Phil 402
Exam 2 Essay Questions
1. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Hick’s soul-making theodicy. In your discussion, briefly explain how Hick’s theodicy differs from a traditional, Augustinian theodicy. Finally, state and explain a major objection to Hick’s theodicy, indicate how he might respond to this objection, and discuss the adequacy of his response (or the response you have provided for him).
2. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Swinburne’s version of the free will defense. In your discussion, be sure to identify at least one serious objection to Swinburne’s account and take a stance on whether there is a good defense against this objection. (The good defense or response could be one Swinburne himself offers or one that is consistent with Swinburne’s overall approach.)
3. Clifford maintains that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (99). State and explain Clifford’s argument for this thesis, then identify and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of his argument. Based on your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his argument, does Clifford’s argument establish that religious belief is “wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone”? Explain and support your answer.
Note: You may use James in your discussion, but you are not required to do so.
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Thursday, April 8, 2010
L30 Reading Guide (Dennett)
Reminder: Caleb is presenting on Dennett.
Reading: Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion", pp. 10-18
Reading Guide: Daniel Dennett is an American philosopher who teaches at Tufts University. He is well known for his work in cognitive science. He is also an outspoken atheist; however, he takes a more "friendly tone" towards religion than Richard Dawkins. In this excerpt from his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Dennett takes a critical approach to religion. He focuses on presenting an account of how religion evolved. Since religion doesn't come cheap, it is worth asking why religions are so "persisten(t) and popular" (11). On p. 12, he argues that "we need to understand what makes religions work, so we can protect ourselves in an informed manner from the circumstances in which religions go haywire". On his account, our innate tendency "to attribute agency - beliefs and desires and other mental states - to anything complicated that moves" is the biological root of religion. In the section titled "Religion, The Early Days", he explains how this "hyperactive" tendency to attribute agency could account for the origins of folk religion, how/why the concept of divination became so prevalent, and the role of ritual in preserving a religion (14-16). On p. 16, he rejects the suggestion that this evolution of ritual necessarily arose deliberately: "Even elaborate and expensive rituals of public rehearsal could emerge out of earlier practices and habits without conscious design". He notes that over time, folk religions "acquired stewards", i.e., people who consciously worked to spread and protect it. They thus became "domesticated". On p. 17, he observes that there are certain features shared by domesticated memes (see the editors' summary for a good definition of memes). He concludes by considering whether religion makes us "better" in some way.
As you read, think about what's at stake for religion. Why does it matter whether Dennett is right?
Reading: Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion", pp. 10-18
Reading Guide: Daniel Dennett is an American philosopher who teaches at Tufts University. He is well known for his work in cognitive science. He is also an outspoken atheist; however, he takes a more "friendly tone" towards religion than Richard Dawkins. In this excerpt from his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Dennett takes a critical approach to religion. He focuses on presenting an account of how religion evolved. Since religion doesn't come cheap, it is worth asking why religions are so "persisten(t) and popular" (11). On p. 12, he argues that "we need to understand what makes religions work, so we can protect ourselves in an informed manner from the circumstances in which religions go haywire". On his account, our innate tendency "to attribute agency - beliefs and desires and other mental states - to anything complicated that moves" is the biological root of religion. In the section titled "Religion, The Early Days", he explains how this "hyperactive" tendency to attribute agency could account for the origins of folk religion, how/why the concept of divination became so prevalent, and the role of ritual in preserving a religion (14-16). On p. 16, he rejects the suggestion that this evolution of ritual necessarily arose deliberately: "Even elaborate and expensive rituals of public rehearsal could emerge out of earlier practices and habits without conscious design". He notes that over time, folk religions "acquired stewards", i.e., people who consciously worked to spread and protect it. They thus became "domesticated". On p. 17, he observes that there are certain features shared by domesticated memes (see the editors' summary for a good definition of memes). He concludes by considering whether religion makes us "better" in some way.
As you read, think about what's at stake for religion. Why does it matter whether Dennett is right?
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
L29 Reading Guide (Kierkegaard)
Reminder: Jarrod is presenting tomorrow.
Reading: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity", pp. 111-114
Reading Guide: This is a short reading, but it is by no means easy. Don't worry if some of it escapes your grasp. Just do the best you can.
In addition to this reading guide, please read the editors' abstract (on the first page of the article).
There are multiple Latin phrases in this selection; if you don't know what they mean, I suggest that you Google them.
