L39 Reading Guide: Sartre

Reading: Sartre, “Ethics without Religion”, pp. 622-629

Reading Guide: The editors give a nice overview of Sartre on p. 622. Sartre was an atheist and an existentialist. For Sartre, “existence precedes essence”; the “first principle” of existentialism is that “man is nothing else but what he makes of himself”(622). Since there is no God, there is no such thing as a “human nature” & thus man’s actions are not determined (625). Man is radically free. Even though we can no longer claim that man is “made in God’s image”, man still has “a greater dignity than inanimate objects and other living organisms. See p. 623 for the source of our dignity. A crucial early passage is on p. 623: “When we say that man chooses his own self, we mean that every one of us does likewise; but we also mean by that that in making this choice he also chooses all men”. Be aware that sometimes what Sartre means is not immediately evident; you think he means one thing, then discover a little later that he couldn’t have meant what you initially thought he meant. So, tag any claims that seem extraordinary or jump out at you and keep those in mind as you read further. On pp. 623-626, Sartre discusses the implications of man’s radical freedom – anguish, forlornness, and despair. Note that his definitions of forlornness and despair seem to have no psychological component. His discussion of anguish is more overtly psychological. Note also that in his discussion of anguish, he makes use of an idea that seems very similar to Kant’s universal law test. While we might think that anguish is paralyzing, Sartre maintains that “it is not a curtain separating us from action, but is part of action itself” (624). In the section on forlornness, Sartre discusses the implications of the recognition that God does not exist. I think this section is pretty straightforward. Note especially his discussion of the example of the young man who was struggling to decide whether to decamp to England and fight with the French Free Forces or instead to stay at home with his mother whose psychological health seemed to depend on his presence. From the bottom of p. 626 through p. 629, Sartre identifies and responds to 3 objections to his position. All 3 of these objections seem to stem from the concern that existentialism makes our choices arbitrary. In response to the objection that the basis of choice is anarchic, Sartre argues that the basis of choice is not caprice or whim; he compares making ethical choices to painting a work of art. Neither the painter nor the moral agent acts arbitrarily. Second, he agrees that there’s a sense in which “we are unable to pass judgment on others”, but maintains that there’s also a sense in which the existentialist can judge others, both epistemically and morally. Still, the kind of moral judgment that the existentialist can pass on others’ ethically significant choices is not likely to satisfy the objector. Third, he responds to the objection that “values aren’t serious” if existentialism is true. Finally, he explains the sense in which existentialism is a humanism and the sense in which it is not a humanism.

L38 Reading Guide

Reading: Aquinas, "Ethics and Natural Law", pp. 619-621. This reading consists of two excerpts from Aquinas. The first excerpt is from The Summa Theologica Question 94, Article 2. Your text has omitted a couple of paragraphs from the beginning of Q94, Article 2, but otherwise, the excerpt is intact. Please go to www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm to read Article 2 of Question 94 in its entirety. When I printed it out, it was 2 full pages. I presume that the second excerpt is also from The Summa, but I could not find the exact reference (googling key phrases didn't help, probably because this is an updated translation). It doesn't appear to be from Q94.

Reading Guide: First Excerpt: The question of Article 2 is "Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?". Aquinas begins, as is his wont, by stating 3 objections (see online text). He then indicates his own position ("On the contrary"). Finally, he begins to explain his position beginning at "I answer that". (If you're reading in your textbook, the words "I answer that" are deleted, but everything that follows those words is included in your text. However, the 3 objections and the "On the contrary" that precede "I answer that" are not included.) He invokes a distinction between practical reason and speculative or theoretical/demonstrative reason. He notes that both practical reason and speculative reason start from first principles, principles that are self-evidently true and are not subject to demonstration. Propositions (statements) may be self-evidently true in themselves, but not self-evidently true to us. (I think our earlier reading on Aquinas explained this.) Some propositions that are self-evidently true (or "self-known") are self-evident to all. Others are self-evident only to the wise. Aquinas gives examples of each of these. The first principle of speculative reason is the principle of noncontradiction, "It is not proper at once to affirm and to deny". The first principle of practical (action-guiding reason) is "The good is what all desire". From this principle, it is a short step to the first principle of natural law. I'll let you read it for yourself. Aquinas then tells us that reason helps us determine what things are goods and what things are evils (things to be avoided) -- see the text for the criteria. Having articulated the standard of goods and evils, he examines our natural inclinations, which he divides into 3 sources: inclinations we share with all substances, inclinations we "share with other animals", and inclinations that have their source in our rational and social nature. (You may recognize Aristotle's influence here.) This marks the end of Article 2.

Second Excerpt: This excerpt begins at the bottom of p. 620 in your book (right after the ...). In this excerpt, Aquinas reminds us that "every judgment of practical reason issue(s) from certain naturally known principles". He then says that although "all moral rules belong to the law of nature", they do not "all" belong to the law of nature "in the same way" (621). He divides moral rules into 3 types, based on how accessible they are. The most accessible moral rules "belong in an unqualified way to the law of nature".

L37 Reading Guide, MacIntyre

Reading: MacIntyre, Which God Ought we to Obey?, pp. 612-618

Reading Guide: The editors provide a summary of MacIntyre’s position, but not much detail. Most of you have probably encountered this question at some point: Are actions right because God commands them or does God command them because they are right? The Divine Command theorist argues that actions are right because God commands them. MacIntyre rejects the Divine Command theory, but tries to preserve some notion of the independence of God the lawgiver.

In the first section (The Nature of God’s Commands), MacIntyre begins with Freud’s “psychologically primitive version of the relation between beliefs about” morality and “beliefs about divine commands”, where the father’s commands are interpreted by the child as having divine authority. He contrasts “the God of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures” with the child’s vision of her father as god and with Jupiter. MacIntyre then considers whether it could be “right for someone to obey (the Jewish or Christian God -RS) and yet also to have justified regrets for so doing”, to be “divided in feelings and will” (613, 614). He contrasts R.M. Adams’ modified divine command theory with Occam’s unmodified divine command theory. Although MacIntyre is not a divine command theorist, he sides with Occam here: “it is logically impossible that it should be true of any action both that it is commanded by God and that it would not be wrong not to do it” (614). MacIntyre believes that both Occam and Adams have impoverished “moral theories”, theories that “are unlikely to be able to distinguish adequately between the claims to human allegiance made in the name of a variety of gods who allegedly issue commands to us” (614). After discussing what’s wrong with Adams’ view, he turns to the question of what assumption(s) we would need to add in order to “derive the conclusion ‘We ought to do what God commands’” (614). In the second section (Why Only Just Commands are Worthy of Obedience), he identifies the “crucial concept that is characteristically missing from divine command theories” (614). In the final section (How We Acquired our Understanding of a Just God), he discusses 3 historical stages of the concept of the divine; he may mean this historical story to apply only to Western civilization, for the 1st stage is recognizably that of ancient Greece. Each of the 3 stages represents “ideal types”, which I take to be his way of saying that he is not presenting his analysis of these stages or the transitions between stages as an accurate, complete historical account. I think it’s pretty clear what the difference is between a stage 1 (or “episode” 1) conception of the divine and a stage 2 conception of the divine. The stage 3 conception of the divine is of the Jewish or Christian God OR a god like the J-C God in important respects. The first paragraph of MacIntyre’s discussion of Stage 3 is quite important; this paragraph gives a good description of MacIntyre’s own position on the relationship between morality and divine commands. The last sentence of the paragraph is especially important. On p. 617, MacIntyre makes a claim that will probably seem surprising, especially if you raced through the previous paragraphs on Stage 3: “From the fact that we can at one stage in our progress towards God evaluate the divine claims, using a standard of justice acquired and elaborated independently of the knowledge of God, it does not follow that in so doing we are judging the Word of God by something external to it.” If you read Section 3 carefully (including the remaining few paragraphs), I think you’ll see why he says this.

L36 Reading Guide

Reading: Hick, “Religious Pluralism”, pp. 597-604

Reading Guide

Note: This is not a reading to try to rush through. You’ll get more out of it by reading it a bit more slowly.

The editors provide an overview of Hick’s position. Hick rejects both exclusivism and inclusivism.

Hick begins by noting that how we understand religious life affects the kinds of questions we ask about religion. From a traditional way of thinking about religion, the obvious question is “which is the true religion?” (p. 598). For Hick, however, this is not the right question, for it implies that one religion has special epistemic status; that is, one religion has dibs on the truth. On p. 599, he criticizes inclusivism, suggesting that “the old dogma (e.g., in Rahner’s case, Christianity) … has … been so emptied of content as no longer to be worth affirming”. Moreover, Hick thinks it is obvious that inclusivism is “logically” unstable (599). Rather, he thinks we should embrace pluralism. His initial definition of pluralism does not sufficiently distinguish pluralism from inclusivism, but the key difference is that for a pluralist there is no privileged access to the divine. He attributes the Christian’s unwillingness to substitute pluralism for inclusivism to “the traditional doctrine of the Incarnation, together with its protective envelope, the doctrine of the Trinity” (599). On p. 600, he outlines what he takes to be “an acceptable Christian route to religious pluralism”. Here, he contrasts “all-or-nothing Christologies” (or substance Christologies) with “degree Christologies”. He notes that these “degree Christologies” have the “unintended consequence” of removing a barrier to Christians accepting pluralism. From pp. 601-604, Hick makes it clearer what pluralism commits one to and presents considerations that he thinks support pluralism. He admits that we have no “cosmic vision” that can establish that there is one Reality that all religions are tapping into. So, the pluralist cannot KNOW that all religions are accessing ultimate reality or that there even is an ultimate reality. He also admits that “religious experience is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis”. However, if one “treat(s) one’s own form of religious experience … as an experience of transcendent divine Reality … one then has to take account of the fact that there are other great streams of religious experience” (601). Pluralism, rather than exclusivism or inclusivism, provides the best account of this diversity. On p. 602, Hick distinguishes between the Real an sich and “the Real as humanly experienced and thought”. He gives multiple examples of religions that make this distinction. He then distinguishes between religions that are personal (that appeal to a Deity or God) and religions that are non-personal (appeal to the Absolute). In large part, we can account for religious diversity by the fact that we cannot experience the Real as it is in itself, but must encounter it through the lens of our “conceptual framework”.

