Reading: Sartre, “Ethics without Religion”, pp. 622-629
Reading Guide: The editors give a nice overview of Sartre on p. 622. Sartre was an atheist and an existentialist. For Sartre, “existence precedes essence”; the “first principle” of existentialism is that “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself”(622). Since there is no God, there is no such thing as a “human nature” & thus man’s actions are not determined (625). Man is radically free. Even though we can no longer claim that man is “made in God’s image”, man still has “a greater dignity than inanimate objects and other living organisms. See p. 623 for the source of our dignity. A crucial early passage is on p. 623: “When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses all men”. Be aware that sometimes what Sartre means is not immediately evident; you think he means one thing, then discover a little later that he couldn’t have meant what you initially thought he meant. So, tag any claims that seem extraordinary or jump out at you and keep those in mind as you read further. On pp. 623-626, Sartre discusses the implications of man’s radical freedom – anguish, forlornness, and despair. Note that his definitions of forlornness and despair seem to have no psychological component. His discussion of anguish is more overtly psychological. Note also that in his discussion of anguish, he makes use of an idea that seems very similar to Kant’s universal law test. While we might think that anguish is paralyzing, Sartre maintains that “it is not a curtain separating us from action, but is part of action itself” (624). In the section on forlornness, Sartre discusses the implications of the recognition that God does not exist. I think this section is pretty straightforward. Note especially his discussion of the example of the young man who was struggling to decide whether to decamp to England and fight with the French Free Forces or instead to stay at home with his mother whose psychological health seemed to depend on his presence. From the bottom of p. 626 through p. 629, Sartre identifies and responds to 3 objections to his position. All 3 of these objections seem to stem from the concern that existentialism makes our choices arbitrary. In response to the objection that the basis of choice is anarchic, Sartre argues that the basis of choice is not caprice or whim; he compares making ethical choices to painting a work of art. Neither the painter nor the moral agent acts arbitrarily. Second, he agrees that there’s a sense in which “we are unable to pass judgment on others”, but maintains that there’s also a sense in which the existentialist can judge others, both epistemically and morally. Still, the kind of moral judgment that the existentialist can pass on others’ ethically significant choices is not likely to satisfy the objector. Third, he responds to the objection that “values aren’t serious” if existentialism is true. Finally, he explains the sense in which existentialism is a humanism and the sense in which it is not a humanism.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Sunday, May 2, 2010
L38 Reading Guide
Reading: Aquinas, "Ethics and Natural Law", pp. 619-621. This reading consists of two excerpts from Aquinas. The first excerpt is from The Summa Theologica Question 94, Article 2. Your text has omitted a couple of paragraphs from the beginning of Q94, Article 2, but otherwise, the excerpt is intact. Please go to www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm to read Article 2 of Question 94 in its entirety. When I printed it out, it was 2 full pages. I presume that the second excerpt is also from The Summa, but I could not find the exact reference (googling key phrases didn't help, probably because this is an updated translation). It doesn't appear to be from Q94.
Reading Guide: First Excerpt: The question of Article 2 is "Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?". Aquinas begins, as is his wont, by stating 3 objections (see online text). He then indicates his own position ("On the contrary"). Finally, he begins to explain his position beginning at "I answer that". (If you're reading in your textbook, the words "I answer that" are deleted, but everything that follows those words is included in your text. However, the 3 objections and the "On the contrary" that precede "I answer that" are not included.) He invokes a distinction between practical reason and speculative or theoretical/demonstrative reason. He notes that both practical reason and speculative reason start from first principles, principles that are self-evidently true and are not subject to demonstration. Propositions (statements) may be self-evidently true in themselves, but not self-evidently true to us. (I think our earlier reading on Aquinas explained this.) Some propositions that are self-evidently true (or "self-known") are self-evident to all. Others are self-evident only to the wise. Aquinas gives examples of each of these. The first principle of speculative reason is the principle of noncontradiction, "It is not proper at once to affirm and to deny". The first principle of practical (action-guiding reason) is "The good is what all desire". From this principle, it is a short step to the first principle of natural law. I'll let you read it for yourself. Aquinas then tells us that reason helps us determine what things are goods and what things are evils (things to be avoided) -- see the text for the criteria. Having articulated the standard of goods and evils, he examines our natural inclinations, which he divides into 3 sources: inclinations we share with all substances, inclinations we "share with other animals", and inclinations that have their source in our rational and social nature. (You may recognize Aristotle's influence here.) This marks the end of Article 2.
Second Excerpt: This excerpt begins at the bottom of p. 620 in your book (right after the ...). In this excerpt, Aquinas reminds us that "every judgment of practical reason issue(s) from certain naturally known principles". He then says that although "all moral rules belong to the law of nature", they do not "all" belong to the law of nature "in the same way" (621). He divides moral rules into 3 types, based on how accessible they are. The most accessible moral rules "belong in an unqualified way to the law of nature".
Reading Guide: First Excerpt: The question of Article 2 is "Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?". Aquinas begins, as is his wont, by stating 3 objections (see online text). He then indicates his own position ("On the contrary"). Finally, he begins to explain his position beginning at "I answer that". (If you're reading in your textbook, the words "I answer that" are deleted, but everything that follows those words is included in your text. However, the 3 objections and the "On the contrary" that precede "I answer that" are not included.) He invokes a distinction between practical reason and speculative or theoretical/demonstrative reason. He notes that both practical reason and speculative reason start from first principles, principles that are self-evidently true and are not subject to demonstration. Propositions (statements) may be self-evidently true in themselves, but not self-evidently true to us. (I think our earlier reading on Aquinas explained this.) Some propositions that are self-evidently true (or "self-known") are self-evident to all. Others are self-evident only to the wise. Aquinas gives examples of each of these. The first principle of speculative reason is the principle of noncontradiction, "It is not proper at once to affirm and to deny". The first principle of practical (action-guiding reason) is "The good is what all desire". From this principle, it is a short step to the first principle of natural law. I'll let you read it for yourself. Aquinas then tells us that reason helps us determine what things are goods and what things are evils (things to be avoided) -- see the text for the criteria. Having articulated the standard of goods and evils, he examines our natural inclinations, which he divides into 3 sources: inclinations we share with all substances, inclinations we "share with other animals", and inclinations that have their source in our rational and social nature. (You may recognize Aristotle's influence here.) This marks the end of Article 2.
Second Excerpt: This excerpt begins at the bottom of p. 620 in your book (right after the ...). In this excerpt, Aquinas reminds us that "every judgment of practical reason issue(s) from certain naturally known principles". He then says that although "all moral rules belong to the law of nature", they do not "all" belong to the law of nature "in the same way" (621). He divides moral rules into 3 types, based on how accessible they are. The most accessible moral rules "belong in an unqualified way to the law of nature".
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
L37 Reading Guide, MacIntyre
Reading: MacIntyre, Which God Ought we to Obey?, pp. 612-618
Reading Guide: The editors provide a summary of MacIntyre’s position, but not much detail. Most of you have probably encountered this question at some point: Are actions right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right? The Divine Command theorist argues that actions are right because God commands them. MacIntyre rejects the Divine Command theory, but tries to preserve some notion of the independence of God the lawgiver.
