s overall approach.)
3. Clifford maintains that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (99). State and explain Clifford’s argument for this thesis, then identify and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of his argument. Based on your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his argument, does Clifford’s argument establish that religious belief is “wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone”? Explain and support your answer.
Note: You may use James in your discussion, but you are not required to do so.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
L30 Reading Guide (Dennett)
Reminder: Caleb is presenting on Dennett.
Reading: Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion", pp. 10-18
Reading Guide: Daniel Dennett is an American philosopher who teaches at Tufts University. He is well known for his work in cognitive science. He is also an outspoken atheist; however, he takes a more "friendly tone" towards religion than Richard Dawkins. In this excerpt from his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Dennett takes a critical approach to religion. He focuses on presenting an account of how religion evolved. Since religion doesn't come cheap, it is worth asking why religions are so "persisten(t) and popular" (11). On p. 12, he argues that "we need to understand what makes religions work, so we can protect ourselves in an informed manner from the circumstances in which religions go haywire". On his account, our innate tendency "to attribute agency - beliefs and desires and other mental states - to anything complicated that moves" is the biological root of religion. In the section titled "Religion, The Early Days", he explains how this "hyperactive" tendency to attribute agency could account for the origins of folk religion, how/why the concept of divination became so prevalent, and the role of ritual in preserving a religion (14-16). On p. 16, he rejects the suggestion that this evolution of ritual necessarily arose deliberately: "Even elaborate and expensive rituals of public rehearsal could emerge out of earlier practices and habits without conscious design". He notes that over time, folk religions "acquired stewards", i.e., people who consciously worked to spread and protect it. They thus became "domesticated". On p. 17, he observes that there are certain features shared by domesticated memes (see the editors' summary for a good definition of memes). He concludes by considering whether religion makes us "better" in some way.
As you read, think about what's at stake for religion. Why does it matter whether Dennett is right?
Reading: Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion", pp. 10-18
Reading Guide: Daniel Dennett is an American philosopher who teaches at Tufts University. He is well known for his work in cognitive science. He is also an outspoken atheist; however, he takes a more "friendly tone" towards religion than Richard Dawkins. In this excerpt from his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Dennett takes a critical approach to religion. He focuses on presenting an account of how religion evolved. Since religion doesn't come cheap, it is worth asking why religions are so "persisten(t) and popular" (11). On p. 12, he argues that "we need to understand what makes religions work, so we can protect ourselves in an informed manner from the circumstances in which religions go haywire". On his account, our innate tendency "to attribute agency - beliefs and desires and other mental states - to anything complicated that moves" is the biological root of religion. In the section titled "Religion, The Early Days", he explains how this "hyperactive" tendency to attribute agency could account for the origins of folk religion, how/why the concept of divination became so prevalent, and the role of ritual in preserving a religion (14-16). On p. 16, he rejects the suggestion that this evolution of ritual necessarily arose deliberately: "Even elaborate and expensive rituals of public rehearsal could emerge out of earlier practices and habits without conscious design". He notes that over time, folk religions "acquired stewards", i.e., people who consciously worked to spread and protect it. They thus became "domesticated". On p. 17, he observes that there are certain features shared by domesticated memes (see the editors' summary for a good definition of memes). He concludes by considering whether religion makes us "better" in some way.
As you read, think about what's at stake for religion. Why does it matter whether Dennett is right?
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
L29 Reading Guide (Kierkegaard)
Reminder: Jarrod is presenting tomorrow.
Reading: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity", pp. 111-114
Reading Guide: This is a short reading, but it is by no means easy. Don't worry if some of it escapes your grasp. Just do the best you can.
In addition to this reading guide, please read the editors' abstract (on the first page of the article).
There are multiple Latin phrases in this selection; if you don't know what they mean, I suggest that you Google them.
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a subject's (i.e., an individual person) being in the truth objectively and his being in the truth objectively. Objectively, I am in the truth so long as my belief accurately reflects facts about the world. Subjectively, I am in the truth if I am related in the proper way to something. Kierkegaard uses the example of God here: "Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God; subjectively, reflection is directed to the question whether the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God relationship"
(112). One and the same person cannot simultaneously be in the truth objectively and in the truth subjectively. On pp. 112 & 113, Kierkegaard uses examples to contrast being in the truth objectively with being in the truth subjectively. The position taken by Climacus (the character in this reading) is that there are advantages to being in the truth subjectively. See Climacus' brief discussion of the man "who goes up to the house of God .. with the true conception of God in his knowledge, ... but prays in a false spirit" (112). The example of Socrates' attitude toward immortality may also be helpful. Climacus suggests that being in the truth subjectively is marked by a passionate embrace of "objective uncertainty" (p. 113); he claims that this is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" (113). Climacus concludes with these comments: "Without risk, there is no faith. ... If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe." (114)
Reading: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity", pp. 111-114
Reading Guide: This is a short reading, but it is by no means easy. Don't worry if some of it escapes your grasp. Just do the best you can.
In addition to this reading guide, please read the editors' abstract (on the first page of the article).
There are multiple Latin phrases in this selection; if you don't know what they mean, I suggest that you Google them.
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a subject's (i.e., an individual person) being in the truth objectively and his being in the truth objectively. Objectively, I am in the truth so long as my belief accurately reflects facts about the world. Subjectively, I am in the truth if I am related in the proper way to something. Kierkegaard uses the example of God here: "Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God; subjectively, reflection is directed to the question whether the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God relationship"
(112). One and the same person cannot simultaneously be in the truth objectively and in the truth subjectively. On pp. 112 & 113, Kierkegaard uses examples to contrast being in the truth objectively with being in the truth subjectively. The position taken by Climacus (the character in this reading) is that there are advantages to being in the truth subjectively. See Climacus' brief discussion of the man "who goes up to the house of God .. with the true conception of God in his knowledge, ... but prays in a false spirit" (112). The example of Socrates' attitude toward immortality may also be helpful. Climacus suggests that being in the truth subjectively is marked by a passionate embrace of "objective uncertainty" (p. 113); he claims that this is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" (113). Climacus concludes with these comments: "Without risk, there is no faith. ... If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe." (114)
Saturday, April 3, 2010
L28 Reading Guide
Reminder: Dave is presenting on this reading.
Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110
The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).
James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).
Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.
Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110
The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).
James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).
Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.
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