Reading Guide L35 -- Rahner, Dalai Lama

Reading: Rahner, “Religious Inclusivism”, pp. 588-595 & Dalai Lama, “Buddhism and Other Religions”, pp. 577-581

Note: The primary reading for next class is Rahner; the Dalai Lama piece is meant to complement the Rahner reading. The editors give a good summary of the Dalai Lama “interview” (I’m not sure it’s a real interview). The editors also give a good overview of Rahner, but I will add a few observations here.

Reading Guide to Rahner: The first few paragraphs of the Rahner are, if read too quickly, hard to understand, but the next few pages are much easier. Rahner begins by noting that Catholics (and, indeed, all Christians) can no longer ignore the fact of religious diversity. Given cross-cultural influence, the issue of how to respond to religious pluralism (the fact that there are so many different, incompatible religions) is more pressing than ever. He then discusses how Christians should respond to this fact. In the section titled First Thesis, he acknowledges that Christianity was not always “the religion which binds men to God”; he then argues that although Christianity is “the absolute and only religion for all men”, it is not the case that all men are now under an “absolute obligation” to encounter God through Christianity. He contrasts this position with the “normal” or traditional position on Christianity, which says that from the time of the Apostles, all are bound to approach God through Christ; the implication of this normal position is that anyone who does not acquire “saving faith” in Christ is condemned. Second Thesis: prior to the point where Christianity is an absolute obligation, non-Christian religions are lawful (see the text for what he means). This section of the article repays close reading. It will help to notice that Rahner is making a few important assumptions: (a) Christianity, properly understood, commits the faithful to believing that God desires that all men be saved and thus provides adequate opportunity for each to be saved; (b) if (a) is true, then that implies that Christianity cannot always and everywhere be the only way to achieve salvation; (c) religion is inherently a social phenomenon, at least as it has been and is in practice a social institution. Rahner is also making implicit assumptions about how a just God would interact with men and about the conditions of being morally responsible for having rejected God. Third Thesis: Christians should regard members of non-Christian religions as “anonymous Christians”. Nonetheless, Christians should still proselytize. Fourth Thesis: it is not presumptuous, but humble, to view non-Christian believers as “anonymous Christians”; we should not expect religious diversity to die out any time soon.

As is perhaps evident from this reading guide, the most difficult part of the reading is the Second Thesis; this is also the meatiest part of the reading.

L34 Reading Guide (Griffiths)

Reading: Griffiths, “The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines”, pp. 581-587

Reminder: Matt Reynolds is presenting tomorrow.

Recommendation: Since Griffiths refers a couple of times to pluralism, you may find it helpful to read the editors’ introduction to this section (pp. 573-576) or at least to read the description on p. 575 of pluralism. Each of the 3 philosophical articles (defending, respectively, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism), refers to at least one of the other two positions.

Reading Guide: Using examples drawn from both Christianity and Buddhism, Griffiths discusses “the five most important dimensions of religious doctrine” (582). Religious doctrines serve as community rules, determine community boundaries (who is part of the community & who isn’t), shape and are shaped by “the spiritual experience of the communities that profess them” (583), “make members” through education and evangelism, and express what the community takes to be “salvifically significant truths” (585). Given these functions or dimensions of religious doctrines, one should not expect religious communities to abandon their universalist and exclusivist claims unless one can offer them “vital and pressing reasons” for doing so. Griffiths concludes with a short section on the uniqueness of Christianity, but he could just as easily have concluded with a section on the uniqueness of Buddhism, Islam, or some other religion. Those of you who have taken Comparative Religions or have direct experience of some other religious tradition should feel free to bring up examples of doctrines within those traditions that serve one or more of the functions listed above.

L33 Reading Guide (Dawkins)

Reading: Dawkins, “Science Discredits Religion”, pp. 523-526

Optional Link (if you’re interested in seeing more about a Catholic perspective on evolution): http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05654a.htm


Reading Guide: This is a short, clear reading. Unlike Gould, Dawkins is not at all conciliatory to religious belief. After arguing that religion has no “special expertise to offer us on moral questions”, he argues that the Pope’s message on evolution itself intrudes into the domain of science. (The passage he quotes here is the passage I referred to or quoted in class last time.) He then identifies other ways in which the Catholic Church intrudes into the domain of science. Basically, he denies that religion and science inhabit separate domains - at least in practice. As you read, think about how Gould might respond to Dawkins’ claims and how Christians might respond to Dawkins.

Terminology: Some of you may be unfamiliar with the term “speciesism”. The term, as you will gather, is derogatory; those who believe that humans are importantly different from the rest of the animal kingdom and therefore deserving of special consideration are referred to as “speciesists” by animal rights activists, some evolutionists, and others who see no morally significant difference between human beings and other animals. Such critics compare those who invest species with special significance to racists and sexists. The idea here is that species does not in itself make a moral difference, any more than race or sex makes a moral difference. Two points are relevant here: (1) It is speciesist to claim for human beings special consideration that we are not willing to extend to non-human animals who, like us, have the properties that make us deserving of special consideration. (2) It is said to be speciesist to insist that human beings who no longer have the capacities that distinguish us from most of the rest of the animal kingdom be given the same protections as normal human beings; given that they are not superior to other animals, why should they be treated as if they were? (This has implications for the debate over euthanasia.)

Essay Questions for the Exam

Phil 402
Exam 2 Essay Questions


1. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Hick’s soul-making theodicy. In your discussion, briefly explain how Hick’s theodicy differs from a traditional, Augustinian theodicy. Finally, state and explain a major objection to Hick’s theodicy, indicate how he might respond to this objection, and discuss the adequacy of his response (or the response you have provided for him).

2. Describe and explain the problem of evil, then discuss Swinburne’s version of the free will defense. In your discussion, be sure to identify at least one serious objection to Swinburne’s account and take a stance on whether there is a good defense against this objection. (The good defense or response could be one Swinburne himself offers or one that is consistent with Swinburne’s overall approach.)

3. Clifford maintains that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (99). State and explain Clifford’s argument for this thesis, then identify and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of his argument. Based on your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of his argument, does Clifford’s argument establish that religious belief is “wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone”? Explain and support your answer.

Note: You may use James in your discussion, but you are not required to do so.

L30 Reading Guide (Dennett)

Reminder: Caleb is presenting on Dennett.

Reading: Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion", pp. 10-18

Reading Guide: Daniel Dennett is an American philosopher who teaches at Tufts University. He is well known for his work in cognitive science. He is also an outspoken atheist; however, he takes a more "friendly tone" towards religion than Richard Dawkins. In this excerpt from his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, Dennett takes a critical approach to religion. He focuses on presenting an account of how religion evolved. Since religion doesn't come cheap, it is worth asking why religions are so "persisten(t) and popular" (11). On p. 12, he argues that "we need to understand what makes religions work, so we can protect ourselves in an informed manner from the circumstances in which religions go haywire". On his account, our innate tendency "to attribute agency - beliefs and desires and other mental states - to anything complicated that moves" is the biological root of religion. In the section titled "Religion, The Early Days", he explains how this "hyperactive" tendency to attribute agency could account for the origins of folk religion, how/why the concept of divination became so prevalent, and the role of ritual in preserving a religion (14-16). On p. 16, he rejects the suggestion that this evolution of ritual necessarily arose deliberately: "Even elaborate and expensive rituals of public rehearsal could emerge out of earlier practices and habits without conscious design". He notes that over time, folk religions "acquired stewards", i.e., people who consciously worked to spread and protect it. They thus became "domesticated". On p. 17, he observes that there are certain features shared by domesticated memes (see the editors' summary for a good definition of memes). He concludes by considering whether religion makes us "better" in some way.

As you read, think about what's at stake for religion. Why does it matter whether Dennett is right?

L29 Reading Guide (Kierkegaard)

Reminder: Jarrod is presenting tomorrow.

Reading: Kierkegaard, "Truth is Subjectivity", pp. 111-114

Reading Guide: This is a short reading, but it is by no means easy. Don't worry if some of it escapes your grasp. Just do the best you can.
In addition to this reading guide, please read the editors' abstract (on the first page of the article).

There are multiple Latin phrases in this selection; if you don't know what they mean, I suggest that you Google them.