In the first section (The Nature of God’s Commands), MacIntyre begins with Freud’s “psychologically primitive version of the relation between beliefs about” morality and “beliefs about divine commands”, where the father’s commands are interpreted by the child as having divine authority. He contrasts “the God of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures” with the child’s vision of her father as god and with Jupiter. MacIntyre then considers whether it could be “right for someone to obey (the Jewish or Christian God -RS) and yet also to have justified regrets for so doing”, to be “divided in feelings and will” (613, 614). He contrasts R.M. Adams’ modified divine command theory with Occam’s unmodified divine command theory. Although MacIntyre is not a divine command theorist, he sides with Occam here: “it is logically impossible that it should be true of any action both that it is commanded by God and that it would not be wrong not to do it” (614). MacIntyre believes that both Occam and Adams have impoverished “moral theories”, theories that “are unlikely to be able to distinguish adequately between the claims to human allegiance made in the name of a variety of gods who allegedly issue commands to us” (614). After discussing what’s wrong with Adams’ view, he turns to the question of what assumption(s) we would need to add in order to “derive the conclusion ‘We ought to do what God commands’” (614). In the second section (Why Only Just Commands are Worthy of Obedience), he identifies the “crucial concept that is characteristically missing from divine command theories” (614). In the final section (How We Acquired our Understanding of a Just God), he discusses 3 historical stages of the concept of the divine; he may mean this historical story to apply only to Western civilization, for the 1st stage is recognizably that of ancient Greece. Each of the 3 stages represents “ideal types”, which I take to be his way of saying that he is not presenting his analysis of these stages or the transitions between stages as an accurate, complete historical account. I think it’s pretty clear what the difference is between a stage 1 (or “episode” 1) conception of the divine and a stage 2 conception of the divine. The stage 3 conception of the divine is of the Jewish or Christian God OR a god like the J-C God in important respects. The first paragraph of MacIntyre’s discussion of Stage 3 is quite important; this paragraph gives a good description of MacIntyre’s own position on the relationship between morality and divine commands. The last sentence of the paragraph is especially important. On p. 617, MacIntyre makes a claim that will probably seem surprising, especially if you raced through the previous paragraphs on Stage 3: “From the fact that we can at one stage in our progress towards God evaluate the divine claims, using a standard of justice acquired and elaborated independently of the knowledge of God, it does not follow that in so doing we are judging the Word of God by something external to it.” If you read Section 3 carefully (including the remaining few paragraphs), I think you’ll see why he says this.
Reading Guide: The editors provide a summary of MacIntyre’s position, but not much detail. Most of you have probably encountered this question at some point: Are actions right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right? The Divine Command theorist argues that actions are right because God commands them. MacIntyre rejects the Divine Command theory, but tries to preserve some notion of the independence of God the lawgiver.
In the first section (The Nature of God’s Commands), MacIntyre begins with Freud’s “psychologically primitive version of the relation between beliefs about” morality and “beliefs about divine commands”, where the father’s commands are interpreted by the child as having divine authority. He contrasts “the God of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures” with the child’s vision of her father as god and with Jupiter. MacIntyre then considers whether it could be “right for someone to obey (the Jewish or Christian God -RS) and yet also to have justified regrets for so doing”, to be “divided in feelings and will” (613, 614). He contrasts R.M. Adams’ modified divine command theory with Occam’s unmodified divine command theory. Although MacIntyre is not a divine command theorist, he sides with Occam here: “it is logically impossible that it should be true of any action both that it is commanded by God and that it would not be wrong not to do it” (614). MacIntyre believes that both Occam and Adams have impoverished “moral theories”, theories that “are unlikely to be able to distinguish adequately between the claims to human allegiance made in the name of a variety of gods who allegedly issue commands to us” (614). After discussing what’s wrong with Adams’ view, he turns to the question of what assumption(s) we would need to add in order to “derive the conclusion ‘We ought to do what God commands’” (614). In the second section (Why Only Just Commands are Worthy of Obedience), he identifies the “crucial concept that is characteristically missing from divine command theories” (614). In the final section (How We Acquired our Understanding of a Just God), he discusses 3 historical stages of the concept of the divine; he may mean this historical story to apply only to Western civilization, for the 1st stage is recognizably that of ancient Greece. Each of the 3 stages represents “ideal types”, which I take to be his way of saying that he is not presenting his analysis of these stages or the transitions between stages as an accurate, complete historical account. I think it’s pretty clear what the difference is between a stage 1 (or “episode” 1) conception of the divine and a stage 2 conception of the divine. The stage 3 conception of the divine is of the Jewish or Christian God OR a god like the J-C God in important respects. The first paragraph of MacIntyre’s discussion of Stage 3 is quite important; this paragraph gives a good description of MacIntyre’s own position on the relationship between morality and divine commands. The last sentence of the paragraph is especially important. On p. 617, MacIntyre makes a claim that will probably seem surprising, especially if you raced through the previous paragraphs on Stage 3: “From the fact that we can at one stage in our progress towards God evaluate the divine claims, using a standard of justice acquired and elaborated independently of the knowledge of God, it does not follow that in so doing we are judging the Word of God by something external to it.” If you read Section 3 carefully (including the remaining few paragraphs), I think you’ll see why he says this.
Monday, April 26, 2010
L36 Reading Guide
Reading: Hick, “Religious Pluralism”, pp. 597-604
Reading Guide
Note: This is not a reading to try to rush through. You’ll get more out of it by reading it a bit more slowly.
The editors provide an overview of Hick’s position. Hick rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism.
Hick begins by noting that how we understand religious life affects the kinds of questions we ask about religion. From a traditional way of thinking about religion, the obvious question is “which is the true religion?” (p. 598). For Hick, however, this is not the right question, for it implies that one religion has special epistemic status; that is, one religion has dibs on the truth. On p. 599, he criticizes inclusivism, suggesting that “the old dogma (e.g., in Rahner’s case, Christianity) … has … been so emptied of content as no longer to be worth affirming”. Moreover, Hick thinks it is obvious that inclusivism is “logically” unstable (599). Rather, he thinks we should embrace pluralism. His initial definition of pluralism does not sufficiently distinguish pluralism from inclusivism, but the key difference is that for a pluralist there is no privileged access to the divine. He attributes the Christian’s unwillingness to substitute pluralism for inclusivism to “the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation, together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity” (599). On p. 600, he outlines what he takes to be “an acceptable Christian route to religious pluralism”. Here, he contrasts “all-or-nothing Christologies” (or substance Christologies) with “degree Christologies”. He notes that these “degree Christologies” have the “unintended consequence” of removing a barrier to Christians accepting pluralism. From pp. 601-604, Hick makes it clearer what pluralism commits one to and presents considerations that he thinks support pluralism. He admits that we have no “cosmic vision” that can establish that there is one Reality that all religions are tapping into. So, the pluralist cannot KNOW that all religions are accessing ultimate reality or that there even is an ultimate reality. He also admits that “religious experience is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis”. However, if one “treat(s) one’s own form of religious experience … as an experience of transcendent divine Reality … one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience” (601). Pluralism, rather than exclusivism or inclusivism, provides the best account of this diversity. On p. 602, Hick distinguishes between the Real an sich and “the Real as humanly experienced and thought”. He gives multiple examples of religions that make this distinction. He then distinguishes between religions that are personal (that appeal to a Deity or God) and religions that are non-personal (appeal to the Absolute). In large part, we can account for religious diversity by the fact that we cannot experience the Real as it is in itself, but must encounter it through the lens of our “conceptual framework”.
Reading Guide
Note: This is not a reading to try to rush through. You’ll get more out of it by reading it a bit more slowly.
The editors provide an overview of Hick’s position. Hick rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism.
Hick begins by noting that how we understand religious life affects the kinds of questions we ask about religion. From a traditional way of thinking about religion, the obvious question is “which is the true religion?” (p. 598). For Hick, however, this is not the right question, for it implies that one religion has special epistemic status; that is, one religion has dibs on the truth. On p. 599, he criticizes inclusivism, suggesting that “the old dogma (e.g., in Rahner’s case, Christianity) … has … been so emptied of content as no longer to be worth affirming”. Moreover, Hick thinks it is obvious that inclusivism is “logically” unstable (599). Rather, he thinks we should embrace pluralism. His initial definition of pluralism does not sufficiently distinguish pluralism from inclusivism, but the key difference is that for a pluralist there is no privileged access to the divine. He attributes the Christian’s unwillingness to substitute pluralism for inclusivism to “the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation, together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity” (599). On p. 600, he outlines what he takes to be “an acceptable Christian route to religious pluralism”. Here, he contrasts “all-or-nothing Christologies” (or substance Christologies) with “degree Christologies”. He notes that these “degree Christologies” have the “unintended consequence” of removing a barrier to Christians accepting pluralism. From pp. 601-604, Hick makes it clearer what pluralism commits one to and presents considerations that he thinks support pluralism. He admits that we have no “cosmic vision” that can establish that there is one Reality that all religions are tapping into. So, the pluralist cannot KNOW that all religions are accessing ultimate reality or that there even is an ultimate reality. He also admits that “religious experience is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis”. However, if one “treat(s) one’s own form of religious experience … as an experience of transcendent divine Reality … one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience” (601). Pluralism, rather than exclusivism or inclusivism, provides the best account of this diversity. On p. 602, Hick distinguishes between the Real an sich and “the Real as humanly experienced and thought”. He gives multiple examples of religions that make this distinction. He then distinguishes between religions that are personal (that appeal to a Deity or God) and religions that are non-personal (appeal to the Absolute). In large part, we can account for religious diversity by the fact that we cannot experience the Real as it is in itself, but must encounter it through the lens of our “conceptual framework”.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
Reading Guide L35 -- Rahner, Dalai Lama
Reading: Rahner, “Religious Inclusivism”, pp. 588-595 & Dalai Lama, “Buddhism and Other Religions”, pp. 577-581
Note: The primary reading for next class is Rahner; the Dalai Lama piece is meant to complement the Rahner reading. The editors give a good summary of the Dalai Lama “interview” (I’m not sure it’s a real interview). The editors also give a good overview of Rahner, but I will add a few observations here.