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a subject's (i.e., an individual person) being in the truth objectively and his being in the truth objectively. Objectively, I am in the truth so long as my belief accurately reflects facts about the world. Subjectively, I am in the truth if I am related in the proper way to something. Kierkegaard uses the example of God here: "Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God; subjectively, reflection is directed to the question whether the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God relationship"
(112). One and the same person cannot simultaneously be in the truth objectively and in the truth subjectively. On pp. 112 & 113, Kierkegaard uses examples to contrast being in the truth objectively with being in the truth subjectively. The position taken by Climacus (the character in this reading) is that there are advantages to being in the truth subjectively. See Climacus' brief discussion of the man "who goes up to the house of God .. with the true conception of God in his knowledge, ... but prays in a false spirit" (112). The example of Socrates' attitude toward immortality may also be helpful. Climacus suggests that being in the truth subjectively is marked by a passionate embrace of "objective uncertainty" (p. 113); he claims that this is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" (113). Climacus concludes with these comments: "Without risk, there is no faith. ... If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe." (114)
Reading: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity", pp. 111-114
Reading Guide: This is a short reading, but it is by no means easy. Don't worry if some of it escapes your grasp. Just do the best you can.
In addition to this reading guide, please read the editors' abstract (on the first page of the article).
There are multiple Latin phrases in this selection; if you don't know what they mean, I suggest that you Google them.
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a subject's (i.e., an individual person) being in the truth objectively and his being in the truth objectively. Objectively, I am in the truth so long as my belief accurately reflects facts about the world. Subjectively, I am in the truth if I am related in the proper way to something. Kierkegaard uses the example of God here: "Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God; subjectively, reflection is directed to the question whether the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God relationship"
(112). One and the same person cannot simultaneously be in the truth objectively and in the truth subjectively. On pp. 112 & 113, Kierkegaard uses examples to contrast being in the truth objectively with being in the truth subjectively. The position taken by Climacus (the character in this reading) is that there are advantages to being in the truth subjectively. See Climacus' brief discussion of the man "who goes up to the house of God .. with the true conception of God in his knowledge, ... but prays in a false spirit" (112). The example of Socrates' attitude toward immortality may also be helpful. Climacus suggests that being in the truth subjectively is marked by a passionate embrace of "objective uncertainty" (p. 113); he claims that this is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" (113). Climacus concludes with these comments: "Without risk, there is no faith. ... If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe." (114)
Saturday, April 3, 2010
L28 Reading Guide
Reminder: Dave is presenting on this reading.
Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110
The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).
James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).
Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.
Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110
The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).
James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).
Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
L27 Reading Guide and Homework
Reminder: Jason is presenting tomorrow.
Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief", pp. 99-103
Reading Guide
As I noted in class, Clifford's position on what it takes to believe responsibly is stronger than Aquinas'. Whereas Aquinas believed that individual believers are not required to understand the proofs for those religious truths that can be demonstrated, Clifford believed that each individual is responsible for believing only propositions for which they themselves have sufficient evidence: "No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe" (102).
Clifford begins with the story of a shipowner who believes on "insufficient evidence" that his ship is shipworthy. In the first version of the story, this has disastrous consequences for his passengers. In the 2nd version, all is well. Pay attention to Clifford's analysis of this example and the subsequent example of the islanders who made "grave accusations" against men who were perceived as heretics. Why does Clifford say in each case that the shipowner and the accusers had "no right to believe" the beliefs they acted upon?
Clifford then explains why the shipowner and the accusers can be faulted both for their actions and for their beliefs. He argues that this duty to believe nothing for which you have insufficient evidence applies to all persons. Moreover, we can still be blamed for believing what turns out to be true if we believed it on insufficient evidence.
These are strong claims. As you read, try to discern what would count for Clifford as sufficient evidence for belief.
Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief", pp. 99-103
Reading Guide
As I noted in class, Clifford's position on what it takes to believe responsibly is stronger than Aquinas'. Whereas Aquinas believed that individual believers are not required to understand the proofs for those religious truths that can be demonstrated, Clifford believed that each individual is responsible for believing only propositions for which they themselves have sufficient evidence: "No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe" (102).
Clifford begins with the story of a shipowner who believes on "insufficient evidence" that his ship is shipworthy. In the first version of the story, this has disastrous consequences for his passengers. In the 2nd version, all is well. Pay attention to Clifford's analysis of this example and the subsequent example of the islanders who made "grave accusations" against men who were perceived as heretics. Why does Clifford say in each case that the shipowner and the accusers had "no right to believe" the beliefs they acted upon?