Kierkegaard distinguishes between a subject's (i.e., an individual person) being in the truth objectively and his being in the truth objectively. Objectively, I am in the truth so long as my belief accurately reflects facts about the world. Subjectively, I am in the truth if I am related in the proper way to something. Kierkegaard uses the example of God here: "Objectively, reflection is directed to the problem of whether this object is the true God; subjectively, reflection is directed to the question whether the individual is related to a something in such a manner that his relationship is in truth a God relationship"
(112). One and the same person cannot simultaneously be in the truth objectively and in the truth subjectively. On pp. 112 & 113, Kierkegaard uses examples to contrast being in the truth objectively with being in the truth subjectively. The position taken by Climacus (the character in this reading) is that there are advantages to being in the truth subjectively. See Climacus' brief discussion of the man "who goes up to the house of God .. with the true conception of God in his knowledge, ... but prays in a false spirit" (112). The example of Socrates' attitude toward immortality may also be helpful. Climacus suggests that being in the truth subjectively is marked by a passionate embrace of "objective uncertainty" (p. 113); he claims that this is "the highest truth attainable for an existing individual" (113). Climacus concludes with these comments: "Without risk, there is no faith. ... If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe." (114)

L28 Reading Guide

Reminder: Dave is presenting on this reading.

Reading: James, "The Will to Believe", pp. 104-110

The editors give a decent summary of this article. However, it is more complex than they indicate. The key here, though, is to pay attention to the distinction between genuine options and options that are not genuine, for James' thesis that the passions "not only lawfully may, but must" decide between two live hypotheses applies only to genuine options that "cannot ... be decided upon intellectual grounds" (105). The passions here refer to our desires and aversions (the latter include our fears).

James says that we have two epistemic duties regarding belief: "know the truth" and "avoid error" (105). He makes the important point that these are not equivalent, but express two distinct aims. Clifford takes avoiding error to be the primary aim in forming beliefs. James thinks that this is a mistake -- at least, it's a mistake when it comes to genuine options that the intellect cannot decide. James claims that Clifford is allowing a passion to determine his priorities with respect to belief. On p. 107, James begins to discuss "speculative questions". He tells us that "moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible proof" (107). He then notes that faith in other persons plays an important role in both personal relationships and social relations. On p. 108, he gives a generic definition of religion; he then argues that religion is a genuine option. On p. 109, he notes that "our religions", by which I think he refers to Western religions, "represent ... the more perfect and eternal aspect of the universe as having personal form". This makes Clifford's "veto on our active faith even more illogical" (109).

Note that James' target is not merely Clifford, but the moral skeptic, the religious skeptic, and those who take Science as the sole paradigm of rational belief.

L27 Reading Guide and Homework

Reminder: Jason is presenting tomorrow.

Reading: Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief", pp. 99-103

Reading Guide


As I noted in class, Clifford's position on what it takes to believe responsibly is stronger than Aquinas'. Whereas Aquinas believed that individual believers are not required to understand the proofs for those religious truths that can be demonstrated, Clifford believed that each individual is responsible for believing only propositions for which they themselves have sufficient evidence: "No simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe" (102).

Clifford begins with the story of a shipowner who believes on "insufficient evidence" that his ship is shipworthy. In the first version of the story, this has disastrous consequences for his passengers. In the 2nd version, all is well. Pay attention to Clifford's analysis of this example and the subsequent example of the islanders who made "grave accusations" against men who were perceived as heretics. Why does Clifford say in each case that the shipowner and the accusers had "no right to believe" the beliefs they acted upon?

Clifford then explains why the shipowner and the accusers can be faulted both for their actions and for their beliefs. He argues that this duty to believe nothing for which you have insufficient evidence applies to all persons. Moreover, we can still be blamed for believing what turns out to be true if we believed it on insufficient evidence.

These are strong claims. As you read, try to discern what would count for Clifford as sufficient evidence for belief.

L26 Reading Guide

Readings: Aquinas, "The Harmony of Reason and Revelation" (pp. 92-95) AND Pascal, "The Wager" (pp. 96-97)

Reminder: Laura will be presenting on Aquinas. Brennan will be presenting on Pascal.

AQUINAS

As indicated by the title of this piece, Aquinas believes that faith and reason are not ultimately at odds. As he puts it at the end of this selection, what is known by revelation cannot conflict with truths "we are naturally endowed to know" via reason, for truth does not conflict with truth. Aquinas believed that truths about God fall into 2 categories -- those that are knowable via reason and those that are known only via revelation. He gives examples of each of these in your text. Truths about God that are knowable by reason may also be believed simply on the basis of faith or revelation; basing one's belief on faith rather than demonstration is not irrational. Insisting otherwise has three "awkward effects". After identifying these awkward effects, Aquinas discusses beliefs about God that fall into the second category -- those that cannot be ascertained by human reason. Aquinas gives us 3 reasons why divine revelation of truths that cannot be known through human reason is both necessary and beneficial. He then argues that belief that is based solely on revelation (and can only be based on revelation) is not foolish. Finally, he claims that reason and revelation do not conflict.


PASCAL

Most of you are probably familiar with Pascal's Wager. This excerpt is a bit abstract, but the central idea should be clear enough. Notice that Pascal begins by assuming that we can't prove whether God exists. He also thinks that we must bet one way or the other (this is the ultimate/cosmic version of You Bet Your Life). Given these assumptions, the real question is whether it is more rational to bet that God exists or more rational to bet that God does not exist. Pascal argues that it is more rational to bet that God does exist. In fact, he seems to think that it is irrational to bet against God's existence. To make this selection less abstract, as you read, imagine the consequences for each bet ("God exists" or "God doesn't exist"): What happens if you bet correctly? What happens if you bet incorrectly?

Reminder: no reading or homework -- movie day

I won't be able to show the film I originally scheduled (Shadowlands, the version with Debra Winger and Anthony Hopkins) because the movie is no longer being made and it was too hard to find a copy that didn't cost the earth. I, will, however, still show a film both this class and next class.

L23 Reading Guide (Rowe)

Reading: “The Evidential Argument from Evil”, pp. 324-330 (pp. 354 & following in 3rd edition)

Reading Guide

You may remember that when we initially presented the problem of evil, I distinguished between the Logical problem of evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil. The readings we have looked at so far have focused on the logical problem of evil, i.e., the claim that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, “wholly good” God. In this article, Rowe presents a version of the Evidential Problem of Evil; he argues that even if we cannot prove that evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God, the existence of evil is evidence that God does not exist. More precisely, the existence of evil for which there seems to be “no morally sufficient reason” is evidence against the existence of God. Thus, we have “rational grounds for believing” that God does not exist.

In the introduction, Rowe lays out what he will do and distinguishes between theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “narrow sense” and theism, atheism and agnosticism in the “broad sense”. In the narrow sense, theism, atheism and agnosticism are positions regarding the existence of “a divine being that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and perfectly good” (325). In this article, Rowe focuses on the narrow sense; thus, he is not at all concerned here with whether the world is utterly devoid of “divine being or divine reality”.

In section I, Rowe presents his argument from evil for atheism. He helpfully states the argument in premise-conclusion form on p. 325 (R-H column). He carefully unpacks the 2nd premise (the premise that God would not allow “intense suffering” unless He “could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”). He thinks that theists will accept premise 2. The premise theists will reject is the first premise, which states that there are evils in this world “which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse” (325). Although Rowe does not think anyone could prove that premise 1 is true OR false, he does think that it is reasonable to believe that there are such evils. He makes this argument on pp. 326-327.

In section II, Rowe considers how a theist might respond to the 1st premise of his argument for evil. While he recognizes that some theists might be “content” to argue that “we have no good reasons for accepting (1) as true”, he notes that the theist “is … committed to the view that (1) is false” (328). For that reason, he focuses on responses designed to show that (1) is false. At the bottom of p. 328 (L-H column), he considers one version of a direct attack on (1) – this version is similar to Hick’s theodicy. At the top of the Right Hand column, he gives two reasons why direct attacks “cannot succeed” (328). On pp. 328-329, he presents a version of an indirect attack on (1); he dubs this “the G.E. Moore shift”. You may find this a little difficult to follow in spots, but the central idea should be clear enough. The theist’s indirect attack is presented on p. 329 (left-hand column) – for those of you who have the earlier edition, just look for the passage where it says “not-3”, followed by 2, therefore, “not-1”.

In section III, Rowe distinguishes between three different responses an atheist might have to this move; he calls them “unfriendly” atheism, “indifferent” atheism, and “friendly” atheism. Rowe then defends the position of friendly atheism, i.e., the position that “some theists are rationally justified in believing that God exists” (329). His argument for friendly atheism begins from the assumption that a person can be justified in holding a false belief; this, by the way, is non-controversial in epistemology. Justification does not guarantee truth. Before considering what reasons the theist might proffer to support his belief in God, Rowe gives an example of a justified belief that is nonetheless false. He then suggests that the friendly atheist can even claim, consistent with his atheism, that modern theists, “people who are aware of the usual grounds for belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science”, can be rationally justified in believing that God exists. As he himself notes, this position will not set well with many atheists, but it may nonetheless be a tenable position.

L22 Reading Guide: Adams

Reading: Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God”, pp. 333-339

Adams argues that standard solutions to the problem of evil cannot successfully deal with “horrendous evils”, i.e., “evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one’s life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good on the whole” (334). The main problem with standard solutions is that their justifications of evil are “generic and global” (335, emphasis in the original). Such justifications have little or no power in the face of the concern that “God cannot be said to be good or loving to any created persons the positive meaning of whose lives He allows to be engulfed in and/or defeated by evils” (336, emphasis in the original). Moreover, Adams maintains that appealing to global, generic justifications for evil doesn’t “make the participant’s life more tolerable, more worth living for him/her” and may even make it worse (336). She considers the suggestion that we should “let the above-mentioned generic and global reasons cover divine permission of nonhorrendous evils, and find other reasons compatible with perfect goodness why even an omnipotent, omniscient God would permit horrors”(337), but rejects this as a non-starter. In her view, “we cannot even conceive of any plausible candidate sort of reason consistent with worthwhile lives for human participants in them” (337). Even so, the Christian’s belief in an “all-wise and all-powerful God” who loves each of us is not “positively irrational” (337).