Reading Guide to Rahner: The first few paragraphs of the Rahner are, if read too quickly, hard to understand, but the next few pages are much easier. Rahner begins by noting that Catholics (and, indeed, all Christians) can no longer ignore the fact of religious diversity. Given cross-cultural influence, the issue of how to respond to religious pluralism (the fact that there are so many different, incompatible religions) is more pressing than ever. He then discusses how Christians should respond to this fact. In the section titled First Thesis, he acknowledges that Christianity was not always “the religion which binds men to God”; he then argues that although Christianity is “the absolute and only religion for all men”, it is not the case that all men are now under an “absolute obligation” to encounter God through Christianity. He contrasts this position with the “normal” or traditional position on Christianity, which says that from the time of the Apostles, all are bound to approach God through Christ; the implication of this normal position is that anyone who does not acquire “saving faith” in Christ is condemned. Second Thesis: prior to the point where Christianity is an absolute obligation, non-Christian religions are lawful (see the text for what he means). This section of the article repays close reading. It will help to notice that Rahner is making a few important assumptions: (a) Christianity, properly understood, commits the faithful to believing that God desires that all men be saved and thus provides adequate opportunity for each to be saved; (b) if (a) is true, then that implies that Christianity cannot always and everywhere be the only way to achieve salvation; (c) religion is inherently a social phenomenon, at least as it has been and is in practice a social institution. Rahner is also making implicit assumptions about how a just God would interact with men and about the conditions of being morally responsible for having rejected God. Third Thesis: Christians should regard members of non-Christian religions as “anonymous Christians”. Nonetheless, Christians should still proselytize. Fourth Thesis: it is not presumptuous, but humble, to view non-Christian believers as “anonymous Christians”; we should not expect religious diversity to die out any time soon.
As is perhaps evident from this reading guide, the most difficult part of the reading is the Second Thesis; this is also the meatiest part of the reading.
Note: The primary reading for next class is Rahner; the Dalai Lama piece is meant to complement the Rahner reading. The editors give a good summary of the Dalai Lama “interview” (I’m not sure it’s a real interview). The editors also give a good overview of Rahner, but I will add a few observations here.
Reading Guide to Rahner: The first few paragraphs of the Rahner are, if read too quickly, hard to understand, but the next few pages are much easier. Rahner begins by noting that Catholics (and, indeed, all Christians) can no longer ignore the fact of religious diversity. Given cross-cultural influence, the issue of how to respond to religious pluralism (the fact that there are so many different, incompatible religions) is more pressing than ever. He then discusses how Christians should respond to this fact. In the section titled First Thesis, he acknowledges that Christianity was not always “the religion which binds men to God”; he then argues that although Christianity is “the absolute and only religion for all men”, it is not the case that all men are now under an “absolute obligation” to encounter God through Christianity. He contrasts this position with the “normal” or traditional position on Christianity, which says that from the time of the Apostles, all are bound to approach God through Christ; the implication of this normal position is that anyone who does not acquire “saving faith” in Christ is condemned. Second Thesis: prior to the point where Christianity is an absolute obligation, non-Christian religions are lawful (see the text for what he means). This section of the article repays close reading. It will help to notice that Rahner is making a few important assumptions: (a) Christianity, properly understood, commits the faithful to believing that God desires that all men be saved and thus provides adequate opportunity for each to be saved; (b) if (a) is true, then that implies that Christianity cannot always and everywhere be the only way to achieve salvation; (c) religion is inherently a social phenomenon, at least as it has been and is in practice a social institution. Rahner is also making implicit assumptions about how a just God would interact with men and about the conditions of being morally responsible for having rejected God. Third Thesis: Christians should regard members of non-Christian religions as “anonymous Christians”. Nonetheless, Christians should still proselytize. Fourth Thesis: it is not presumptuous, but humble, to view non-Christian believers as “anonymous Christians”; we should not expect religious diversity to die out any time soon.
As is perhaps evident from this reading guide, the most difficult part of the reading is the Second Thesis; this is also the meatiest part of the reading.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
L34 Reading Guide (Griffiths)
Reading: Griffiths, “The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines”, pp. 581-587
Reminder: Matt Reynolds is presenting tomorrow.
Recommendation: Since Griffiths refers a couple of times to pluralism, you may find it helpful to read the editors’ introduction to this section (pp. 573-576) or at least to read the description on p. 575 of pluralism. Each of the 3 philosophical articles (defending, respectively, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), refers to at least one of the other two positions.
Reading Guide: Using examples drawn from both Christianity and Buddhism, Griffiths discusses “the five most important dimensions of religious doctrine” (582). Religious doctrines serve as community rules, determine community boundaries (who is part of the community & who isn’t), shape and are shaped by “the spiritual experience of the communities that profess them” (583), “make members” through education and evangelism, and express what the community takes to be “salvifically significant truths” (585). Given these functions or dimensions of religious doctrines, one should not expect religious communities to abandon their universalist and exclusivist claims unless one can offer them “vital and pressing reasons” for doing so. Griffiths concludes with a short section on the uniqueness of Christianity, but he could just as easily have concluded with a section on the uniqueness of Buddhism, Islam, or some other religion. Those of you who have taken Comparative Religions or have direct experience of some other religious tradition should feel free to bring up examples of doctrines within those traditions that serve one or more of the functions listed above.
Reminder: Matt Reynolds is presenting tomorrow.
Recommendation: Since Griffiths refers a couple of times to pluralism, you may find it helpful to read the editors’ introduction to this section (pp. 573-576) or at least to read the description on p. 575 of pluralism. Each of the 3 philosophical articles (defending, respectively, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), refers to at least one of the other two positions.
Reading Guide: Using examples drawn from both Christianity and Buddhism, Griffiths discusses “the five most important dimensions of religious doctrine” (582). Religious doctrines serve as community rules, determine community boundaries (who is part of the community & who isn’t), shape and are shaped by “the spiritual experience of the communities that profess them” (583), “make members” through education and evangelism, and express what the community takes to be “salvifically significant truths” (585). Given these functions or dimensions of religious doctrines, one should not expect religious communities to abandon their universalist and exclusivist claims unless one can offer them “vital and pressing reasons” for doing so. Griffiths concludes with a short section on the uniqueness of Christianity, but he could just as easily have concluded with a section on the uniqueness of Buddhism, Islam, or some other religion. Those of you who have taken Comparative Religions or have direct experience of some other religious tradition should feel free to bring up examples of doctrines within those traditions that serve one or more of the functions listed above.
Sunday, April 18, 2010
L33 Reading Guide (Dawkins)
Reading: Dawkins, “Science Discredits Religion”, pp. 523-526
Optional Link (if you’re interested in seeing more about a Catholic perspective on evolution): http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05654a.htm
Reading Guide: This is a short, clear reading. Unlike Gould, Dawkins is not at all conciliatory to religious belief. After arguing that religion has no “special expertise to offer us on moral questions”, he argues that the Pope’s message on evolution itself intrudes into the domain of science. (The passage he quotes here is the passage I referred to or quoted in class last time.) He then identifies other ways in which the Catholic Church intrudes into the domain of science. Basically, he denies that religion and science inhabit separate domains - at least in practice. As you read, think about how Gould might respond to Dawkins’ claims and how Christians might respond to Dawkins.
