Reminder: Dave is presenting on this reading.
Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110
The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).
James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).
Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.
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12 comments:
I thought James’ idea was well thought out and I tend to agree with it. I think it is possible for us to spend too much time being skeptical and it can keep up from finding truth. Although after reading James’ argument and how he believes genuine decisions that cannot be solved by reason must be made by our passional nature I started to wonder about what the implications of deciding from passional nature are. I am assuming we are born with our passions and if they are independent of reason then doesn’t that mean some people are born to believe in God and some not?
Dave, In case I forgot to tell you, you don't need to post a comment since you are presenting.
James's article is very practical in the sense that he tells us what many of the faithful actually do, whereas Aquinas and Clifford argue for what we ought to do. In this regard, I do not understand what James is trying to do. It seems like he is simply stating the obvious while the other two (legitimate) philosophers are trying to get readers to change their behavior. Although I agree with his idea that Clifford limits the amount of belief a person can have, I side with Clifford's idea that belief should be based on evidence and knowledge instead of faith, because blind faith is neither logical nor rational, and humans have a duty to be rational.
I like James' article overall, but once again I think like many responses to another philosopher, he goes a little to much to the opposite. I feel he somewhat distorts what Clifford is saying to some extent. Clifford makes it a point to let the reader know that if you have sufficient evidence, then by all means live it and tell it. James says "Clifford...exhorts us to the latter course. Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense forever." I think this somewhat distorts Clifford's point, and though James makes a lot of good arguments later, he somewhat loses some credibility due to his personal vendetta with Clifford.
I personally like the way James goes about addressing the issue of faith in a manner devoid of religious bias. Rather than simply counter Clifford's argument with a standard Christian argument of "you should believe because that's what faith is," James approaches the argument in a measured and calculated manner. James is not proposing simple blind faith, but rather claims that faith should only be utilized in choosing between "living options" (options in which both hypotheses are live ones). The individual is not expected to simply "drink the Kool Aid" of the closest religious doctrine. The options must be carefully weighed and measured before the choice may be used as a springboard for future illumination of truth. By beginning with a broad doctrinal understanding and advancing in one's individual search for truth, belief thus acts as a highly motivating and essential driving force for a life of philosophical exploration.
I like the two rules that William sets out in his argument - "We must know the truth" and "we must avoid error." They seem pretty simple and are good guidelines to follow in life, but I'm wondering what the limits are. How far do I have to go to find the truth or to make sure I avoid error? It seems like William thinks its pretty important but how important? Regardless, I like his response to Clifford and I think his argument is well written, even if it is a little hard for me to read.
James states "Better risk less of truth than chance of error"... Does this mean a person should believe just because if he doesn't the error will be so great that it was not worth waiting for "sufficient evidence"? If so, I think it sounds a bit like Pascal's the Wager. I don't think one should believe in a religion as a back up plan. Also, the "freedom to believe what we will" is not applied by James to the agnostic. He forces the agnostic to make a decision and I think it is a bit hypocritical of him.
I am not quite sure how I feel about James' arguement at the bottom of 108 and top of 109 about "better to risk chance of truth rather than chance of error". I think that truth vs. error holds different weights for different individuals. If you are seeking truth for your life you might care less for the chance of error whereas if you are seeking to minimize errors in life then you might care less for truth.
I really like the breakdown that James presents in his article. Most especially his distinction between believing truth while also having the ability to shun errors. I find it more plausible to consider having belief in something or someone while the possibility always exists that my beliefs are false rather than simply remaining in a sort of limbo stage whereas I fail to believe in anything for fear of being wrong. James claims that some may feel that shunning error gives way to always allowing truth; however, he makes it clear that the two concepts are truly distinct and must be given due consideration.
I liked James' argument, however there are parts that I am not sure I agree with. Clifford pins religion to factual evidence, but doesn't clearly define exactly what he means. I think James does a better job of explaining what he means by each of his claims. I think that religion should be a balance of faith and evidence which neither of them explicitly say, but is closer to James' argument.
I read the majority of this article with raised eyebrows. As I came to the end of the article it became clear that perhaps James' real objective here (or at least one of them) is to bring about respect for one another's beliefs and a "spirit of inner tolerance." This is fine and well, but as far as philosophical arguments are concernced, I would like to echo Ed's comment that evidentiary arguments like Cliffords are preferable.
I agree with Jason in that I think James is perhaps taking Clifford's argument to the extreme. While I have no other real qualms with his argument, I think that Clifford wasn't telling us to be skeptics and never search for the truth: on the contrary, I believe he says that we should search out the truth such that we may not be deceived by lies. I think the line by Descartes is actually one of the better things James places in this argument: the heart has it's reasons that reason does not know. It's true and human, and there are certain things, like love and affection, we don't just make factual decisions about. I liked how he set forth his argument, and that is was less vague than Clifford, but I'd like to see what other people say in class about it as well.
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