If we can’t “conceive of” reasons why God, as described on p. 337, would permit horrendous evils, then the only alternative is to “show how” God defeats these horrendous evils “within the context of the individual’s life” and “give(s) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338). But this cannot be done by appealing to reasons that are “religion-neutral” (339). Rather, it has to be done by appealing to Christian values: “it is not only legitimate, but, given horrendous evils, necessary for Christians to dip into their richer store of valuables to exhibit the consistency” of the existence of God and the existence of evil (339). In section 4.3, she explains how God could both “engulf” and defeat horrendous evils experienced or done by an individual and “giv(e) that individual a life that is a great good to him/her on the whole” (338).

L21 Reading Guide (Hick)

Reading: Hick, "Soul-Making Theodicy", pp. 316-322

Hick writes very well, so this article is pretty straightforward, which is not to say that it is non-controversial. Hick's starting point is different from that of others we have read. First, Hick views Biblical stories of creation, the Fall, and the great flood, etc., as myths, not recountings of actual events. In consequence, the Augustinian defense of evil (evil as the result of the Fall)holds no appeal for him. Nor, he surmises, does it appeal to anyone who holds a scientific world view. Second, Hick accepts evolution as the right account of human origins. Third, Hick believes in universal salvation, the "culmination" of "the divine program of soul-making" (editors' abstract, p. 316). Hick, in formulating his theodicy, takes inspiration from St. Irenaeus, who distinguished stages in human development. He argues that human beings are gradually evolving from their original spiritual and moral immaturity to a state of moral and spiritual perfection; evils in this world are justified insofar as they are necessary for this evolutionary process.

On p. 316, Hick describes "the theodicy project", which starts from the assumption that "an infinite creative goodness exists ... and attempts to show that this belief is not rendered irrational by the fact of evil". On p. 317, he identifies the standards for a successful theodicy and distinguishes the Augustinian from the Irenaean approach. On pp. 318-322, he develops a theodicy in the spirit of St. Irenaeaus. "The central themes of out which this ... type of theodicy has arisen is the two-stage conception of the creation of humankind, first in the 'image' and then in the 'likeness' of God." (318) Unlike the Augustinian approach, which assumes that we were once morally and spiritually perfect and fell through sin, this approach, as Hick develops it, assumes that we have never been morally and spiritually perfect. Moreover, Hick assumes that we are getting progressively closer (though perhaps in fits and starts) to moral and spiritual perfection. Ultimately, each and every one of us will achieve perfection in the afterlife.

On p. 319, Hick raises the obvious question: Why would God have created us "as imperfect and developing creature(s)"? Why not just create us "as ... perfect being(s)" at the outset? Hick's answer is that "coming freely to know and love one's Maker" requires "an (initial) epistemic distance from God". I'll let you read the text to see what he means by epistemic distance and why He thinks such epistemic distance is in fact necessary. He then asks "why humans should not have been created at this epistemic distance from God, and yet at the same time as morally perfect beings" (319). He agrees with Mackie that a world in which we all freely choose not to sin is logically possible. Given that God could have created us as morally perfect creatures who would freely choose not to do evil, why didn't He? His answer appears on the left-hand column of p. 320. Hick then turns to the task of demonstrating that the actual world is "one of" "an immense range of possible worlds", each of which is consistent with "the general concept of spiritually and morally immature creatures developing ethically in an appropriate environment" (320). Along the way, he addresses the justification for non-moral (natural) evil and considers what the world needs to be like to "constitute an appropriate environment" for gradual moral and spiritual maturation.

L19 Reading Guide (Swinburne)

Reading: Swinburne, "Why God Allows Evil", pp. 95-113 (handout)

Reading Guide: Tuesday, we'll start with a brief description of the standard free will defense so that it is clear how Swinburne's position improves upon the standard free will defense. Swinburne provides a free will defense with a bit of a twist. His thesis is stated at the bottom of p. 96. One of the important twists is that he makes it really clear that it is "free and responsible choice that is so valuable, not free will narrowly defined (p.98). He stresses that responsibility and usefulness are great goods, goods that we moderns may undervalue. In explicating the position that responsibility is a great good, he distinguishes between "genuine responsibility" and "limited responsibility" (p. 99). He then compares human parents to a divine parent (i.e., God). This theme of the responsibilities and privileges of parents is important, both in his defense of moral evils and his defense of natural evils. On p. 101, Swinburne argues that "in order to have a choice between good and evil (& thereby to have genuine responsibility - RS), agents need already a certain depravity, in the sense of a system of desires for what they correctly believe to be evil". Turning to the claim that usefulness is a great good, Swinburne argues that suffering is not "a pure loss" to those who suffer. On p. 102, he claims that "being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced upon you". He then discusses how suffering makes the sufferer useful and is thus a benefit to the sufferer. On pp. 103-107, he replies to two objections to his account of moral evil. In the course of responding to the second objection, Swinburne acknowledges that the benefit of Life may not, in particular cases, be sufficent "to outweigh the suffering" (106); still, we should "recall that it is an additional benefit to the sufferer that his suffering is the means whereby the one who hurt him had the opportunity to make a significant choice between good and evil ..." (106). This, of course, will not be much comfort to the sufferer. He closes the section on moral evil by acknowledging that there are limits (and sketching those limits) to God's right to allow some to suffer for the good of others.

At the bottom of p. 107, Swinburne begins to discuss the justification of natural evils. He argues that natural evils "make it possible for humans to have" free and responsible choice and "to make available to humans specially worthwhile kinds of choices" (107). After articulating two ways in which natural evils make these "specially worthwhile kinds of choices" available, he introduces the objection that natural evils are unnecessary overkill on God's part (109). After responding to this objection, he briefly discusses whether the suffering of animals can be justified, poses a thought-experiment, and identifies his "fall-back" position.

L18 Reading Guide Mackie

Reading: J.L. Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, pp. 288-296

Mackie was a well-respected British philosopher who was equally well known for his atheism. His book The Miracle of Theism is a tightly reasoned rejection of theism and defense of atheism. The article you are reading for Friday is an earlier piece, originally published in 1955. Mackie died in 1983.

Notice that Mackie is arguing for a very strong thesis, viz., “that religious beliefs … are positively irrational”.

Mackie, like Hume, does not explicitly include omniscience in his description of the problem of evil, but presumably a being that lacked knowledge would also lack power and thus would not be omnipotent. So, he may be implicitly assuming that God is omniscient. Mackie seems to assume that omnipotence means being able to do anything (even something that is logically impossible).

On page 289-290, Mackie distinguishes between adequate and fallacious solutions to the problem of evil. An adequate solution to the problem of evil gives up one of the assumptions that generate the problem (e.g., revising the dfn of omnipotence). Fallacious solutions “explicitly maintain all the constituent propositions, but implicitly reject at least one of them in the course of the argument that explains away the problem of evil” (290). Mackie then argues that 4 popular solutions to the problem of evil are fallacious.

L17 Reading Guide

Reading: Hume, "Evil Makes a Strong Case Against God's Existence", pp. 276-281

Reading Guide The editors' summary is quite good; they helpfully tell you a little bit about each character in this dialogue (Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes). The first few pages consist of a catalog of the evils of this world -- the evils suffered by human beings and by other animals are described in very striking terms. Man is not an exception to the rule that "every animal is surrounded with enemies which incessantly seek his misery and destruction" (277). Even though man can conquer his natural enemies (lions, tigers, and bears, oh my), other enemies arise to take their place. Demea lists a number of physical, psychological and social woes, concluding that "All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man, but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and any one of them (i.e., ills of life -RS) almost ... is sufficient to render life ineligible" (278). Philo chimes in at this point, asserting that the only reason we don't kill ourselves is that we're "afraid of death": "We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our existence" (278). He also responds to the charge that things aren't really so bad; it's only our "wretched temper" (i.e., temperament) and "delicate sensibilities" that make us miserable.

On p. 279, we have the first statement of the problem of evil (top of the page, right-hand column). Notice that omniscience is not explicitly mentioned. This is likely because omnipotence seems to imply omniscience. On p. 280, Demea proposes his solution, a solution that Cleanthes vehemently rejects. Cleanthes' own solution seems equally unsatisfactory -- insist that the evils of life are outweighed by the goods of life. Philo rejects Cleanthes' solution, but he grants it for the sake of argument. Still, even if Cleanthes is right, a revised version of the original problem rears its ugly head: How can a benevolent, all-powerful God allow ANY misery?
Finally, Philo says that even if he grants that evil is compatible with the existence of God, this doesn't help Cleanthes: "A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient". (281)

L16 Reading Guide, Swinburne on miracles

Reading: Swinburne, “Miracles and Historical Evidence”, pp. 455-460

Reading Guide

Swinburne seems to be defining miracles as events that cannot be explained by the laws of nature because these events are physically impossible. In contrast to Hume, he broadens the scope of evidence for miracles. The basic distinction is between historical evidence, which is divided into 3 types (testimony, our own apparent memories, physical traces), and scientific evidence (“our contemporary understanding of what things are physically impossible or improbable”, 455).