Terminology: Some of you may be unfamiliar with the term “speciesism”. The term, as you will gather, is derogatory; those who believe that humans are importantly different from the rest of the animal kingdom and therefore deserving of special consideration are referred to as “speciesists” by animal rights activists, some evolutionists, and others who see no morally significant difference between human beings and other animals. Such critics compare those who invest species with special significance to racists and sexists. The idea here is that species does not in itself make a moral difference, any more than race or sex makes a moral difference. Two points are relevant here: (1) It is speciesist to claim for human beings special consideration that we are not willing to extend to non-human animals who, like us, have the properties that make us deserving of special consideration. (2) It is said to be speciesist to insist that human beings who no longer have the capacities that distinguish us from most of the rest of the animal kingdom be given the same protections as normal human beings; given that they are not superior to other animals, why should they be treated as if they were? (This has implications for the debate over euthanasia.)
Optional Link (if you’re interested in seeing more about a Catholic perspective on evolution): http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05654a.htm
Reading Guide: This is a short, clear reading. Unlike Gould, Dawkins is not at all conciliatory to religious belief. After arguing that religion has no “special expertise to offer us on moral questions”, he argues that the Pope’s message on evolution itself intrudes into the domain of science. (The passage he quotes here is the passage I referred to or quoted in class last time.) He then identifies other ways in which the Catholic Church intrudes into the domain of science. Basically, he denies that religion and science inhabit separate domains - at least in practice. As you read, think about how Gould might respond to Dawkins’ claims and how Christians might respond to Dawkins.
Terminology: Some of you may be unfamiliar with the term “speciesism”. The term, as you will gather, is derogatory; those who believe that humans are importantly different from the rest of the animal kingdom and therefore deserving of special consideration are referred to as “speciesists” by animal rights activists, some evolutionists, and others who see no morally significant difference between human beings and other animals. Such critics compare those who invest species with special significance to racists and sexists. The idea here is that species does not in itself make a moral difference, any more than race or sex makes a moral difference. Two points are relevant here: (1) It is speciesist to claim for human beings special consideration that we are not willing to extend to non-human animals who, like us, have the properties that make us deserving of special consideration. (2) It is said to be speciesist to insist that human beings who no longer have the capacities that distinguish us from most of the rest of the animal kingdom be given the same protections as normal human beings; given that they are not superior to other animals, why should they be treated as if they were? (This has implications for the debate over euthanasia.)
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Essay Questions for the Exam
Phil 402
Exam 2 Essay Questions
1. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Hick’s soul-making theodicy. In your discussion, briefly explain how Hick’s theodicy differs from a traditional, Augustinian theodicy. Finally, state and explain a major objection to Hick’s theodicy, indicate how he might respond to this objection, and discuss the adequacy of his response (or the response you have provided for him).
2. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Swinburne’s version of the free will defense. In your discussion, be sure to identify at least one serious objection to Swinburne’s account and take a stance on whether there is a good defense against this objection. (The good defense or response could be one Swinburne himself offers or one that is consistent with Swinburne’s overall approach.)
3. Clifford maintains that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (99). State and explain Clifford’s argument for this thesis, then identify and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of his argument. Based on your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his argument, does Clifford’s argument establish that religious belief is “wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone”? Explain and support your answer.
Note: You may use James in your discussion, but you are not required to do so.
Exam 2 Essay Questions
1. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Hick’s soul-making theodicy. In your discussion, briefly explain how Hick’s theodicy differs from a traditional, Augustinian theodicy. Finally, state and explain a major objection to Hick’s theodicy, indicate how he might respond to this objection, and discuss the adequacy of his response (or the response you have provided for him).
2. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Swinburne’s version of the free will defense. In your discussion, be sure to identify at least one serious objection to Swinburne’s account and take a stance on whether there is a good defense against this objection. (The good defense or response could be one Swinburne himself offers or one that is consistent with Swinburne’s overall approach.)
3. Clifford maintains that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (99). State and explain Clifford’s argument for this thesis, then identify and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of his argument. Based on your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his argument, does Clifford’s argument establish that religious belief is “wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone”? Explain and support your answer.
Note: You may use James in your discussion, but you are not required to do so.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
L30 Reading Guide (Dennett)
Reminder: Caleb is presenting on Dennett.
Reading: Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion", pp. 10-18
Reading Guide: Daniel Dennett is an American philosopher who teaches at Tufts University. He is well known for his work in cognitive science. He is also an outspoken atheist; however, he takes a more "friendly tone" towards religion than Richard Dawkins. In this excerpt from his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Dennett takes a critical approach to religion. He focuses on presenting an account of how religion evolved. Since religion doesn't come cheap, it is worth asking why religions are so "persisten(t) and popular" (11). On p. 12, he argues that "we need to understand what makes religions work, so we can protect ourselves in an informed manner from the circumstances in which religions go haywire". On his account, our innate tendency "to attribute agency - beliefs and desires and other mental states - to anything complicated that moves" is the biological root of religion. In the section titled "Religion, The Early Days", he explains how this "hyperactive" tendency to attribute agency could account for the origins of folk religion, how/why the concept of divination became so prevalent, and the role of ritual in preserving a religion (14-16). On p. 16, he rejects the suggestion that this evolution of ritual necessarily arose deliberately: "Even elaborate and expensive rituals of public rehearsal could emerge out of earlier practices and habits without conscious design". He notes that over time, folk religions "acquired stewards", i.e., people who consciously worked to spread and protect it. They thus became "domesticated". On p. 17, he observes that there are certain features shared by domesticated memes (see the editors' summary for a good definition of memes). He concludes by considering whether religion makes us "better" in some way.
As you read, think about what's at stake for religion. Why does it matter whether Dennett is right?
Reading: Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion", pp. 10-18
Reading Guide: Daniel Dennett is an American philosopher who teaches at Tufts University. He is well known for his work in cognitive science. He is also an outspoken atheist; however, he takes a more "friendly tone" towards religion than Richard Dawkins. In this excerpt from his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Dennett takes a critical approach to religion. He focuses on presenting an account of how religion evolved. Since religion doesn't come cheap, it is worth asking why religions are so "persisten(t) and popular" (11). On p. 12, he argues that "we need to understand what makes religions work, so we can protect ourselves in an informed manner from the circumstances in which religions go haywire". On his account, our innate tendency "to attribute agency - beliefs and desires and other mental states - to anything complicated that moves" is the biological root of religion. In the section titled "Religion, The Early Days", he explains how this "hyperactive" tendency to attribute agency could account for the origins of folk religion, how/why the concept of divination became so prevalent, and the role of ritual in preserving a religion (14-16). On p. 16, he rejects the suggestion that this evolution of ritual necessarily arose deliberately: "Even elaborate and expensive rituals of public rehearsal could emerge out of earlier practices and habits without conscious design". He notes that over time, folk religions "acquired stewards", i.e., people who consciously worked to spread and protect it. They thus became "domesticated". On p. 17, he observes that there are certain features shared by domesticated memes (see the editors' summary for a good definition of memes). He concludes by considering whether religion makes us "better" in some way.
As you read, think about what's at stake for religion. Why does it matter whether Dennett is right?
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
L29 Reading Guide (Kierkegaard)
Reminder: Jarrod is presenting tomorrow.
Reading: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity", pp. 111-114
Reading Guide: This is a short reading, but it is by no means easy. Don't worry if some of it escapes your grasp. Just do the best you can.
In addition to this reading guide, please read the editors' abstract (on the first page of the article).
There are multiple Latin phrases in this selection; if you don't know what they mean, I suggest that you Google them.