Clifford then explains why the shipowner and the accusers can be faulted both for their actions and for their beliefs. He argues that this duty to believe nothing for which you have insufficient evidence applies to all persons. Moreover, we can still be blamed for believing what turns out to be true if we believed it on insufficient evidence.
These are strong claims. As you read, try to discern what would count for Clifford as sufficient evidence for belief.
Friday, March 26, 2010
L26 Reading Guide
Readings: Aquinas, "The Harmony of Reason and Revelation" (pp. 92-95) AND Pascal, "The Wager" (pp. 96-97)
Reminder: Laura will be presenting on Aquinas. Brennan will be presenting on Pascal.
AQUINAS
As indicated by the title of this piece, Aquinas believes that faith and reason are not ultimately at odds. As he puts it at the end of this selection, what is known by revelation cannot conflict with truths "we are naturally endowed to know" via reason, for truth does not conflict with truth. Aquinas believed that truths about God fall into 2 categories -- those that are knowable via reason and those that are known only via revelation. He gives examples of each of these in your text. Truths about God that are knowable by reason may also be believed simply on the basis of faith or revelation; basing one's belief on faith rather than demonstration is not irrational. Insisting otherwise has three "awkward effects". After identifying these awkward effects, Aquinas discusses beliefs about God that fall into the second category -- those that cannot be ascertained by human reason. Aquinas gives us 3 reasons why divine revelation of truths that cannot be known through human reason is both necessary and beneficial. He then argues that belief that is based solely on revelation (and can only be based on revelation) is not foolish. Finally, he claims that reason and revelation do not conflict.
PASCAL
Most of you are probably familiar with Pascal's Wager. This excerpt is a bit abstract, but the central idea should be clear enough. Notice that Pascal begins by assuming that we can't prove whether God exists. He also thinks that we must bet one way or the other (this is the ultimate/cosmic version of You Bet Your Life). Given these assumptions, the real question is whether it is more rational to bet that God exists or more rational to bet that God does not exist. Pascal argues that it is more rational to bet that God does exist. In fact, he seems to think that it is irrational to bet against God's existence. To make this selection less abstract, as you read, imagine the consequences for each bet ("God exists" or "God doesn't exist"): What happens if you bet correctly? What happens if you bet incorrectly?
Reminder: Laura will be presenting on Aquinas. Brennan will be presenting on Pascal.
AQUINAS
As indicated by the title of this piece, Aquinas believes that faith and reason are not ultimately at odds. As he puts it at the end of this selection, what is known by revelation cannot conflict with truths "we are naturally endowed to know" via reason, for truth does not conflict with truth. Aquinas believed that truths about God fall into 2 categories -- those that are knowable via reason and those that are known only via revelation. He gives examples of each of these in your text. Truths about God that are knowable by reason may also be believed simply on the basis of faith or revelation; basing one's belief on faith rather than demonstration is not irrational. Insisting otherwise has three "awkward effects". After identifying these awkward effects, Aquinas discusses beliefs about God that fall into the second category -- those that cannot be ascertained by human reason. Aquinas gives us 3 reasons why divine revelation of truths that cannot be known through human reason is both necessary and beneficial. He then argues that belief that is based solely on revelation (and can only be based on revelation) is not foolish. Finally, he claims that reason and revelation do not conflict.
PASCAL
Most of you are probably familiar with Pascal's Wager. This excerpt is a bit abstract, but the central idea should be clear enough. Notice that Pascal begins by assuming that we can't prove whether God exists. He also thinks that we must bet one way or the other (this is the ultimate/cosmic version of You Bet Your Life). Given these assumptions, the real question is whether it is more rational to bet that God exists or more rational to bet that God does not exist. Pascal argues that it is more rational to bet that God does exist. In fact, he seems to think that it is irrational to bet against God's existence. To make this selection less abstract, as you read, imagine the consequences for each bet ("God exists" or "God doesn't exist"): What happens if you bet correctly? What happens if you bet incorrectly?
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Reminder: no reading or homework -- movie day
I won't be able to show the film I originally scheduled (Shadowlands, the version with Debra Winger and Anthony Hopkins) because the movie is no longer being made and it was too hard to find a copy that didn't cost the earth. I, will, however, still show a film both this class and next class.
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