On p. 456, Swinburne articulates a basic principle and 3 subsidiary principles regarding how to weigh evidence. He takes these principles to be non-controversial, “adopted … by and large by all historical investigators” (457). In the course of discussing the first subsidiary principle, he uses a term that may be unfamiliar to some of you; ceteris paribus means “all other things equal”. His discussion of the 2nd subsidiary principle may be a bit difficult for some of you to follow, but I think the example of Smith and Jones should help you understand what he means. Basically, he’s talking about a process of making finer and finer distinctions. For example, we can lump all testimonial evidence together or we can make classifications within the category of testimony (e.g., testimony of children vs. testimony of adults, testimony of those who have a stake in the outcome vs. testimony of those who have no stake, Jones’ testimony vs. Smith’s testimony). The need to make narrower classifications is spurred by the conflict of testimony. After making these finer-grained distinctions, we then assess which class of testimony is more reliable.

Swinburne then turns to the question of whether historical or scientific evidence should take precedence when trying to determine whether a miracle has occurred. He agrees with Hume that “we should accept the historical evidence … only if the falsity of the” historical evidence “would be ‘more miraculous’, i.e., more improbable ‘than the event which he relates’” (459). However, he rejects the assumption that scientific evidence automatically takes precedence, an assumption that Antony Flew, an influential modern Humean, accepts and attributes to Hume. Flew identifies what he takes to be an important difference between historical evidence and the laws of nature, viz., that the latter can “in theory, though obviously not always in practice, be tested at any time by any person” (Flew, quoted in Swinburne, 457). Swinburne gives a plausible interpretation of why Flew takes this to be significant, but then argues that the contrast that Flew draws is incorrect. So, “Flew’s justification of his principle” – the principle that scientific evidence always outweighs historical evidence – “is mistaken” (457). But this does not establish that Flew’s principle is wrong. In the last 2+ pages of the article, Swinburne argues that Flew’s principle is wrong: “claims that some formula L is a law of nature, and claims that apparent memory, testimony, or traces of certain types are to be relied on are claims established ultimately in a similar kind of way … and will be strong or weak for the same reasons, and so neither ought to take automatic preference over the other” (457). This section is a bit technical, but I think the basic points are clear enough. Just pay attention to what the variables stand for – L = a specific law of nature, C = correlation between a specific type of (historical) evidence and the facts/the truth (basically, C specifies reliability), and E = the (alleged) event. When scientific and historical evidence conflict, we determine which takes precedence by considering (a) whether L or C is better established (see p. 458, 1st full paragraph for a statement of how a L or C is established) and (b) whether the L is universal or statistical and (c) whether the C is universal or statistical. Swinburne admits that “in general any one correlation C will be less well established than L, and since L will usually be a universal law, its evidence will in general be preferred to that of C” (459). Still, there may be exceptions to the general rule such that the historical evidence will trump the scientific evidence.

L13 Reading Guide: Hume on Miracles

Reading: Hume, “The Evidence for Miracles is Weak”, pp. 441-447

Reminder: Whitney is presenting tomorrow. Please be well prepared for class.

Reading Guide: The editors’ summary of this piece is good and the section titles are helpful. Hume’s basic line of argument is straightforward - the evidence against miracles is stronger than the evidence in favor of miracles.

Hume begins by describing the burden of proof on those who allege that miracles have occurred: “no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact, which it endeavors to establish”(441-442). He adds that even when the unlikelihood of the testimony’s being false is higher than the unlikelihood of the miracle having occurred, this is still not decisive proof that a miracle has occurred. The force of this fact is diminished by the unlikelihood of the miracle’s having occurred; so, the likelihood of a miracle having occurred is equal to the unlikelihood of the testimony’s being false MINUS the unlikelihood of the miracle having occurred. I think it is obvious that satisfying this burden of proof would be very difficult. Next, Hume articulates several reasons "why we should doubt reports of miraculous events"(442). Each of these is important. Notice that Hume sets out some stiff requirements for witnesses being reliable. In the section on our gullibility, Hume notes our willingness to set aside normal principles of reasoning in order to feed our "passion for surprise and wonder" (442). In his discussion of the counterevidence against miracles, Hume works through a couple of examples and explains why, despite the supposed evidence for the miracles, reason was on the side of the skeptics. The last paragraph of this section is especially important. On p. 445, Hume gives us, via analysis of an example - darkness covering the earth - a description of the kind of evidence that would be needed to make it reasonable to believe on the basis of testimony that a miracle has occurred. He then contrasts this example with the example of testimony that Queen Elizabeth died, was buried for a month, and then came back to life. Pay attention to his analysis of these two examples. Notice that Hume issues an important caveat here: "there may possibly be miracles .. of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony" (445). However, it is doubtful that we would ever be in the position to know that a miracle has occurred. Hume concludes by disputing the testimony of the authors of the Pentateuch (the first 5 books of the Bible).

Terminology:

prodigies = miracles

Maxim = a principle

Paper Assignment (due T16 C.O.B.)

Phil 402
Dr. Smith
Paper Assignment 1


Due Date: T16, C.O.B.

Length: 5-7 pages, typed, double-spaced, using Times New Roman, 10-12 point font

Assignment: Choose an important issue in philosophy of religion that interests you. It should be clear from your paper why this issue is important. Frame the issue or question, then defend your own answer to the question OR subject another person’s argument to critical evaluation and defend your assessment of that person’s argument. A few topic suggestions are listed below; you may choose a topic that is on the list or you may write on some other topic.

Constraints:

 You may not recycle a paper you’ve written for another class. Nor may you use this paper for a future class.

 Your paper topic should be manageable; that is, it should be possible to write a good, 5-7 page paper on this topic. Your discussion should not be superficial, repetitive, or padded with filler.

 Your topic should clearly fall within philosophy of religion. If you have any doubts about whether your topic is acceptable, please run it by me.


Point Value: 175

Documentation: Include a documentation statement at the end of your paper. If no help was received, simply type “No help of any kind was received on this paper”. If you did receive help, indicate who gave you the help and what kind or kinds of help you received. See page 2 of this document for my policy on permissible and impermissible help.

Other Specifications: The last 4 digits of your social security number should appear on the title page. Your name should not appear anywhere on your paper. This is to make sure that I do not know whose paper I am grading. Please staple your papers and number your pages.

Keep a back-up copy of your paper!!

Your paper must be submitted to my university email account.



Audience: A reasonably intelligent person who is not in this class and has not read the authors you discuss should be able to understand their views by reading your paper. You will need to define any terms that would be unfamiliar to your target audience. If an author uses a term (e.g., ‘freedom’) in a non-standard sense, be sure to indicate how the author defines the term. In addition to describing the author’s view, you will need to explain why the author takes a particular stance on an issue. It is not enough to state an author’s argument; you must also explain the reasoning in your own words. I’m looking for evidence that you understand the philosophical issue you are discussing. I’m also looking for evidence of your ability to engage in sustained philosophical analysis.


Drafts: I am happy to meet with you to discuss your paper. I am also happy to read drafts; however, to ensure that I have time to give you useful feedback, you should get the draft to me at least 2 days before the paper is due. I can probably still read it after that point, but how much feedback I can give you will depend on how many drafts have been turned in. Furthermore, if there’s some major problem with your paper, you’ll want to know this while you still have time to correct it.


Permissible Help: In addition to consulting me, you may get help from an outside reader. The Writing Center is located on the first floor of Fairchild Hall in room 1A82. It is open Monday through Friday, periods 2 to 6. They are also open from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m., Sunday through Thursday. The Writing Center keeps an online appointment schedule; you can access it by going to the Registrar’s website. Although it is best, especially during busy times of the semester, to make an appointment, the Writing Center will take walk-ins IF time permits. Your reader may check for all the hallmarks of good writing – e.g., grammatical correctness, organization, focus and clarity. Your reader may also ask substantive questions as a way of helping you express yourself more clearly and may raise objections to your thesis. However, it is decidedly not permissible for your reader to answer those substantive questions and objections he poses. Nor is it permissible for him to correct your description of a philosopher’s view. Your reader may, however, point out that your interpretation is controversial or misleading. Again, any help that you receive must be documented; in your documentation, be sure to indicate both the source of help and the kind of help you got from that source. If you have a friend read your paper, make sure your friend has high standards and is not afraid to correct you.


Suggested Topics

1. Pike argues that certain common assumptions jointly produce a conflict between God’s existence and human free will. Identify and explain (where necessary) the assumptions that produce this result. It should be clear how each of these assumptions contributes to the conflict between God’s existence and human free will. Using examples, illustrate the conflict. Then do one of the following:

- discuss Boethius’ solution, consider how Pike would respond (see the online version of his article for this, available via JSTOR), and discuss whether Pike is correct to reject Boethius’ solution

- discuss one or more possible solutions and evaluate each for their adequacy



2. Consider a specific version of the ontological argument. State and explain an objection to the ontological argument OTHER than Gaunilo’s island objection. Then, discuss how a proponent of this version of the ontological argument might or should respond to the objection. Finally, assess the damage done to the argument by the objection (you can do this by considering whether the response the proponent of the argument offers or the response you offer is adequate).



3. State and explain the moral argument for the existence of God – see either the article in your text or C.S. Lewis’ moral argument for the existence of God. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this argument and take a stance on its overall power.