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a subject's (i.e., an individual person) being in the truth objectively and his being in the truth objectively. Objectively, I am in the truth so long as my belief accurately reflects facts about the world. Subjectively, I am in the truth if I am related in the proper way to something. Kierkegaard uses the example of God here: "Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God; subjectively, reflection is directed to the question whether the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God relationship"
(112). One and the same person cannot simultaneously be in the truth objectively and in the truth subjectively. On pp. 112 & 113, Kierkegaard uses examples to contrast being in the truth objectively with being in the truth subjectively. The position taken by Climacus (the character in this reading) is that there are advantages to being in the truth subjectively. See Climacus' brief discussion of the man "who goes up to the house of God .. with the true conception of God in his knowledge, ... but prays in a false spirit" (112). The example of Socrates' attitude toward immortality may also be helpful. Climacus suggests that being in the truth subjectively is marked by a passionate embrace of "objective uncertainty" (p. 113); he claims that this is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" (113). Climacus concludes with these comments: "Without risk, there is no faith. ... If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe." (114)
Reading: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity", pp. 111-114
Reading Guide: This is a short reading, but it is by no means easy. Don't worry if some of it escapes your grasp. Just do the best you can.
In addition to this reading guide, please read the editors' abstract (on the first page of the article).
There are multiple Latin phrases in this selection; if you don't know what they mean, I suggest that you Google them.
Kierkegaard distinguishes between a subject's (i.e., an individual person) being in the truth objectively and his being in the truth objectively. Objectively, I am in the truth so long as my belief accurately reflects facts about the world. Subjectively, I am in the truth if I am related in the proper way to something. Kierkegaard uses the example of God here: "Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God; subjectively, reflection is directed to the question whether the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God relationship"
(112). One and the same person cannot simultaneously be in the truth objectively and in the truth subjectively. On pp. 112 & 113, Kierkegaard uses examples to contrast being in the truth objectively with being in the truth subjectively. The position taken by Climacus (the character in this reading) is that there are advantages to being in the truth subjectively. See Climacus' brief discussion of the man "who goes up to the house of God .. with the true conception of God in his knowledge, ... but prays in a false spirit" (112). The example of Socrates' attitude toward immortality may also be helpful. Climacus suggests that being in the truth subjectively is marked by a passionate embrace of "objective uncertainty" (p. 113); he claims that this is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" (113). Climacus concludes with these comments: "Without risk, there is no faith. ... If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe." (114)
Saturday, April 3, 2010
L28 Reading Guide
Reminder: Dave is presenting on this reading.
Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110
The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).
James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).
Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.
Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110
The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).
James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).
Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
L27 Reading Guide and Homework
Reminder: Jason is presenting tomorrow.
Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief", pp. 99-103
Reading Guide
As I noted in class, Clifford's position on what it takes to believe responsibly is stronger than Aquinas'. Whereas Aquinas believed that individual believers are not required to understand the proofs for those religious truths that can be demonstrated, Clifford believed that each individual is responsible for believing only propositions for which they themselves have sufficient evidence: "No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe" (102).
Clifford begins with the story of a shipowner who believes on "insufficient evidence" that his ship is shipworthy. In the first version of the story, this has disastrous consequences for his passengers. In the 2nd version, all is well. Pay attention to Clifford's analysis of this example and the subsequent example of the islanders who made "grave accusations" against men who were perceived as heretics. Why does Clifford say in each case that the shipowner and the accusers had "no right to believe" the beliefs they acted upon?
Clifford then explains why the shipowner and the accusers can be faulted both for their actions and for their beliefs. He argues that this duty to believe nothing for which you have insufficient evidence applies to all persons. Moreover, we can still be blamed for believing what turns out to be true if we believed it on insufficient evidence.
These are strong claims. As you read, try to discern what would count for Clifford as sufficient evidence for belief.
Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief", pp. 99-103
Reading Guide
As I noted in class, Clifford's position on what it takes to believe responsibly is stronger than Aquinas'. Whereas Aquinas believed that individual believers are not required to understand the proofs for those religious truths that can be demonstrated, Clifford believed that each individual is responsible for believing only propositions for which they themselves have sufficient evidence: "No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe" (102).
Clifford begins with the story of a shipowner who believes on "insufficient evidence" that his ship is shipworthy. In the first version of the story, this has disastrous consequences for his passengers. In the 2nd version, all is well. Pay attention to Clifford's analysis of this example and the subsequent example of the islanders who made "grave accusations" against men who were perceived as heretics. Why does Clifford say in each case that the shipowner and the accusers had "no right to believe" the beliefs they acted upon?
Clifford then explains why the shipowner and the accusers can be faulted both for their actions and for their beliefs. He argues that this duty to believe nothing for which you have insufficient evidence applies to all persons. Moreover, we can still be blamed for believing what turns out to be true if we believed it on insufficient evidence.
These are strong claims. As you read, try to discern what would count for Clifford as sufficient evidence for belief.
Friday, March 26, 2010
L26 Reading Guide
Readings: Aquinas, "The Harmony of Reason and Revelation" (pp. 92-95) AND Pascal, "The Wager" (pp. 96-97)
Reminder: Laura will be presenting on Aquinas. Brennan will be presenting on Pascal.
AQUINAS
As indicated by the title of this piece, Aquinas believes that faith and reason are not ultimately at odds. As he puts it at the end of this selection, what is known by revelation cannot conflict with truths "we are naturally endowed to know" via reason, for truth does not conflict with truth. Aquinas believed that truths about God fall into 2 categories -- those that are knowable via reason and those that are known only via revelation. He gives examples of each of these in your text. Truths about God that are knowable by reason may also be believed simply on the basis of faith or revelation; basing one's belief on faith rather than demonstration is not irrational. Insisting otherwise has three "awkward effects". After identifying these awkward effects, Aquinas discusses beliefs about God that fall into the second category -- those that cannot be ascertained by human reason. Aquinas gives us 3 reasons why divine revelation of truths that cannot be known through human reason is both necessary and beneficial. He then argues that belief that is based solely on revelation (and can only be based on revelation) is not foolish. Finally, he claims that reason and revelation do not conflict.
PASCAL
Most of you are probably familiar with Pascal's Wager. This excerpt is a bit abstract, but the central idea should be clear enough. Notice that Pascal begins by assuming that we can't prove whether God exists. He also thinks that we must bet one way or the other (this is the ultimate/cosmic version of You Bet Your Life). Given these assumptions, the real question is whether it is more rational to bet that God exists or more rational to bet that God does not exist. Pascal argues that it is more rational to bet that God does exist. In fact, he seems to think that it is irrational to bet against God's existence. To make this selection less abstract, as you read, imagine the consequences for each bet ("God exists" or "God doesn't exist"): What happens if you bet correctly? What happens if you bet incorrectly?
Reminder: Laura will be presenting on Aquinas. Brennan will be presenting on Pascal.
AQUINAS
As indicated by the title of this piece, Aquinas believes that faith and reason are not ultimately at odds. As he puts it at the end of this selection, what is known by revelation cannot conflict with truths "we are naturally endowed to know" via reason, for truth does not conflict with truth. Aquinas believed that truths about God fall into 2 categories -- those that are knowable via reason and those that are known only via revelation. He gives examples of each of these in your text. Truths about God that are knowable by reason may also be believed simply on the basis of faith or revelation; basing one's belief on faith rather than demonstration is not irrational. Insisting otherwise has three "awkward effects". After identifying these awkward effects, Aquinas discusses beliefs about God that fall into the second category -- those that cannot be ascertained by human reason. Aquinas gives us 3 reasons why divine revelation of truths that cannot be known through human reason is both necessary and beneficial. He then argues that belief that is based solely on revelation (and can only be based on revelation) is not foolish. Finally, he claims that reason and revelation do not conflict.
PASCAL
Most of you are probably familiar with Pascal's Wager. This excerpt is a bit abstract, but the central idea should be clear enough. Notice that Pascal begins by assuming that we can't prove whether God exists. He also thinks that we must bet one way or the other (this is the ultimate/cosmic version of You Bet Your Life). Given these assumptions, the real question is whether it is more rational to bet that God exists or more rational to bet that God does not exist. Pascal argues that it is more rational to bet that God does exist. In fact, he seems to think that it is irrational to bet against God's existence. To make this selection less abstract, as you read, imagine the consequences for each bet ("God exists" or "God doesn't exist"): What happens if you bet correctly? What happens if you bet incorrectly?
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Reminder: no reading or homework -- movie day
I won't be able to show the film I originally scheduled (Shadowlands, the version with Debra Winger and Anthony Hopkins) because the movie is no longer being made and it was too hard to find a copy that didn't cost the earth. I, will, however, still show a film both this class and next class.
Thursday, March 11, 2010
L23 Reading Guide (Rowe)
Reading: “The Evidential Argument from Evil”, pp. 324-330 (pp. 354 & following in 3rd edition)
Reading Guide
You may remember that when we initially presented the problem of evil, I distinguished between the Logical problem of evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil. The readings we have looked at so far have focused on the logical problem of evil, i.e., the claim that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, “wholly good” God. In this article, Rowe presents a version of the Evidential Problem of Evil; he argues that even if we cannot prove that evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God, the existence of evil is evidence that God does not exist. More precisely, the existence of evil for which there seems to be “no morally sufficient reason” is evidence against the existence of God. Thus, we have “rational grounds for believing” that God does not exist.
In the introduction, Rowe lays out what he will do and distinguishes between theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “narrow sense” and theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “broad sense”. In the narrow sense, theism, atheism and agnosticism are positions regarding the existence of “a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good” (325). In this article, Rowe focuses on the narrow sense; thus, he is not at all concerned here with whether the world is utterly devoid of “divine being or divine reality”.
In section I, Rowe presents his argument from evil for atheism. He helpfully states the argument in premise-conclusion form on p. 325 (R-H column). He carefully unpacks the 2nd premise (the premise that God would not allow “intense suffering” unless He “could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”). He thinks that theists will accept premise 2. The premise theists will reject is the first premise, which states that there are evils in this world “which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (325). Although Rowe does not think anyone could prove that premise 1 is true OR false, he does think that it is reasonable to believe that there are such evils. He makes this argument on pp. 326-327.
In section II, Rowe considers how a theist might respond to the 1st premise of his argument for evil. While he recognizes that some theists might be “content” to argue that “we have no good reasons for accepting (1) as true”, he notes that the theist “is … committed to the view that (1) is false” (328). For that reason, he focuses on responses designed to show that (1) is false. At the bottom of p. 328 (L-H column), he considers one version of a direct attack on (1) – this version is similar to Hick’s theodicy. At the top of the Right Hand column, he gives two reasons why direct attacks “cannot succeed” (328). On pp. 328-329, he presents a version of an indirect attack on (1); he dubs this “the G.E. Moore shift”. You may find this a little difficult to follow in spots, but the central idea should be clear enough. The theist’s indirect attack is presented on p. 329 (left-hand column) – for those of you who have the earlier edition, just look for the passage where it says “not-3”, followed by 2, therefore, “not-1”.
In section III, Rowe distinguishes between three different responses an atheist might have to this move; he calls them “unfriendly” atheism, “indifferent” atheism, and “friendly” atheism. Rowe then defends the position of friendly atheism, i.e., the position that “some theists are rationally justified in believing that God exists” (329). His argument for friendly atheism begins from the assumption that a person can be justified in holding a false belief; this, by the way, is non-controversial in epistemology. Justification does not guarantee truth. Before considering what reasons the theist might proffer to support his belief in God, Rowe gives an example of a justified belief that is nonetheless false. He then suggests that the friendly atheist can even claim, consistent with his atheism, that modern theists, “people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science”, can be rationally justified in believing that God exists. As he himself notes, this position will not set well with many atheists, but it may nonetheless be a tenable position.
Reading Guide
You may remember that when we initially presented the problem of evil, I distinguished between the Logical problem of evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil. The readings we have looked at so far have focused on the logical problem of evil, i.e., the claim that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, “wholly good” God. In this article, Rowe presents a version of the Evidential Problem of Evil; he argues that even if we cannot prove that evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God, the existence of evil is evidence that God does not exist. More precisely, the existence of evil for which there seems to be “no morally sufficient reason” is evidence against the existence of God. Thus, we have “rational grounds for believing” that God does not exist.
In the introduction, Rowe lays out what he will do and distinguishes between theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “narrow sense” and theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “broad sense”. In the narrow sense, theism, atheism and agnosticism are positions regarding the existence of “a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good” (325). In this article, Rowe focuses on the narrow sense; thus, he is not at all concerned here with whether the world is utterly devoid of “divine being or divine reality”.
In section I, Rowe presents his argument from evil for atheism. He helpfully states the argument in premise-conclusion form on p. 325 (R-H column). He carefully unpacks the 2nd premise (the premise that God would not allow “intense suffering” unless He “could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”). He thinks that theists will accept premise 2. The premise theists will reject is the first premise, which states that there are evils in this world “which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (325). Although Rowe does not think anyone could prove that premise 1 is true OR false, he does think that it is reasonable to believe that there are such evils. He makes this argument on pp. 326-327.
In section II, Rowe considers how a theist might respond to the 1st premise of his argument for evil. While he recognizes that some theists might be “content” to argue that “we have no good reasons for accepting (1) as true”, he notes that the theist “is … committed to the view that (1) is false” (328). For that reason, he focuses on responses designed to show that (1) is false. At the bottom of p. 328 (L-H column), he considers one version of a direct attack on (1) – this version is similar to Hick’s theodicy. At the top of the Right Hand column, he gives two reasons why direct attacks “cannot succeed” (328). On pp. 328-329, he presents a version of an indirect attack on (1); he dubs this “the G.E. Moore shift”. You may find this a little difficult to follow in spots, but the central idea should be clear enough. The theist’s indirect attack is presented on p. 329 (left-hand column) – for those of you who have the earlier edition, just look for the passage where it says “not-3”, followed by 2, therefore, “not-1”.
In section III, Rowe distinguishes between three different responses an atheist might have to this move; he calls them “unfriendly” atheism, “indifferent” atheism, and “friendly” atheism. Rowe then defends the position of friendly atheism, i.e., the position that “some theists are rationally justified in believing that God exists” (329). His argument for friendly atheism begins from the assumption that a person can be justified in holding a false belief; this, by the way, is non-controversial in epistemology. Justification does not guarantee truth. Before considering what reasons the theist might proffer to support his belief in God, Rowe gives an example of a justified belief that is nonetheless false. He then suggests that the friendly atheist can even claim, consistent with his atheism, that modern theists, “people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science”, can be rationally justified in believing that God exists. As he himself notes, this position will not set well with many atheists, but it may nonetheless be a tenable position.
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
L22 Reading Guide: Adams
Reading: Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God”, pp. 333-339
Adams argues that standard solutions to the problem of evil cannot successfully deal with “horrendous evils”, i.e., “evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good on the whole” (334). The main problem with standard solutions is that their justifications of evil are “generic and global” (335, emphasis in the original). Such justifications have little or no power in the face of the concern that “God cannot be said to be good or loving to any created persons the positive meaning of whose lives He allows to be engulfed in and/or defeated by evils” (336, emphasis in the original). Moreover, Adams maintains that appealing to global, generic justifications for evil doesn’t “make the participant’s life more tolerable, more worth living for him/her” and may even make it worse (336). She considers the suggestion that we should “let the above-mentioned generic and global reasons cover divine permission of nonhorrendous evils, and find other reasons compatible with perfect goodness why even an omnipotent, omniscient God would permit horrors”(337), but rejects this as a non-starter. In her view, “we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile lives for human participants in them” (337). Even so, the Christian’s belief in an “all-wise and all-powerful God” who loves each of us is not “positively irrational” (337).
If we can’t “conceive of” reasons why God, as described on p. 337, would permit horrendous evils, then the only alternative is to “show how” God defeats these horrendous evils “within the context of the individual’s life” and “give(s) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338). But this cannot be done by appealing to reasons that are “religion-neutral” (339). Rather, it has to be done by appealing to Christian values: “it is not only legitimate, but, given horrendous evils, necessary for Christians to dip into their richer store of valuables to exhibit the consistency” of the existence of God and the existence of evil (339). In section 4.3, she explains how God could both “engulf” and defeat horrendous evils experienced or done by an individual and “giv(e) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338).