Other possibilities: (a) discuss the evidence for miracles, viz., the question of whether there can ever be sufficient evidence for miracles – evidence sufficient to make the belief that a miracle has occurred rational, (b) discuss the debate between religious realists and religious non-realists (see the articles in your text), (c) State and explain Pascal’s Wager, then discuss whether Pascal is right when he claims that it is more rational to bet on God’s existing than to bet against there being a God, etc..

Essay Questions for Exam 1 (T14 -- FRIDAY)

Essay Questions for Exam 1

1. State and explain Anselm’s argument for the existence of God. In your answer, be sure to identify the strategy of the argument and explain the logic of the argument. Discuss at least two of Gaunilo’s criticisms of Anselm’s argument. Indicate which criticism you find to be most effective. For the criticism you take to be most effective, indicate how a defender of Anselm’s argument might respond. Finally, take a stance on whether that response is effective; be sure to give reasons to support your position.


2. State and explain Paley’s version of the Argument from Design. Be sure to identify and explain Paley’s strategy. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of Paley’s argument; it should be clear to the reader why a particular feature of his argument counts as a strength or weakness. For any weaknesses that you identify, discuss how Paley’s argument could be made stronger. Finally, discuss whether the new-and-improved version of Paley’s argument is successful. Be sure to support your overall assessment of the new-and-improved version of the Argument from Design.


3. State and explain the apparent conflict between God’s omniscience and human freedom. Then explain Boethius’s proposed solution. In your considered opinion, does Boethius’s solution eliminate the conflict between God’s omniscience and human freedom? Explain and support your answer.

4. Anne Minas argues that a divine being cannot forgive. Discuss how Minas argues for her position, then subject her argument to critical evaluation. Specifically, identify the parts of her argument that you believe are correct and the parts that you believe are mistaken. It should be clear to the reader why you think that parts of her argument are successful and other parts are not successful. Based on your analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of her argument, come to a reasoned conclusion regarding the overall strength of her argument.

Note: We did not discuss all aspects of Minas’ argument. For instance, we did not discuss her argument that God cannot be injured and thus cannot be wronged.
You are not responsible for this aspect of her argument on the exam. However, you may discuss this part of her argument in the essay; just make sure that you have a good understanding of this part of her article.

5. Alvin Plantinga argues that belief in God can be properly basic. Explain what it means for a belief to be basic and why Plantinga believes that belief in God can be properly basic. In order to fully explain why Plantinga believes that belief in God can be properly basic, you will need to explain why he rejects the foundationalist’s strong criteria for basicality. State and explain one major objection to Plantinga’s argument. If Plantinga provides a response to this objection, explain and evaluate the merits of his response. If Plantinga does not provide a response to this objection, consider how he might respond and evaluate the merits of that predicted response.

L12 Reading Guide: Pargetter's Response to Plantinga

Reading:

Plantinga Supplement - sent by email on Thursday

Plantinga, pp. 252-254 (the section on The Great Pumpkin Objection)

Pargetter, “Experience, Proper Basicality, and Belief in God”, pp. 256-260


Note: Your responses should focus on Pargetter’s critique.

Reading Guide to Pargetter

Pargetter compares Plantinga’s description of how many theists believe in God to the way in which Obi-Wan Kenobi believed in the Force. Pargetter helpfully gives you several examples of direct experiences that Plantinga thinks induce many religious people to believe in God.

The first section of Pargetter’s article concerns defeaters for the belief that God exists. I think the concept of a defeater is clear enough, but if you need help, the Glossary at the back of your text has an excellent definition. Pargetter considers 3 possible defeaters for the religious believer’s belief that God exists:

1. the prevalence of sophisticated atheism
2. the existence of evil
3. many people who are in the same or similar position as the religious believer who claims to have direct experience of God have never felt the presence of God

Pargetter claims that none of these facts can count as a defeater for the religious believer who claims to have experienced the presence of God. He argues that in order to determine whether belief in God is properly basic, we have to turn to a holistic evaluation of the religious believer’s system or network of beliefs (what Plantinga called the “noetic structure”). Specifically, we have to compare the religious believer’s system of beliefs to the system of beliefs he would have were he “to reject the belief that God exists” (259). On p. 260, Pargetter lists a few criteria by which to judge whether one system of beliefs is, holistically speaking, more rational than another.

L11 Reading Guide

Reading: Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology”, pp. 246-254

Plantinga is a well-respected epistemologist who has for many years taught at the University of Notre Dame. In addition to epistemology, he also specializes in metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Plantinga is also a Calvinist, writing in the Reformed tradition.

Although Plantinga has argued for the existence of God elsewhere, in this article he argues that belief in God is rational even if our belief in God is not based on other beliefs: “a person is entirely within his epistemic rights, entirely rational, in believing in God, even if he has no argument for this belief and does not believe it on the basis of other beliefs he holds”(249). Put another way, belief in God “can properly be taken as basic” (249).

The first few pages of the article consist of a discussion of the Reformed tradition. I think these pages are pretty easy to follow. The section on Foundationalism is more difficult. Plantinga opens this section by observing that the Reformers, in holding that belief in God is properly basic, are implicitly rejecting classical foundationalism. He maintains that the Reformers are correct to reject classical foundationalism.

Epistemology is the area of philosophy that focuses on questions of knowledge and justification: What is knowledge? When am I justified in believing a particular proposition to be true? How do we come to know? What kinds of processes are truth-preserving or truth-destroying? What are the limits of human knowledge?, etc.. To be justified in believing a proposition is to have sufficient conditions for believing it be true. Foundationalism is a theory of knowledge and justification. Foundationalists distinguish between basic beliefs and beliefs that are derived from basic beliefs. For foundationalists, a belief counts as knowledge (alternatively, a belief is justified) if it is either a basic belief OR is derived from a basic belief by a sound argument.

Plantinga distinguishes between weak foundationalism and strong foundationalism. Weak foundationalism is the position described above. Strong foundationalism adds criteria for determining whether a belief is basic. Classical Foundationalism is weak foundationalism coupled with VERY STRICT criteria for basic beliefs.

More explicitly, classical foundationalism is:

Weak Foundationalism (to count as an item of knowledge or to count as justified, a belief must be either basic or based on a basic belief)

PLUS

EITHER the claim that beliefs are basic only if they are “either self-evident or evident to the senses” (Aquinas)

OR the claim that beliefs are basic only if they are indubitable – cannot be doubted because they cannot be false (Descartes)


The problem with classical foundationalism, as Plantinga sees it, is that its criteria for basic beliefs are far too strong. Those of you who’ve read Descartes may remember that Descartes runs into trouble precisely because he assumes that beliefs must be indubitable or derived from indubitable beliefs if they are to count as knowledge; this leaves him with the conclusion that the only items of knowledge are things like “I (the thinker) exist” and “I seem to see a bird flying”. “I seem to see a bird flying” in no way guarantees that there is a bird flying, so it turns out that we can’t know anything about the external world (including whether there are other people like us who think, have desires, etc.). To escape this conclusion, Descartes could back away from his strong position on knowledge and weaken his criterion for basic beliefs. Instead, Descartes argues for God’s existence. If Descartes’ arguments for God’s existence fail, then we’re left with the position that we can’t know anything about the external world.

In the final section of the article, Plantinga responds to The Great Pumpkin Objection: “If belief in God is properly basic, why can’t just any belief be properly basic?”. For example, why can’t Linus’ belief in the Great Pumpkin be properly basic?

Plantinga rightly notes that rejecting classical foundationalism’s strong criteria for basic belief does not entail the absurd position that “just any belief” can “be properly basic” (253). He points out that “the modern foundationalist’s criterion for proper basicality” is “self-referentially incoherent” - it “is neither self-evident nor incorrigible”; thus, “the classical foundationalist” and the modern foundationalist cannot consistently hold that their criterion for basicality is itself basic. So, by the foundationalist’s own theory, this criterion of basicality must be deduced from basic beliefs.

Plantinga doubts that ANY criterion of basicality can be derived from a set of premises, each of which is either self-evident or incorrigible. So, any criterion or set of criteria of basicality must be arrived at via induction. After outlining how this would work, Plantinga gives a counter-example to the classical foundationalist’s criteria for basicality. Plantinga concludes that “the Reformed epistemologist can properly hold that belief in the Great Pumpkin is not properly basic” while also “hold(ing) that belief in God is properly basic “ -- “even if he has no full fledged criterion of basicality” (254).

L10 Reading Guide, Betty and Cordell

Reading: Betty and Cordell, “The Anthropic Teleological Argument”, pp. 222-230

Reading Guide: Last class, a few of you pointed out that the teleological argument becomes more powerful if it is applied at a different level, the level of explaining how evolution could have even gotten started. In this article, Betty and Cordell focus on the origins of a universe like ours; they pay special attention to the origins of intelligent life. They give 4 different arguments, but only 2 are included in your text.

The first type of argument included in your text is that from cosmology (pp. 222-226). Here, they look at 3 different theories that address the universe’s beginnings – The Big Bang, the grand unification theory and superstrings. They regard the Big Bang argument as the most “intuitive” and thus weakest because “it does not lend itself to … a probability calculus” (223). After briefly describing each of these 3 theories, they introduce the Anthropic Principle: “if the universe were in fact different in any significant way from the way it is, we wouldn’t be here to wonder why it is the way it is” (Schwartzenburg, quoted in B & C, p. 224). Had any of “the values of a few basic physical constants” been much different than they are, this would have precluded “the possibility of life evolving later” (p. 224). The probability of each of these constants simultaneously being exactly as they are is miniscule. By comparison, “the odds against a Cosmic Designer” may be significantly lower.

Betty and Cordell then consider three objections to the view that a Cosmic Designer is more probable than randomness. According to B & C, the first two objections, although not decisive, are at least “not intrinsically implausible”; the third objection, is, however, “intrinsically implausible” (226). The first objection is that our vision is too narrow; “intelligent life might have evolved out of a very different kind of universe, and not just the one we know” (225). The second objection postulates that this is but one of many universes; “given enough universes, it is not unlikely that one would come along which had the right ingredients for life” (225). B & C view the possibilities referenced by these two objections as unlikely; however, since these possibilities can’t be ruled out, they turn to what they consider to be an even more powerful argument for a Cosmic Designer, namely, the argument from Biochemical Complexity (pp. 226-229). Here, they focus on the difficulties associated with explaining “the earliest, simplest life forms on Earth” (227). Based on the work of Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, they conclude that the odds of the biochemical ingredients of life all coming together at once are infinitesimal. They also cite the failure of thousands of experiments to “simulate earth’s primitive geological condition … and atmosphere” (228). Finally, they cite the work of Sidney Fox. I’ll have to look to be sure, but I’m guessing that they cite Fox because the scientific community might dispute Thaxton’s neutrality. The last section, “What God Might Be”, is rather speculative.

L9 Reading Guide: The Teleological Argument

Reading: Paley, “The Analogical Teleological Argument” and Hume, “Critique of the Analogical Teleological Argument”, pp. 212-221.

Reading Guide
Since the teleological argument , a.k.a. the Argument from Design, is the most popular argument for God’s existence, most of you probably have a basic familiarity with the argument. I know that a few of you are also familiar with Paley’s version of the argument.

Paley starts with the simple example of a watch, but he could have used any other complex artifact as an example. He argues that if we found a watch in a meadow and examined its features, we would naturally conclude that the watch was made by a designer. The best explanation of the watch’s apparent design is that the watch is in fact the product of design. He then extends this argument to the natural world, arguing that the features of the watch that lead us to conclude that someone designed it are found to an even greater extent in nature. If these features when found in artifacts imply design, they also imply design when found in nature.

Paley goes into a lot of detail about the watch, but you will find that the details are generally important for developing or understanding the argument. Notice also that Paley separates the question of whether there is a designer from the question of the designer’s attributes.


For a reading guide to Hume, please consult the editors’ excellent summary at the beginning of the article.

L8 Reading Guide: The Cosmological Argument

Note: I misplaced my copy of the 2nd edition of our text, so I was not able to copy the Taylor article for you. Instead, I’ve substituted the Reichenbach article, which is in both the 3rd and 4th editions of the text, and is, if I remember Taylor well, more accessible.


Reading: Reichenbach, “The Cosmological Argument”, pp. 187-195 and Aquinas, “The Classical Cosmological Argument”, pp. 184-186.

We will focus on the Reichenbach article in class, especially section 6. The Aquinas is assigned primarily for background.


Reichenbach

Note: If you’re already familiar with Hume’s basic approach, then you can skip my explanation. Similarly, if you’re already familiar with the idea of a “God of the gaps”, there’s no need to read my explanation.

Since the editors provide a good summary of this article, I would recommend reading that too.

Reichenbach begins by summarizing Aquinas’ version (or one of them) of the cosmological argument, then notes that during the Enlightenment, the Principle of Sufficient Reason “gradually” replaced Aristotelian physics as the basis of the cosmological argument. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is stated on p. 188. Reichenbach endorses the moderate version of this principle. According to Reichenbach, the PSR “is not derivable from more basic principles”, but “this is not to say that the principle is unjustified” (188). Rather, the principle can be justified in two ways: (1) by considering the requirements of explanation (the “epistemological” ground) or (2) by grounding it in the nature of contingent beings (the “ontological” ground),

For those of you who are unfamiliar with Hume, two points are especially pertinent in the context of R’s discussion of Hume on p. 188. First, Hume believed that our knowledge of the world comes through ideas, which themselves are copies of impressions we receive through the senses and through reflection. Second, Hume was a skeptic with respect to causation; as a good Empiricist (knowledge comes through experience), he pointed out that we never observe causation; rather, what we observe is constant correlation and temporal order. Suppose we observe that event A always precedes event B. We then infer that A caused B, but strictly speaking, we don’t have sufficient warrant for this inference.

In sections 2 & 3, Reichenbach makes two important distinctions. The first is between a partial explanation and a full explanation; the central point here is that “theistic arguments demand that whatever exists contingently or arises contingently have a full explanation” (189). Opponents tend to reject the requirement that there be a “full” explanation. The second distinguishes scientific from personal explanations. This distinction is significant because defenders of the cosmological argument assume that personal explanations, explanations that appeal to a person’s intentions and his acting on those intentions, are legitimate explanations. However, as Reichenbach points out on p. 190, “the events in question (the things that need to be explained, e.g., the coming into being of the universe – RS) must be intrinsically and not merely accidentally, completely inexplicable by scientific or natural explanations”. He then gives a helpful example.

For those of you who are unfamiliar with the phrase God of the gaps, the basic idea is this: Historically, when a philosopher reached a point at which there was a gap between the conclusion his argument supported and the conclusion he desired to prove, he’d often plug the gap by postulating the existence of God. For instance, Descartes, having established that there is reason to doubt the existence of the external world and having presumed that we should not believe anything doubtful, finds himself in a bind. He wants to restore knowledge of the external world, but if the slightest reason for doubt means that we don’t have knowledge, there’s clearly a problem. Descartes’ solution is to postulate that clear and distinct ideas can’t be doubted because God, being a morally perfect being, is not a deceiver and thus would not create us such that even our clear and distinct ideas could be false. So, God’s existence is postulated in order to guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas; since some of our clear and distinct ideas are about the external world, Descartes has reached the conclusion he wants simply by postulating that God exists and is not a deceiver. (He does give arguments for these claims, but of his two arguments, one is viciously circular and the other is a version of the ontological argument.)


In section 6, Reichenbach gives a general statement of the cosmological argument. Pay attention to his definitions of a contingent being and a necessary being. We are contingent beings; we actually exist, but we “can not-exist”. At some point, each of us will cease to exist. A necessary being is defined as “a being which, if it exists, cannot not-exist” (191). Reichenbach explains the significance of the “if it exists” clause on p. 194, when he distinguishes logical necessity from ontological or factual necessity. From pp. 191-194, Reichenbach discusses and rebuts three objections to the cosmological argument set out on p. 191. In section 6.1, he discusses Russell’s objection that the existence of the universe doesn’t need to be explained. Russell gives two different arguments to support this objection. Since the second version is hard to evaluate given the disagreement in quantum physics about indeterminacy, focus on the first version. The second objection Reichenbach responds to is Hume’s objection that explaining each of the parts is sufficient to explain the whole; thus, if we can explain each part of the universe, we’ve explained the universe itself. This argument seems to presume that the whole is nothing over and above the sum of its parts. The third objection is that the cosmological argument “presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument” (194). In response, Reichenbach points out that the cosmological argument and the ontological argument rely on different conceptions of a necessary being. Thus, the former does not presuppose the latter. In the last section, he provides four reasons why appealing to God provides “the best or ultimate” explanation of the existence of the universe.

Aquinas

Read the editors’ summary of the article. In your reading of the article, focus on the initial argument, which is set out in paragraphs 1 and 3 (the editors omitted paragraph 2). Don’t worry too much about the details of the argument. Aquinas relies on Aristotle’s arguments for a prime mover. Unfortunately, he does not always provide Aristotle’s argument; sometimes, he just says “as it is proved in the Physics” and assumes that his audience is familiar with that part of Aristotle’s argument.

L7 Reading Guide: Anselm & Guanilo

Reading: Anselm, “The Classical Ontological Argument”, pp. 169-170 & Gaunilo, “Critique of Anselm’s Argument”, pp. 171-173.

Reading Guide
The ontological argument attempts to deduce proof of God’s existence from the very definition of “God”. Anselm’s main argument is in Ch.2. Pay close attention to his definition of God; you will note that it is a rather abstract definition.
Because his definition is expressed rather awkwardly, this can cause confusion, but if you underline the definition, that should help you keep your bearings. See the editors’ abstract for a summary of Anselm’s argument.

Anselm’s painter example contrasts two senses of “existence”: existing in the understanding and existing in reality. Anselm thinks it is clear even to “the fool” that God exists in the understanding. Although some things that exist in the understanding do not exist in reality, Anselm argues that if God exists in the understanding (i.e., if we have a concept of God), he must exist in reality. The editors’ abstract will help you understand Anselm’s argument here.

Since the editors provide an excellent summary of Gaunilo’s argument, I won’t add to it. Gaunilo is best remembered for his perfect island example, but this is not his only criticism of Anselm’s argument. By the way, in response to Gaunilo’s perfect island example, Anselm asserts that his argument applies only to God, not to anyone or anything else. However, he does not explain why the concept of God is different from all other concepts.

Reminder: presentations

Please email me a list of two or three articles you'd like to use for your presentation; be sure to rank them in order of preference.

Also, be sure that you will be in town both on the day the article is scheduled for discussion and on the previous and subsequent days (just in case we're running behind a day or running ahead).