Adams argues that standard solutions to the problem of evil cannot successfully deal with “horrendous evils”, i.e., “evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good on the whole” (334). The main problem with standard solutions is that their justifications of evil are “generic and global” (335, emphasis in the original). Such justifications have little or no power in the face of the concern that “God cannot be said to be good or loving to any created persons the positive meaning of whose lives He allows to be engulfed in and/or defeated by evils” (336, emphasis in the original). Moreover, Adams maintains that appealing to global, generic justifications for evil doesn’t “make the participant’s life more tolerable, more worth living for him/her” and may even make it worse (336). She considers the suggestion that we should “let the above-mentioned generic and global reasons cover divine permission of nonhorrendous evils, and find other reasons compatible with perfect goodness why even an omnipotent, omniscient God would permit horrors”(337), but rejects this as a non-starter. In her view, “we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile lives for human participants in them” (337). Even so, the Christian’s belief in an “all-wise and all-powerful God” who loves each of us is not “positively irrational” (337).
If we can’t “conceive of” reasons why God, as described on p. 337, would permit horrendous evils, then the only alternative is to “show how” God defeats these horrendous evils “within the context of the individual’s life” and “give(s) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338). But this cannot be done by appealing to reasons that are “religion-neutral” (339). Rather, it has to be done by appealing to Christian values: “it is not only legitimate, but, given horrendous evils, necessary for Christians to dip into their richer store of valuables to exhibit the consistency” of the existence of God and the existence of evil (339). In section 4.3, she explains how God could both “engulf” and defeat horrendous evils experienced or done by an individual and “giv(e) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338).
Saturday, March 6, 2010
L21 Reading Guide (Hick)
Reading: Hick, "Soul-Making Theodicy", pp. 316-322
Hick writes very well, so this article is pretty straightforward, which is not to say that it is non-controversial. Hick's starting point is different from that of others we have read. First, Hick views Biblical stories of creation, the Fall, and the great flood, etc., as myths, not recountings of actual events. In consequence, the Augustinian defense of evil (evil as the result of the Fall)holds no appeal for him. Nor, he surmises, does it appeal to anyone who holds a scientific world view. Second, Hick accepts evolution as the right account of human origins. Third, Hick believes in universal salvation, the "culmination" of "the divine program of soul-making" (editors' abstract, p. 316). Hick, in formulating his theodicy, takes inspiration from St. Irenaeus, who distinguished stages in human development. He argues that human beings are gradually evolving from their original spiritual and moral immaturity to a state of moral and spiritual perfection; evils in this world are justified insofar as they are necessary for this evolutionary process.
On p. 316, Hick describes "the theodicy project", which starts from the assumption that "an infinite creative goodness exists ... and attempts to show that this belief is not rendered irrational by the fact of evil". On p. 317, he identifies the standards for a successful theodicy and distinguishes the Augustinian from the Irenaean approach. On pp. 318-322, he develops a theodicy in the spirit of St. Irenaeaus. "The central themes of out which this ... type of theodicy has arisen is the two-stage conception of the creation of humankind, first in the 'image' and then in the 'likeness' of God." (318) Unlike the Augustinian approach, which assumes that we were once morally and spiritually perfect and fell through sin, this approach, as Hick develops it, assumes that we have never been morally and spiritually perfect. Moreover, Hick assumes that we are getting progressively closer (though perhaps in fits and starts) to moral and spiritual perfection. Ultimately, each and every one of us will achieve perfection in the afterlife.
On p. 319, Hick raises the obvious question: Why would God have created us "as imperfect and developing creature(s)"? Why not just create us "as ... perfect being(s)" at the outset? Hick's answer is that "coming freely to know and love one's Maker" requires "an (initial) epistemic distance from God". I'll let you read the text to see what he means by epistemic distance and why He thinks such epistemic distance is in fact necessary. He then asks "why humans should not have been created at this epistemic distance from God, and yet at the same time as morally perfect beings" (319). He agrees with Mackie that a world in which we all freely choose not to sin is logically possible. Given that God could have created us as morally perfect creatures who would freely choose not to do evil, why didn't He? His answer appears on the left-hand column of p. 320. Hick then turns to the task of demonstrating that the actual world is "one of" "an immense range of possible worlds", each of which is consistent with "the general concept of spiritually and morally immature creatures developing ethically in an appropriate environment" (320). Along the way, he addresses the justification for non-moral (natural) evil and considers what the world needs to be like to "constitute an appropriate environment" for gradual moral and spiritual maturation.
Hick writes very well, so this article is pretty straightforward, which is not to say that it is non-controversial. Hick's starting point is different from that of others we have read. First, Hick views Biblical stories of creation, the Fall, and the great flood, etc., as myths, not recountings of actual events. In consequence, the Augustinian defense of evil (evil as the result of the Fall)holds no appeal for him. Nor, he surmises, does it appeal to anyone who holds a scientific world view. Second, Hick accepts evolution as the right account of human origins. Third, Hick believes in universal salvation, the "culmination" of "the divine program of soul-making" (editors' abstract, p. 316). Hick, in formulating his theodicy, takes inspiration from St. Irenaeus, who distinguished stages in human development. He argues that human beings are gradually evolving from their original spiritual and moral immaturity to a state of moral and spiritual perfection; evils in this world are justified insofar as they are necessary for this evolutionary process.
On p. 316, Hick describes "the theodicy project", which starts from the assumption that "an infinite creative goodness exists ... and attempts to show that this belief is not rendered irrational by the fact of evil". On p. 317, he identifies the standards for a successful theodicy and distinguishes the Augustinian from the Irenaean approach. On pp. 318-322, he develops a theodicy in the spirit of St. Irenaeaus. "The central themes of out which this ... type of theodicy has arisen is the two-stage conception of the creation of humankind, first in the 'image' and then in the 'likeness' of God." (318) Unlike the Augustinian approach, which assumes that we were once morally and spiritually perfect and fell through sin, this approach, as Hick develops it, assumes that we have never been morally and spiritually perfect. Moreover, Hick assumes that we are getting progressively closer (though perhaps in fits and starts) to moral and spiritual perfection. Ultimately, each and every one of us will achieve perfection in the afterlife.
On p. 319, Hick raises the obvious question: Why would God have created us "as imperfect and developing creature(s)"? Why not just create us "as ... perfect being(s)" at the outset? Hick's answer is that "coming freely to know and love one's Maker" requires "an (initial) epistemic distance from God". I'll let you read the text to see what he means by epistemic distance and why He thinks such epistemic distance is in fact necessary. He then asks "why humans should not have been created at this epistemic distance from God, and yet at the same time as morally perfect beings" (319). He agrees with Mackie that a world in which we all freely choose not to sin is logically possible. Given that God could have created us as morally perfect creatures who would freely choose not to do evil, why didn't He? His answer appears on the left-hand column of p. 320. Hick then turns to the task of demonstrating that the actual world is "one of" "an immense range of possible worlds", each of which is consistent with "the general concept of spiritually and morally immature creatures developing ethically in an appropriate environment" (320). Along the way, he addresses the justification for non-moral (natural) evil and considers what the world needs to be like to "constitute an appropriate environment" for gradual moral and spiritual maturation.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
L19 Reading Guide (Swinburne)
Reading: Swinburne, "Why God Allows Evil", pp. 95-113 (handout)
Reading Guide: Tuesday, we'll start with a brief description of the standard free will defense so that it is clear how Swinburne's position improves upon the standard free will defense. Swinburne provides a free will defense with a bit of a twist. His thesis is stated at the bottom of p. 96. One of the important twists is that he makes it really clear that it is "free and responsible choice that is so valuable, not free will narrowly defined (p.98). He stresses that responsibility and usefulness are great goods, goods that we moderns may undervalue. In explicating the position that responsibility is a great good, he distinguishes between "genuine responsibility" and "limited responsibility" (p. 99). He then compares human parents to a divine parent (i.e., God). This theme of the responsibilities and privileges of parents is important, both in his defense of moral evils and his defense of natural evils. On p. 101, Swinburne argues that "in order to have a choice between good and evil (& thereby to have genuine responsibility - RS), agents need already a certain depravity, in the sense of a system of desires for what they correctly believe to be evil". Turning to the claim that usefulness is a great good, Swinburne argues that suffering is not "a pure loss" to those who suffer. On p. 102, he claims that "being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced upon you". He then discusses how suffering makes the sufferer useful and is thus a benefit to the sufferer. On pp. 103-107, he replies to two objections to his account of moral evil. In the course of responding to the second objection, Swinburne acknowledges that the benefit of Life may not, in particular cases, be sufficent "to outweigh the suffering" (106); still, we should "recall that it is an additional benefit to the sufferer that his suffering is the means whereby the one who hurt him had the opportunity to make a significant choice between good and evil ..." (106). This, of course, will not be much comfort to the sufferer. He closes the section on moral evil by acknowledging that there are limits (and sketching those limits) to God's right to allow some to suffer for the good of others.