Finally, since I may be on jury duty T0 & T11, it's best not to schedule a presentation for that day. Since we may not have caught back up by then, it's best not to schedule a presentation on Paley, either. Paley was originally scheduled for T9, but will probably be discussed T10. Plantinga, originally scheduled for T11, will most likely be discussed on T12.



Presentation Schedule (to be updated as I get more information from you)

T13 -- Whitney -- Hume, "The Evidence for Miracles is Weak" -- note: this will be
T13 only if we catch up before then; otherwise, it'll be T16

T16 (T17 if still a class behind) -- Logan -- Swinburne, "Miracles and Historical Evidence"

T26 -- Laura, Aquinas, “The Harmony of Reason and Revelation”, pp. 92-95

Brennan, Pascal, “The Wager", pp. 96-97


T27 -- Jason -- Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief"

T29 -- Jarrod -- Kierkegaard, “Truth is Subjectivity”

T30 -- Caleb -- Dennett, "An Evolutionary Account of Religion"

T33 -- Matt Rice -- Dawkins, "Science Discredits Religion"

T34 -- Matt Reynolds -- Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Religious Doctrines"

T37 -- Edward -- MacIntyre, "Which God Ought We to Obey?"

T38 -- Dan -- Aquinas, "Ethics and Natural Law"

T39 or T40 (depending on which is the Paper Writing Day) -- Katie

L6 Reading Guide -- Minas

Reading: Minas, “God and Forgiveness”

Minas argues that God cannot forgive because He is divine. If she is right, this has significant consequences for any religion that emphasizes the forgiveness God grants to us. Minas’ strategy, identified on p. 138, is to “take up various kinds of actions forgiveness is, or might be, and show that not one of them is an action that could be performed by a perfect being”. To that end, she discusses the following varieties of forgiveness:

Forgiveness as reversal of moral judgment - pp. 138-140

Forgiveness in response to special considerations – p. 140

Forgiveness as condoning offenses – pp. 140-141

Forgiveness as remitting punishment without changing your initial judgment of the offense or the offender - p. 141-144

Forgiveness as giving up resentment, which she associates with ceasing to take an injury personally, pp. 144-148

Forgiveness as the “washing away of sins”, pp. 149-150


In between discussing the last two types of forgiveness, Minas gives us a perfectly general reason why God cannot forgive -- viz., that “forgiveness … is appropriately directed only towards actions which have wronged the forgiver” (149). She wonders “how it is possible to wrong, to injure, a perfect being” (149). Setting that concern aside, she finds it disturbing, perhaps even incomprehensible, that a perfect being “could construe as primarily wrongs to himself actions which seem mainly to harm someone else” (149).

As you can gather from the page numbers above, Minas gives the most attention to two types of forgiveness – forgiveness as remitting punishment and forgiveness as giving up resentment. With regard to the former, Minas argues that if God remits punishment despite retaining his original judgment of the offense and the offender, then he is either “something of a practical joker” or unjust. Regarding forgiveness as giving up resentment, Minas identifies ways in which humans come to cease to take an injury personally. First, over time, the initial feelings may erode unless one stirs them up. But God is omnipercipient; “to be omnipercipient is to have all reactions to all situations equally vivid, regardless of when they happened” (145). Thus, God’s feelings do not grow dim over time. Second, a human being might, in order to heal a breach or to protect his psychological health, consciously work to dispel his resentment. It is only here that she makes the rather obvious point that God, a perfect being, wouldn’t take an injury personally in the first place. She also claims that a perfect being wouldn’t have allowed a breach to occur. Nor would he need to protect his psychological health.

I think you’ll find Minas’ article both provocative and thought-provoking

L4 Reading Guide God as Eternal: Boethius & Wolterstorff

Reading: Boethius, “God is Timeless”, pp. 150-152 & Wolterstorff, “God is Everlasting”, pp. 153-159


You will need to read Boethius carefully; he’s not easy to understand. Wolterstorff is, I think, significantly easier to follow.

Boethius

The editors give a pretty good summary on p. 150 of Boethius’ position. Boethius here endorses the doctrine that God is outside of time. He begins by defining eternity and then contrasts the eternal with the temporal. Temporal things “live in no more than a fleeting, transitory moment”; by contrast, an eternal being “grasps and possesses simultaneously the entire fullness of an unending life, a life which lacks nothing of the future and has lost nothing of the fleeting past” (150-151). An eternal thing is, of course, infinite, but an infinite thing is not necessarily eternal. So, even if Aristotle is right when he says that the universe is infinite, it does not follow from this that the universe is eternal.

The next key move comes at the bottom of the left-hand column on p. 151 where Boethius tells us that the nature of a being determines the contents of its knowledge. Since God is eternal, His knowledge will be eternal; as B. puts it, God’s “foresight” is “the knowledge of a never fading instant” (151). He later adds that “God sees all things in His eternal present”; hence, His “divine foreknowledge does not change” (151).

Boethius then considers the objection that if God sees something as “about to happen”, it must happen. Doesn’t God’s foreknowledge then render all human actions unfree? Boethius’s response to this objection rests on a distinction between simple necessity (necessity that is in the nature of things, e.g., man is mortal) and conditional necessity (see p. 152 for an explanation of this concept). Simple necessity is incompatible with freedom. To use B’s example, we are not free not to die. We have no control over whether we will die. By contrast, conditional necessity is compatible with freedom. For example, IF I “really know” that you will be on time this morning, then you WILL be on time. However, this kind of necessity does not “alter the nature of things”. Boethius thinks it doesn’t matter whether the knower is another human being or God Himself. The mere fact that God knows what you will do before you do it does not entail that your action is unfree. What determines whether your act is free or not is whether it is simply necessary. Another way of putting the argument is this: God’s foreknowledge implies conditional necessity, but does not imply simple necessity.

Finally, Boethius responds to the objection that it seems like “I can make Providence void” because “it is within my power to change my mind” (152). Here, I think the objector is assuming that if an act is free, then the agent could have done otherwise. If that’s the case, then it seems like the agent can, by doing something other than God foresees, negate Providence.


Wolterstorff

Wolterstorff rejects the traditional interpretation of the doctrine that God is eternal. In this selection, he argues that the God of the Bible is everlasting, “existing within time”. He supports his argument by looking at the picture of God presented by the biblical authors.

He begins by noting that God is presented as both an Agent and a Redeemer. Both of these roles imply change - not change in God’s nature, but rather “a change on God’s time-strand”. He gives 4 examples from the Bible of God as an Agent (one of these is also an example of God as Redeemer). A God that changes cannot be outside of time.

After explaining the origins of the view that God is timeless, he considers how Aquinas might interpret his 4 examples. Aquinas held that God’s actions are not temporal even though the effects of God’s actions ARE temporal. In explaining Aquinas’ view, W. distinguishes between an everlasting event and a temporal event (p. 155). He acknowledges that Aquinas and others could argue that the biblical language is misleading and could plausibly interpret these passages as being consistent with the view that God is timeless. But, he then asks whether Aquinas’s strategy can be generalized – that is, whether every act of God that appears to be temporal could be re-interpreted as eternal via Aquinas’ strategy. At the bottom of the left-hand column on p. 157, he identifies 3 types of divine actions that cannot be successfully interpreted as eternal.

Later on p. 157, W. adds that God’s role as a Planner is inconsistent with the doctrine that God is timeless. Finally, on p. 158, he explains why two key passages that appear to support the doctrine that God does not change actually do not support the doctrine that God does not change and thus cannot be used to support the doctrine that God is timeless.

L3 Reading Guide: Omniscience (Pike)

Reading: Pike, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action”, pp. 144-149

This is an excerpt from a longer article that appeared in Philosophical Review in 1965. In the longer article, Pike considers a couple of attempts to render traditional assumptions about omniscience compatible with human freedom. Here, the editors have chosen to focus on Pike’s description of the basic problem. The problem that Pike is concerned with is this: GIVEN certain assumptions about the nature of God, omniscience itself, knowledge, the limits of human power, and what is required for voluntary action, divine omniscience is incompatible with voluntary action. Thus, no human action is voluntary. The editors have given a very good summary/overview on p. 144 of Pike’s argument, so I recommend reading that before reading the article. Note: Pike is not concerned with the question of whether each of these assumptions is true; rather, he is simply taking some common assumptions and pointing out that they jointly produce the conclusion that divine omniscience is incompatible with human freedom. According to Pike, we can escape this conclusion only by rejecting one or more of the assumptions that jointly entail it.

In editing this, the editors cut out Pike’s initial explication of the doctrine of omniscience and what it entails. However, Pike’s assumptions about knowledge and about the implications of omniscience are stated on p. 147 beginning with “To conclude:”. I recommend reading this paragraph before reading the article. In this summation, Pike also explains the concept of essential omniscience. To say that God is essentially omniscient (omniscience is essential to God’s nature) is to say that God is by definition omniscient; any being who claims to be God, but is not omniscient is not God. In Pike’s formal statement of the argument on p. 146, premises 1 and 2 “make explicit the doctrine of God’s (essential) omniscience with which I am working” (146).

Things to Think About:

- Is Pike right? That is, does endorsing all of these assumptions entail that divine omniscience is incompatible with human freedom?

- Many Christians would find Pike’s conclusion that omniscience is incompatible with human freedom disturbing. Should they find this conclusion disturbing?

- Assuming that the theist wants to preserve both God’s omniscience and human freedom, how might he do this? Which, if any, of the traditional assumptions about omniscience, God, etc., should the theist reject? Note: in thinking about this, think about the implications of rejecting particular assumptions.