At the bottom of p. 107, Swinburne begins to discuss the justification of natural evils. He argues that natural evils "make it possible for humans to have" free and responsible choice and "to make available to humans specially worthwhile kinds of choices" (107). After articulating two ways in which natural evils make these "specially worthwhile kinds of choices" available, he introduces the objection that natural evils are unnecessary overkill on God's part (109). After responding to this objection, he briefly discusses whether the suffering of animals can be justified, poses a thought-experiment, and identifies his "fall-back" position.
Reading Guide: Tuesday, we'll start with a brief description of the standard free will defense so that it is clear how Swinburne's position improves upon the standard free will defense. Swinburne provides a free will defense with a bit of a twist. His thesis is stated at the bottom of p. 96. One of the important twists is that he makes it really clear that it is "free and responsible choice that is so valuable, not free will narrowly defined (p.98). He stresses that responsibility and usefulness are great goods, goods that we moderns may undervalue. In explicating the position that responsibility is a great good, he distinguishes between "genuine responsibility" and "limited responsibility" (p. 99). He then compares human parents to a divine parent (i.e., God). This theme of the responsibilities and privileges of parents is important, both in his defense of moral evils and his defense of natural evils. On p. 101, Swinburne argues that "in order to have a choice between good and evil (& thereby to have genuine responsibility - RS), agents need already a certain depravity, in the sense of a system of desires for what they correctly believe to be evil". Turning to the claim that usefulness is a great good, Swinburne argues that suffering is not "a pure loss" to those who suffer. On p. 102, he claims that "being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced upon you". He then discusses how suffering makes the sufferer useful and is thus a benefit to the sufferer. On pp. 103-107, he replies to two objections to his account of moral evil. In the course of responding to the second objection, Swinburne acknowledges that the benefit of Life may not, in particular cases, be sufficent "to outweigh the suffering" (106); still, we should "recall that it is an additional benefit to the sufferer that his suffering is the means whereby the one who hurt him had the opportunity to make a significant choice between good and evil ..." (106). This, of course, will not be much comfort to the sufferer. He closes the section on moral evil by acknowledging that there are limits (and sketching those limits) to God's right to allow some to suffer for the good of others.
At the bottom of p. 107, Swinburne begins to discuss the justification of natural evils. He argues that natural evils "make it possible for humans to have" free and responsible choice and "to make available to humans specially worthwhile kinds of choices" (107). After articulating two ways in which natural evils make these "specially worthwhile kinds of choices" available, he introduces the objection that natural evils are unnecessary overkill on God's part (109). After responding to this objection, he briefly discusses whether the suffering of animals can be justified, poses a thought-experiment, and identifies his "fall-back" position.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
L18 Reading Guide Mackie
Reading: J.L. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, pp. 288-296
Mackie was a well-respected British philosopher who was equally well known for his atheism. His book The Miracle of Theism is a tightly reasoned rejection of theism and defense of atheism. The article you are reading for Friday is an earlier piece, originally published in 1955. Mackie died in 1983.
Notice that Mackie is arguing for a very strong thesis, viz., “that religious beliefs … are positively irrational”.
Mackie, like Hume, does not explicitly include omniscience in his description of the problem of evil, but presumably a being that lacked knowledge would also lack power and thus would not be omnipotent. So, he may be implicitly assuming that God is omniscient. Mackie seems to assume that omnipotence means being able to do anything (even something that is logically impossible).
On page 289-290, Mackie distinguishes between adequate and fallacious solutions to the problem of evil. An adequate solution to the problem of evil gives up one of the assumptions that generate the problem (e.g., revising the dfn of omnipotence). Fallacious solutions “explicitly maintain all the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil” (290). Mackie then argues that 4 popular solutions to the problem of evil are fallacious.
Mackie was a well-respected British philosopher who was equally well known for his atheism. His book The Miracle of Theism is a tightly reasoned rejection of theism and defense of atheism. The article you are reading for Friday is an earlier piece, originally published in 1955. Mackie died in 1983.
Notice that Mackie is arguing for a very strong thesis, viz., “that religious beliefs … are positively irrational”.
Mackie, like Hume, does not explicitly include omniscience in his description of the problem of evil, but presumably a being that lacked knowledge would also lack power and thus would not be omnipotent. So, he may be implicitly assuming that God is omniscient. Mackie seems to assume that omnipotence means being able to do anything (even something that is logically impossible).
On page 289-290, Mackie distinguishes between adequate and fallacious solutions to the problem of evil. An adequate solution to the problem of evil gives up one of the assumptions that generate the problem (e.g., revising the dfn of omnipotence). Fallacious solutions “explicitly maintain all the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil” (290). Mackie then argues that 4 popular solutions to the problem of evil are fallacious.
Tuesday, February 23, 2010
L17 Reading Guide
Reading: Hume, "Evil Makes a Strong Case Against God's Existence", pp. 276-281
Reading Guide The editors' summary is quite good; they helpfully tell you a little bit about each character in this dialogue (Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes). The first few pages consist of a catalog of the evils of this world -- the evils suffered by human beings and by other animals are described in very striking terms. Man is not an exception to the rule that "every animal is surrounded with enemies which incessantly seek his misery and destruction" (277). Even though man can conquer his natural enemies (lions, tigers, and bears, oh my), other enemies arise to take their place. Demea lists a number of physical, psychological and social woes, concluding that "All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man, but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them (i.e., ills of life -RS) almost ... is sufficient to render life ineligible" (278). Philo chimes in at this point, asserting that the only reason we don't kill ourselves is that we're "afraid of death": "We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence" (278). He also responds to the charge that things aren't really so bad; it's only our "wretched temper" (i.e., temperament) and "delicate sensibilities" that make us miserable.
On p. 279, we have the first statement of the problem of evil (top of the page, right-hand column). Notice that omniscience is not explicitly mentioned. This is likely because omnipotence seems to imply omniscience. On p. 280, Demea proposes his solution, a solution that Cleanthes vehemently rejects. Cleanthes' own solution seems equally unsatisfactory -- insist that the evils of life are outweighed by the goods of life. Philo rejects Cleanthes' solution, but he grants it for the sake of argument. Still, even if Cleanthes is right, a revised version of the original problem rears its ugly head: How can a benevolent, all-powerful God allow ANY misery?
Finally, Philo says that even if he grants that evil is compatible with the existence of God, this doesn't help Cleanthes: "A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient". (281)
Reading Guide The editors' summary is quite good; they helpfully tell you a little bit about each character in this dialogue (Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes). The first few pages consist of a catalog of the evils of this world -- the evils suffered by human beings and by other animals are described in very striking terms. Man is not an exception to the rule that "every animal is surrounded with enemies which incessantly seek his misery and destruction" (277). Even though man can conquer his natural enemies (lions, tigers, and bears, oh my), other enemies arise to take their place. Demea lists a number of physical, psychological and social woes, concluding that "All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man, but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them (i.e., ills of life -RS) almost ... is sufficient to render life ineligible" (278). Philo chimes in at this point, asserting that the only reason we don't kill ourselves is that we're "afraid of death": "We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence" (278). He also responds to the charge that things aren't really so bad; it's only our "wretched temper" (i.e., temperament) and "delicate sensibilities" that make us miserable.
On p. 279, we have the first statement of the problem of evil (top of the page, right-hand column). Notice that omniscience is not explicitly mentioned. This is likely because omnipotence seems to imply omniscience. On p. 280, Demea proposes his solution, a solution that Cleanthes vehemently rejects. Cleanthes' own solution seems equally unsatisfactory -- insist that the evils of life are outweighed by the goods of life. Philo rejects Cleanthes' solution, but he grants it for the sake of argument. Still, even if Cleanthes is right, a revised version of the original problem rears its ugly head: How can a benevolent, all-powerful God allow ANY misery?
Finally, Philo says that even if he grants that evil is compatible with the existence of God, this doesn't help Cleanthes: "A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient". (281)
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